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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PAUL TRUNELL,

an individual,

,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VERN A FERGEL,

Defendant-Respondent.

Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Bonner County
HONORABLESTEVEVERBY
District Judge

COTTRELL
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-1292

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST

-------------_.)
COME NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his counsel undersigned, and
In

compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order makes the following disclosure concerning

exhibits for trial:
EXHIBITS:
I. The Plaintiff reserves the right to present as exhibits any and all documents or material
disclosed in response to Plaintiffs discovery requests and in the course of depositions
2.
3.

ftt#/imtm ..l4w 7'irm a.&

4.

'.!Janie!P. !JtJltlierstmt
'.1lrmt c. 7e4t1ierstmt*
J~ P. !JtJltlierston
Stuulra:/. 'Wtuc.t

5.

Stephen To Sneitfen
>1~"Unv

conducted in this matter.
Google Aerial Photo, 2008
Quitclaim deeds from l.W. Roylance Construction, Inc. to Paul Trunnell dated August 6,
2007, instrument numbers 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner County, thIdaho.
Quitclaim deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell dated February 13 , 2008,
instrument number 746201 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho.
Road Creation Documents including
a. Right of Way Deed for County Road No. 32 dated August 24, 1908.
b. Viewer's Report
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c. Field Notes of the Survey of County Road No. 32.
d. Public Road Petition Approval
6. Lund v. Silta, Bonner County District Court case #3184 (1928) Complaint and Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law
7. Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving an easement for ingress, egress
and utilities, recorded December 31 st, 1975 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as
instrument number 171685.
1
8. Right of Way Deed between Frank and Fanny Lund and Bonner County, dated June 9 \
1934 and found in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as instrument number 85319.
9. Bonner County Road List, December 2008.
10. V.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 24th, 1958
11. V.S. Fish and Wildlife Map
12. Bonneville Power Map
13. Bonner County Metsker Map
14. Affidavit of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer
15. Deposition of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer
16. Affidavit of Jacob Jeppsen
17. Affidavit of Ron Hager
18. Affidavit of Michael Creegan
19. Affidavit of Britt Ivey
20. Affidavit of Dmitry Borisov
21. Affidavit of Michael Cavanaugh
22. Affidavit of David Miller
23. Affidavit of Randy Painter
24. Affidavit of Karleen Neumann
DATED this l3 th day of April, 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM

BY:_~~~=-________
-_
-_
Stephen T. Snedden
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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'.1Jrmt C. :TetltiJerstotl*
JtTI!1rI!I P. :TetltiJerston
5Dntfra J. 'J#uc{
steplim 'T. SndIfm
J4tI<mII!P tit ""'"
113 S. S,,",ruf )4 ....

S#uufpoi,.,_ /a",",l13864
(2(8)263-6866
:r~ (208) 26.3-040()

• Licensea in
/atlfw & 'WtlSlii'W,on

PLAINTIFF'S LIST OF EXHIBITS - 2

199

CERTIFICATION

hereby certify that on the 13 th day of April, 2009, I filed the foregoing Exhibit List with the
lerk of the Bonner County Court and I hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing to the
th
efendant with hand delivery on April 14 , 2009:
onathon Cottrell
o Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

?-----Stephen T. Snedden
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TRIAL DATE: April 27, 28~?:~, ?~09p -=:: ','

CASE NO: CV-2007-1292

i'.1 f\

\)

•

TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Vema Fergel
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS)
LTR

OR

Marked

Description

NO.

A

Aerial photo "8-25-58

DOR-9V"

B

Aerial photo "8-25-58
Sec. 34

DOR-9V" area detail in S Y2

C

Aerial photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" area detail with
Fergel and Trunnell properties

D

Aerial photo, Google ©2008 Tele Atlas

E

Area map, USGS, Cabinet Quadrangle, ID-MT 1997

F

Easement Huff to United States of America, for
electric transmission line, November 2, 1950, Book
17 of Miscellaneous, Page 227, Instrument No.
36425

G

Easement Huff to Washington Water Power
Company for public utilities, recorded February 1,
1952, Book 18 of Miscellaneous, Page 193,
Instrument no. 40999

H

Right of Way deed, Huff to Bonner County for
purpose of a public highway [now named River
Road], recorded June 11, 1957, Instrument No.
61367

I

Warranty Deed Payne to Johnson, Instrument No.
171891

J

Warranty Deed, Johnson to Bethel, easement
reserved for ingress, egress and utilities, recorded
December 31, 1975,InstrumentNo.171685
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Admitted
by Slip

Offered

Admitted

Refused

Reserved
Ruling

LIST OF EXHIBITS
CASE NO: CV-2007-1292

TRIAL DATE: April 27,

TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Vema Fergel
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS)
K

Easement Antrosio to Lagerquist for maintenance,
repair and replacement of present water line,
recorded October 31, 1990, Instrument No. 382540

L

Easement Antrosio to Painter for maintenance,
repair, replacement of present water line, recorded
November 13, 1990, Instrument No. 383041

M

Agreement among Antrosio-Lagerquist-Painter
regarding maintenance of water supply, recorded
January 16, 1991, Instrument No. 385466

N

Easement to Northern Lights, Inc. for public
utilities, recorded November 22, 1991, Instrument
No. 398285

0

Warranty Deed, Antrosio to Fergel, Instrument No.
394764

P

Affidavit of Survivorship, surviving spouse Vema I.
Fergel, Instrument No. 519878

Q

Articles of Agreement, Kingston to Moore and
Neumann, May 14, 1958, Instrument No. 90431

R

Assignment of Contract Moore to Neumann, May
17, 1963, Instrument No. 90432

S

Warranty Deed, Kingston to Moore and Neumann,
May 14,1958, recorded April 20, 1978, Instrument
No. 199__ , Bk 173 of Deeds, Pg 479

T

Trust Agreement, The Neumann Family Trust, July
19, 1990,Instrument No. 378067

U

Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karleen
Neumann Instrument No. 565709
-2-
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LIST OF EXHIBITS
TRlAL DATE: April 27, 28',G~,!\~009)

CASE NO: CV-2007-1292

TITLE OF CASE: Paul Trunnell and Bill Lomu vs. Vema Fergel
SUBMITTING ATTORNEY/PARTY: Jonathan W. Cottrell
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS (LETTERS)

V

Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et
ux. Instrument No. 582371'

W

Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et
ux. Instrument No. 582373

X

Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Kathy Neumann
et ux. Instrument No. 582372
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JONATHAN W. COTTRELL, Chartered
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

(208) 263-7534
(208) 265-9226 Fax
ISB NO. 1353

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL and
BILL LOMU,

Case No. CV-2007-1292
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF

Plaintiffs,
vs.
VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant.
CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to an easement to construct and
maintain a road over Defendant's property. Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to such
an easement on either of two grounds. First, they contend that in 1908 a public county
road was created over the Defendant property and that such road has not been abandoned.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that they are the holders of an easement by prescriptive use
continued for five years or more.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF
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Defendant denies that there is an easement, either public or private, in favor
of Plaintiffs. Defendant also contends that if a public easement ever existed for the
alleged road, this has been abandoned and ceased to exist by operation of law. Defendant
also asserts that any claim of Plaintiffs is barred by the statutes of limitations, including
but not limited to Idaho Code §5-203.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1991, Vema Fergel and her now deceased husband purchased a parcel of
approximately 20 acres in Section 34, Township 55 North, Range 3 East. The Fergel
parcel was originally part of a larger property owned by one Karl Johnson. At the time of
F ergel 's purchase, the property was fenced, but otherwise unimproved except for a
primitive driveway which ran to a farm stead, a part of the former Karl Johnson
ownership, lying west of the Fergel property. After purchasing the property Fergel and
her husband moved a mobile home onto the property and made it their home. Continuing
from then to the present, the property has been used to pasture horses and has been kept
fenced for that purpose.
In 2007 and 2008, Paul Trunnell received quitclaims from J. W. Roylance
Construction, Inc., and Kathy Neumann, respectively to the SW Y4 SW Y4 of Section 34,
which is south and west of the Fergel property, together with land in Section 3, which is
south of Section 34. The Trunnell parcels are parts of what formerly was a single farm.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF
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Until 1958 this farm was owned by Charles Kingston. The Kingston farm lay across the
south half of the southwest quarter of Section 34 and parts of several other sections of
land to the east and south of Section 34. It was accessed at its east end by means of roads
coming in through Montana. On the west, it was accessed via a Bonner County road
known as Painter Road. To get from one end of the farm to the other involved either a
trip through Montana or going cross-country through the fields of the farm itself. In
1958, George and Lois Moore and Louis and Jean Neumann bought the farm from
Kingston. [Articles of Agreement, Ex. Q] Moores and Neumanns farmed together until
1968 when Moores sold their share to Neumanns. [Assignment of Contract, Ex. R] The
Kingston-Moore-Neumann farm continued as a single ownership until after Louis and
Jean Neumann died.

In 2000 and 2001, it was divided up among Neumann's heirs.

[Deeds of Distribution, Exs. U, V, W, X]
There is no evidence that the Fergel and Trunnell properties were at any
time part of a common ownership.
The Fergel property is bounded on the east by the north-south centerline of
Section 34. The Trunnell property is bounded on the west by the north-south centerline.
The two properties meet only at a common comer. To

visualize

the

situation,

see

Attachment A, on which the Fergel parcel is shown in blue and Trunnell is shown in
yellow. Two county roads, neither of which is in dispute, "Painter Road" and "River
Road," are included in the illustration for reference.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF
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The allegation that a county road crosses the Fergel property is based upon
Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, a fragmentary and somewhat hieroglyphic collection of papers
which have been obtained and stored by the Bonner County Assessor. If admissible at all,
and if carefully examined and read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs claim, these
papers bearing various dates during the period July, 1908 to October, 1930, appear to
show that:
(a) On July 23, 1908, a group of individuals, "inhabitants of road district
No. 23," signed a petition addressed to the county commissioners of Bonner
County, praying "that a public road be established in said county, fifty feet in
width." The petition then describes the proposed general route of the road as
running from the "intersection of County Road at Cabinet Hill" southeast through
Sections 27 and 34 to the north-south centerline of Section 34, then south along the
centerline "to quarter post of Sec. 34," and then east "to quarter post of Sec. 3
Town. 55 N ofR 3 E." From this description, it appears that if the county had in
fact built the road as requested, its course would have crossed the east 25 feet of
the Fergel property, the west 25 feet of the Trunnell property, as well as other
properties lying within 25 feet on either side of the north-south centerline of
Section 34.
(b) The petition asserts that four individuals (plus a non-petitioner Northern
Pacific Rail Road Co.) would consent to opening of the road. But one person,

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF
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"M. E. Mulvihill" would go along only if the right of way was limited to a width of
32 feet.
(c) On August 4th or 7th 1908, this petition was filed with the clerk.
(d) Dated August 4, 1908, four individuals executed a bond to Bonner
County to "pay all the costs of viewing and surveying said road in case the prayer
of said petitioners is not granted and the road finally opened,

* * * [text illegible]

* * * otherwise to remain in full force and effect."
(e) On August 24, 1908, a page titled Right-of-Way Deed for County Road
to "County of Kootenai" appears to have been signed by four individuals, whose
names are indiscernible. I By its terms the Deed states that these individuals will
"release all claims to damages sustained by them by reason of the laying out and
opening of said road through their lands." This "deed" is not acknowledged and
was never recorded.
(f) What appears to be a copy of commissioner's minutes state that on

August 24, 1908, the Bonner County commissioners met, that they approved "said
petition with road bond accompanying same," and that three persons, the County
Surveyor and two other individuals, "were appointed as viewers, to view out and
survey said road, and make their report to this Board."

1

Bonner County had been formed in March 1907. See Compiler's Note following
I.e. §31-111.

DEFENDANT'S TRlAL BRlEF

5

208

(g) The papers include a "Viewers' Report." This report states that Gus
Johnson, Charles Senft and F. L. Churchill "have consented in writing to give the
right-of-way for said road over lands owned by them," but that Mike Mulvihill,
apparently still not on board with the other petitioners, was demanding to be paid
$150 for right of way over ~is property. The Viewers' Report concludes by stating
that opening the road would cost an estimated $375, plus an additional $50 for "all
bridges that may be needed on said road."
(h) The Viewers' Report is marked as "approved" by the County
Commissioners, with a date of January 17, 1910.
(i)

Exhibit 5 also includes a sheet [the first page of Exhibit 5] titled

"Engineer's Report." This is unsigned, undated, and all of the spaces provided on
it for information are blank, except for the road number which refers to the
proposed road as "Road No. 32." Although all of the remainder of the petition and
the viewer's report is handwritten and the proposed road was to have been built
across three Sections 27, 34, and 3, this sheet contains a typewritten entry, upside
down to the printed text, referring to a road in a more limited area: "ROAD #32
Section 34, Township 55N Range 3E."

U) Nothing in the papers collected

In

Exhibit H indicates that after

approving the viewer's report, the county took any further action, either to acquire
the necessary right of way or to build the proposed road.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF
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(k) By stamps and notations on one page in Exhibit 5, it appears that on
October 21, 1930, some or all of these papers were offered in evidence as an
exhibit in Bonner County civil case no. 3184, perhaps in an attempt to establish a
public right of way. According to the notations on this sheet, whatever else may
have been admitted as part of this exhibit, admission of the "paper headed 'Right
of Way Deed' ," was refused.

If the county ever acquired any part of the right of way along the proposed
road, nothing has ever been recorded, at least for such part of the route as would have
crossed what is now the Fergel property.

The only public easement ever recorded over

the Fergel parcel was granted to Bonner County in 1957. [Exhibit H]. This easement lies
along the north boundary of the property, for the east-west county road now known as
River Road. Other easements have been granted or reserved over the Fergel property, but
these are for electric utilities [Exhibits F, G and N], for private access to certain parts of
the southwest quarter of the Section [Exhibit J], and to maintain an underground water
pipeline [Exhibits K, L, M].
Moreover, there is no evidence that Bonner County ever built or maintained
the proposed road. The county road office has no record of either the existence of the
alleged road or ever having spent money or other resources on it.
A privately maintained access road, Lone Cedar Lane, runs for a short
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distance across property which lies north of the Fergel parcel and north of River Road.
Except for that road and Fergel's own culvert and cattle guard where her driveway comes
off of River Road, there is no roadbed, ditch, bridge, culvert, other man-made road
structure, or even a vestige of any former feature of this kind along the north-south
centerline. There is nothing of the kind, either on the Fergel parcel, on the Trunnell
property, or on any of the other properties lying south of River Road.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PUBLIC ROAD
Plaintiff Trunnell alleges that a county road was established in 1908,
running north-south over Fergel's property and that this road has not been abandoned.
Before looking at whether the alleged road was abandoned, it is necessary to determine
whether it was ever established. The burden of establishing the existence of a public road
is on the person who alleges it. Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35,225 P. 1021 (1924).
Idaho statutes provide three means by which a county may establish a
public road: (1) by "laying out and recording" the road pursuant to order of the Board of
Commissioners; (2) by public use of a road for five years or more, coupled with work
and upkeep at public expense over that period; or (3) by use as a public road for five years
or more over a route which is "located and recorded" pursuant to an order of the Board of
Commissioners.
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Idaho Code §40-109(5) provides that:
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of a Board of
Commissioners, and all roads used as such for period of five (5) years,
provided that they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the
public, or located and recorded by order of a Board of Commissioners, are
highways"
And Idaho Code §40-202 requires that:
"(2) If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real property for
highway or public right-of-way purposes, the respective commissioners
shall:
"(a) Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or other
document establishing an interest in the property for their highway
system purposes to be recorded in the county records; or
"(b) Cause the official map of the county or highway district system
to be amended as affected by the acceptance of the highway or
public right-of-way.

***
"(3) Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2)
of this section, by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used
for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and
kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a
board of commissioners, are highways."

These statutes, though recodified a number of times over the years, have
remained essentially unchanged since 1893. Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P.
780 (1908); Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 261 P.2d 815 (1953); Tomchak v. Walker,
108 Idaho 446,700 P.2d 68 (1985); Burrup v. Stanger, 114 Idaho 50,753 P.2d 261 (Ct.
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App. 1988); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205,998 P.2d 1118 (2000).
Each method of establishing a public road has its own requirements. In two
respects the requirements of the first and third methods are the same. The provision that
the route be "laid out" under the first method and that it be "located" under the third
require a survey to be done. Meservey v. Gulliford, supra, 14 Idaho at 141, 93 P. at 782;

Burrup v. Stanger, 114 Idaho at 52, 753 P.2d at 263. The papers comprising Exhibit 5
leave substantial doubt that the proposed route was surveyed, or if any survey was ever
made that it was done at the instance of the county. As noted in the Statement of Facts
above, the last known action of the county commissioners was to approve the Viewer's
Report. The Viewer's Report describes the line of the proposed right of way, not in
surveyed courses and distances, but in the same general terms as was used in the original
petition.

And the Engineer's Report where the report of survey work should have

appeared was never signed or even filled in.
Both the first and third method also require that the establishment of the
road be "recorded." Since Idaho Territory was formed in 1864, the office of the county
recorder is where all instruments and other documents affecting an interest in land are to
be recorded. Idaho Code §31-2402. This includes conveyances and orders by which
public road rights of way are created. John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 129
Idaho 740 at 744; 932 P.2d 368 at 372 (Ct. App. 1997); Kosanke v. Kopp, supra, 74
Idaho at 305, 261 P.2d at 816; Kootenai County v. Kinman, 56 Idaho 1 at 3, 47 P.2d

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF

10

213

887 at 888 (1935).
All three methods of establishing a public road right of way also require a
third thing: getting public ownership of either the land or an easement over the land
where the road is to be.

Under each method, the means by which a public right is to be

obtained is different.
The first method, describe simply in the statute as "laid out and recorded by
order of the board" obviously requires something more than just a survey and a
commissioners' order. The county could not have acquired a right of way over private
property by mere fiat. C & G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 75
P.2d 194 (2003). Idaho law has always required either a voluntary conveyance of title or
a taking under the power of eminent domain for which just compensation is paid. Idaho

Constitution, Art. I, §14.

A conveyance requires a deed or other grant. Idaho Code

§55-601. The exercise or eminent domain requires a court action. Idaho Code §7-701 et
seq.
As discussed above, the first method requires that the action by which the
road is established be recorded. Both voluntary conveyances (Idaho Code §8-801) and
judgments affecting title to land (Idaho Code §8-802) are to be recorded with the county
recorder. Idaho Code §31-2402. The evidence does not show any recording of a grant
or a taking by eminent domain of the claimed public easement urged by Trunnell.
The second and third methods provide the means of acquiring a right of way
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by prescriptive use. Although it does not appear from the Second Amended Complaint
that Trunnell claims that the prescriptive acts alleged in Count II gave rise to a public
easement, a discussion of the legal requirements of this may be appropriate.
Under the second method mentioned above, creation of a public easement
by prescriptive use does not require an act of recording. Kosanke v. Kopp, supra, 74
Idaho at 304, 261 P.2d at 816. What it does require is proof of both public use of a road
for five years or more and that it has been worked and kept up at public expense during
that same period. Id, 74 Idaho at 305,261 P.2d at 817. As summarized in Burrup v.
Stanger 114 Idaho 50,753 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1988), proof of the creation of a public
easement by prescription alone requires that:
"A sufficient showing of public use under the statute must
demonstrate the following. The public's use of the road must have
been more than only casual and desultory. Kirk v. Shultz, 63 Idaho
278, 119 266 (1941). One or more public agencies must have
regularly maintained the road and the public must have used the road
for a period of five years. Pugmire v. Johnson, supra; State v.
Nesbitt, supra. It must be shown that the public agency's
maintenance of the road was performed at necessary times and
places. It is not required that the road be worked on for five
consecutive years, nor does the statute require work to be done
throughout the road's entire length. State v. Nesbitt, supra. Thus, the
facts should show that the public has used the road regularly, as it
would any similar public highway, and that public funds were used
to maintain the road for a five-year period; the maintenance being
more than occasional or sporadic, but as was necessary."
114 Idaho at 53; 753 P.2d at 264.
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There is no evidence that the alleged public road was ever "worked and
kept up at public expense." According to Plaintiff s Exhibit 5, as of 1908-1910 to put the
road in the first place would have required constructing one or more bridges, plus the
expenditure of additional funds for other construction. There is no evidence that this was
ever done, and certainly not over a period of five years or more. There is no evidence that
if the county ever did even one minute's work or spent one cent on any part of the alleged
road any of this ever touched the Fergel property. Absent work at public expense over a
period five years, no amount of use by travelers, whether on foot, by horse, wagon or
motor vehicle, and whether deemed public or private, and whether regular or "only casual
and desultory," would give rise to a public easement. French v. Sorenson, 113 Idaho
905,751 P.2d 98 (1988).
For the reasons already discussed above, the third method to establish a
public road, public use for five years followed by location and recording by the county
commissioners, also fails. There is no evidence of public use for five years or more prior
to either 1908 or 1910. The very fact that the 1908 petitioners would ask the county to
"open" a road and state in their petition the need to obtain right of way from dissenting
owners along the route is itself evidence that an the road did not yet exist, or that if it did
it was private and had not yet come into public use. If there was no road in already in
existence by prior use, it is no surprise that the county commissioners were not requested
to and never did record anything purporting to "locate" one.
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ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC ROAD
In addition to alleging that a public road was established in 1908-1910,
Plaintiff alleges that it was not thereafter abandoned.

In order for there to be an

abandonment, the alleged public road must first have been established. Burrup v.

Stanger, 114 Idaho 50, 753P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1988).
For much the same reasons as discussed above under the heading
concerning establishment of a public road, i.e. lack of work and upkeep at public expense,
subsequent abandonment of any such road is presumed to have occurred by operation of
law. The statutes applicable to this part of the discussion are those which were in effect
prior to 1985. Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, entered herein June 3,
2008. From that date onward, abandonment would have required affirmative action by
the board of county commissioners.
An informative history of the statutes applicable to these facts is contained
in the decision in Boise City By and Through Amyx v. Fails, 94 Idaho 840; 499 P.2d
326. As discussed there, in 1887 the 14th Session of the Territorial Legislative Assembly
adopted the Revised Statutes as a comprehensive body of legislation. Provisions of that
act pertinent to the issues in this case were R.S. §850, §851 and §852 which provided as
follows:
"Section 850. Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laid out
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or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or
abandoned to the public.
"Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the
Board of Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five
years, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll bridge or a
turnpike, plank or common wagon road is dissolved, or discontinues the
road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge or road becomes a
highway.
"Section 852. A road not worked or used for the period of five years ceases
to be a highway for any purpose whatever."

§851 was amended by S.L.1893, Sec. 1, to read as follows:
"Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the
board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five
years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the expense
of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a to11bridge, or a turnpike, plank, or common wagon road is dissolved or
discontinues the road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge or
road becomes a highway."
Sections 851 and 852 were each thereafter reenacted and recodified
a number of times, RS §851 with becoming IC §40-103 and RS §852 becoming IC
§41-104.

2

Until 1963, IC §40-104, was worded as originally enacted in 1897:

"I.C. §40-104.-Abandonment of highways.-A road not worked or used for
the period of five years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever."
In 1963, the statute was amended to limit its scope to roads established by prescription:
2

See Compiler's notes found under current IC §40-103 in Idaho Code (Michie), Titles 39-40

Vol. at p. 249.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF

15

218

"I.C. §40-104-Abandonment of Highways.-A road established by
prescription and not worked or used for the period of five years ceases to be
a highway for any purpose whatever." S.L.1963, Ch. 6, p. 17
The language of §40-103 and §40-104 remained unchanged thereafter until
1985 when were both sections were repealed and replaced by the current statutes which
require affirmative action by the Board of Commissioners for abandonment of a county
road. S.L. 1985, Ch 253.
If the statutory requirements for establishment of a public road were never
met, the road never came into existence, so that the issue of whether it was later
abandoned would not arise. Similarly, but effectively in reverse, if a county road once
existed but thereafter there was not maintained and used for five years or more the road
ceased to be a road "for any purpose whatever." However, unlike the establishment of a
road which required affirmative action of the board of commissioners, abandonment
through neglect under the former statutes were entirely self-operating. No formal action
by any public agency was required. Once abandonment has occurred, that has final and
permanent effect. Subsequent amendments to the county road laws do not operate to
change the effect of past events which occurred when the fonner statutes were in effect.

Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356, 613 P.2d 367 (1980); John Brown
Properties v. Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171,59 P.3d 976 (2002).
Abandonment occurs when during any five year period there was both no
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maintenance and no public use. In this case, there is no record of the county ever having
maintained a road. Witnesses with knowledge going back to at least the early 1950s
concur that the county has never constructed or maintained any north-south road across
the Fergel property, the Trunnell property or over any adjoining property.
Once lack of maintenance is shown, in order to avoid abandonment it must
be shown that there has been no period of five years or more over which public use was
also discontinued. Public use need not have been for any particular purposed or by a
particular number of persons. But it must be upon what was previously established as a
public road, Taggart v. Highway Board for North Latah County, 115 Idaho 816, 771
P .2d 37 (1989). And, at a minimum, it must have been "regular" and "continuous."

Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 134 Idaho 576 at 580, 6 P.3d 826 at 830 (2000);
Taggart v. Highway Bd., 115 Idaho at 818, 771 P.2d at 39.

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
As a separate claim, Trunnell alleges that he and/or predecessors in title to
his property have made prescriptive use of the Fergel property. This allegation of the
complaint is in purely notice pleading terms, so that the circumstances through upon
which Trunnell proposes to establish a prescriptive right are not alleged with any
particularity .
The circumstances necessary to establish an easement by prescription are:
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(1) an open and notorious use of the servient property by the claiming party; (2) done with
the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient property; (3) that the use be
continued for a period of five years without interruption or interference; and (4) that the
use be done under a claim of right. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 563 P.2d 50
(1977). The burden is upon Moore to establish each of these elements by "clear and
convincing" evidence. Marshall v. Blair, l30 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 975 (1997).
To be a prescriptive, a use must be exclusive, not a use made by others or a
use made in common with others. Carbon v. Moon, 68 Idaho 385, 195 P.2d 351 (1948);

State ex rei. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979; State v. Camp, l34
Idaho 662, 8 P.3d 657 (et. App. 2000). For example, the use of a way in common with
the owner and the general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part
indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption of
individual right therein in his favor. Simmons v. Perkins, 118 P.2d 740, 63 Idaho l36
(1941).
The use upon which an easement by prescription is based must be so open,
conspicuous and continuous as to alert the owner whose property is being used. A use
which is random, sporadic, periodic, or inconsistent in frequency does not support a claim
of prescriptive easement. Carbon v. Moon, 68 Idaho 385, 195 P.2d 351(1948); Anderson

v. Larson, 136 Idaho 402,34 P.3d 1085(2001).
The elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement are framed
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around a requirement that the use upon which the prescriptive right is based must be such as
to clearly "bring home" to the owner of the property claimed to be servient that an adverse
claim is being made. Tremayne

lI.

Taylor, 101 Idaho 792, 621 P.2d 408(1980). Thus, the

burden to establish these elements is by "clear and convincing" evidence. Marshall v.

Blair, 130 Idaho 675,946 P.2d 975 (1997).
Prescriptive use may not be established by use which is permissive. Once
there is permissive use, the use continues to be presumed permissive unless there is
unequivocal conduct which gives the servient estate owner notice of hostile and adverse
use. Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148 at 152,953 P.2d 588 at 592 (1998).
Dated this

~ay of April, 2009.

Attorney for Defendant
I certify that on the /}O day of April, 2009, a true copy ofthe foregoing
has been hand delivered to Stephen T. Snedden, Attorney at Law, Featherston Law Firm,
Chtd., 113 S. Second Avenue, Sandpoint, ID 83864.

DEFENDANT'S TRIAL BRIEF

19

222

::.:;:;==== ~ ==:::;=:=:::".,1======"

"~\

\\

-====:::::.!::=

.:===.::

•

II

II
J":~

~

;:==~

\\

\\
II

,

~,
,

"_!
•

'1

t,

i\

,

,;

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Brent C. Featherston, ISB No. 4602
Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Tel: (208) 263-6866
Fax: (208) 263-0400
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.

VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-1292
PLAINTIFF'S PRE-TRIAL
BRIEF

----------------------------------)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent
Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the
following pre-trial brief:

I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a dispute over use of a road. The road crosses one parcel of private property. It
provides the only access to another parcel of private property. To summarize Plaintiff s
JCdimtm .£4w !firm cfIIIi
'!lani6 'P. :Tutlierston
1Irmt C. :TutJiuston*
Jeremy 'P. :Tl!lltlierston
Stm4ra.7. 'J#uc.{
Suplim'T. sneUm

arguments, the road is either a public road or alternatively, Plaintiff has obtained a
prescriptive easement for use.
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Trunnell is the owner of three parcels of real property near Clark Fork, Idaho. There are
no improvements on these parcels. All three parcels have historically used access across the
Defendant's adjoining parcel, the property owned by Ms. Fergel. Ms. Fergel purchased the
property with her husband in 1991. After her husband's death, Ms. Fergel took title solely.
The access across Defendant's property is currently the only road to Mr. Trunnell's
properties. In addition, the road provides access to another adjoining landowner, Mr. Randy
Painter.

In 1908, ten landowners in the area petitioned Bonner County for a public road. As the road
crossed three private properties, several landowners agreed to relinquish their interests in the
properties for a public road. This road was accepted after a survey and viewer's report in
1908.

Subsequently the road was constructed and improved through great cost to Bonner County.
From previous litigation between landowners in the area, it appears that Bonner County
th

Road No. 32 was used and maintained regularly in the early part of the 20 century.

An aerial photo from 1958 shows a road across the Defendant's property. In addition,
previous owners of the Trunnell property speak about using County Road No. 32 prior to
~DJn .Law !firm cf*.
'Daniel P. 7tJJt/rerstQn
'Brent C. 7ut/rerstQn*
7tJJt/rerston

1963. Plaintiffs intend to prove based on this evidence that County Road No. 32 has been
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regularly used through 1963. In all proceedings to date, Defendants have not rebutted this
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claim through any evidence of non-use or non-maintenance prior to 1963. In denying
Defendant's previous motion for summary judgment, this court ruled that non-use and nonmaintenance prior to 1963 are necessary for abandonment. See Order Denying Defendant's
Motion For Summary Judgment, dated June 3rd , 2008.

After 1963, property owners in the area describe maintaining and improving the road.
Defendant has provided witnesses who conflictingly describe that no use or maintenance of
County Road No. 32 has occurred.

In 2007, Plaintiff was denied use of the road in question by the Defendant when Defendant
gated the road. After Plaintiff walked through the gate, Defendant pad-locked the gate and
threatened to shoot the Plaintiff. Seeing no other option, Mr. Trunell filed this action pro se.
Since early 2007 Plaintiff has been unable to access his property. This has caused multiple
roblems including possible loss of the timber tax exemption for his properties and
estruction to the lands by beavers. The Plaintiff s claim of intentional interference with a
rospective economic advantage was bifurcated by Plaintiffs request in 2008.

III. ARGUMENT
The Creation of County Road No. 32
r.thn'Sfm .JAw :f{rm cftIL

he first facet of Plaintiffs case rests on the acceptance of County Road No. 32 by the
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series of multiple years) and clarity (the documents show a landowner's petition, survey,
viewer's report, and several commissioner meetings). Plaintiff intends to present these
documents as proof of the creation of County Road No. 32. These documents are as follows:

1. Petition by Landowners: On or about July 23, 1908 approximately ten landowners
residing in County Road District No. 23 petitioned the Board of County
Commissioners for the acceptance of a County Road fifty feet in width. This road
was deemed County Road No. 32. All ten landowners signed the petition and
provided a road bond accompanying the application.
2. Order By The County Commissioners for Approval of Road Petition: On or
about the 26th day of August, 1908 the clerk of Bonner County certified the County
Commissioner's "Original Order" from its August 24th, 1908 meeting. This order
notes that the petition was accepted and the Board appointed a County "viewer" to
"view out and survey said road and make their report" to the Board.
3. Viewer's Report for Proposed Route of County Road No. 32: Subsequent to the
Board's order the proposed route of the road was laid out by the County's viewer.
4. Relinquishment of Private Property Interests In The Road: It was noted that the
proposed route of County Road No. 32 would cross over three private properties.
Accordingly, those owners relinquished any interest in County Road. No. 32.
5. SurveylPlat of County Road No. 32: County Road No. 32 was surveyed with a
legal description and drawing of the proposed route.
6. Viewer's Report of Completed Road: On December 21 st, 1908, the viewers found
a road beginning in the surveyed location. This report was accepted and approved by
the Board of County Commissioners on January 17, 1909.

County Road No. 32 crosses Defendant's property. As laid out on the County's surveyed
description, the Defendant's property lies between points thirteen and fourteen. County

r.thmtm .lAw !firm
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Road No. 32 then continues over a portion of Plaintiff's property.
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The Statutory Road Scheme In 1908

It is important to study the statutory road scheme in existence at the time of creation of

County Road No. 32. This statutory scheme shows that County Road No. 32 was validly
created and accepted in 1908/1909. Idaho's early road scheme was concisely stated

In

Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 306 (1953). It is excerpted here.

"As early a (sic) 1875 all roads, trails, streets and thoroughfares, used as such, were
highways. Idaho Territory Laws, 1875, p. 677. Later, under the Revised Statutes of
1887, sec. 851, the legislature declared that roads laid out and recorded as highways,
by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of
five years, are highways. Under this statute, the use of a highway for a period of five
years brought the road into existence as a highway without more; it was founded on
user and the lapse of time and passed at once under the control of the public
authorities designated by law.
Sec. 851 of the Revised Statutes of 1887 was amended in 1893, after the Sunbeam
Road had been brought into existence by user for a period of time in excess of the
required five years. Under the amendment, a road would not come into existence as a
highway by mere user for the period of five years; additionally, it must have been
worked and kept up at the expense of the public. Laws of 1893, sec. 851, p. 12. The
requisite steps to establish a highway, before and after the amendment of 1893, are
aptly set forth in the syllabus in Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35, 225 P. 1021, as
follows:
'In order to establish the existence of a public road, it is necessary to show either (1)
that prior to 1893 it had been laid out and recorded as a highway by order of the
board of commissioners, or that it had been used as such for a period of five years, or
(2) that, since 1893 the road was laid out and recorded as a highway by order of the
board of commissioners or that it has been used as such for a period of five years,
and has been either worked and kept up at public expense or located and recorded by
order of the board of commissioners. '" Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 306
(1953)(citations omitted).
r.dimtm .caw !firm "*
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Kosanke makes it clear there are two routes (pun intended) to the establishment of a public
road. I The first is through order by the local board of commissioners. Under this method
there are no further requirements for the creation of a public road. The establishment is
complete upon acceptance by the board of commissioners. The second method is through
use for a period of five years.

In this case, the road was laid out and recorded by order of the county commissioners. No
use or maintenance was required for its establishment. Defendant argues that the road may
have been laid out but there is no physical proof of construction of the road. Even if this
court were to completely ignore the Viewers' Report showing a road by December 21 st,
1908, the requirements for the creation of a public road are still met here. The road is valid
under the statutory scheme in effect in 1908, the time of creation of County Road No. 32.

County Road No. 32 Has Not Been Abandoned
Defendant argues that if County Road No. 32 was accepted and created, it was subsequently
abandoned. As described in this Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment, from 1887 to 1963, Idaho code provided that a road could only be abandoned
through non-maintenance and non-use for a period of five years. See Boise v. Fails, 94

Idaho 840, 843-844, 499 P.2d 326, 329-30 (1972), Farrell v. Board of Com'rs, Lemhi
County, 138 Idaho 378, 385, 64 P.23d 304, 311 (2002). In 1963 this same code section was
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amended so that only roads established by prescription could be abandoned after a period of

I In 1963 the statute was substantially amended. This court's ruling in the Order Denying Defendant's Motion
For Summary Judgment applies the statute in effect at the time of creation of the road.
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five years. See Floyd v. Board of Com 'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 727, 52 P.3d
863, 872 (2002). In 1986, the state legislature adopted the current road abandonment statutes
which only allow road abandonment through a specific procedure. See Ie. § 40-203.

As County Road No. 32 was not established by prescription, it cannot be abandoned
subsequent to 1963 through non-use. Therefore, Defendant has argued that County Road No.
32 was abandoned prior to 1963. In order to prove this Defendant must show that there was
no maintenance and no use of County Road No. 32 for a period of five years prior to 1963.
In fact, Defendant has not shown any proof of non-use or non-maintenance prior to 1963.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs can show proof of historical use and maintenance of County Road
No. 32.
Use of County Road No. 32 Prior to 1963
From the Viewer's Report, December 21 st, 1908, it appears that the petitioners for County
Road No. 32 did in fact create a road. This is supported by a 1930 verified statement of Matt
Hakala who was a landowner living in the area of County Road No. 32. Mr. Hakala was one
of two property owners who obtained a water right and installed a water pipe along County
Road No. 32 in 1928. A neighboring property owner protested the installation of the pipe
and sued. The Defendants in the suit included Ms. Ferge!'s predecessor in interest. See Lund
v. Silta, Bonner County Case #3184 (1930).
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In the verified pleadings,Mr. Hakala and Mr. Silta state that County Road No. 32 was
constructed at great expense to Bonner County. The verified pleadings also show that the
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road is improved from time to time and that the landowners kept the road clear. In addition,
the installation of Mr. Hakala's and Mr. Silta's pipeline along County Road No. 32 shows
some use of the public road.

The Court skirts the issue of the validity of County Road No. 32 by finding that such a
determination is not material. This case is informative since in this case, Ms, Fergel's
predecessor in interest argues that the entire portion of County Road No. 32 was improved
by Bonner County except for possibly a very small portion. The court then declines to
decide whether this unconstructed portion is a public road. However, the court notes that the
use of the portion of unconstructed road did not cause any damage. The case of Lund v. Silta,
Bonner County #3184 (1930) is informative in that it shows two things. First, the case shows
improvement and construction of a road across the Defendant's property as of 1930.
Secondly, it shows use of County Road No. 32.

The historical use of County Road No. 32 is validated by a 1958 Forest Service aerial photo.
This aerial photo dated August 24, 1958 shows a road along the Defendant's property. It
appears that this road is constructed and used since it appears plainly from an aerial view.

Finally, Kathy Neumann, predecessor in interest to the Trunnell Property is expected to
testify that she was born on a portion of the property currently owned by Mr. Trunnell. She
~
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will also testify that for as long as she can remember she used the road in question. In
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addition, she is expected to testify that her father regularly did maintenance on County Road
No. 32 with an adjacent property owner. This maintenance and use occurred prior to 1963.

Use of County Road No. 32 After 1963 / Prescriptive Easement

Alternatively, Plaintiff has claimed a prescriptive easement over the Defendant's property.
With the exception of Kathy Neumann, the Plaintiffs testimonial evidence of use on County
Road No. 32 focuses on the period in time after 1963. As this court has already ruled that
after 1963, County Road No. 32 cannot be abandoned through non-use, the Plaintiff intends
to use this evidence to prove a prescriptive easement. Briefly, a prescriptive easement
requires that the Plaintiff show use of the property in a manner that is open, notorious,
continuous, uninterrupted and under a claim of right.

r.tIimrm Urw !finn
!Fut!iuston
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"To establish a prescnptIve easement, the dominant landowner must "submit
'reasonably clear and convincing' proof of open, notorious, continuous,
uninterrupted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the
servient tenement, for the prescriptive period." West v. Smith. 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511
P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973) (footnotes omitted). In order to constitute "continuous" use,
the dominant landowner need not be "bodily on the land every minute." It is enough
that "the frequency of use ... is normal for the kind of easement claimed." R.
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 8.7 at 455 (1984). In other words, intermittent use is enough if such would be the
normal use. The use must also "constitute some actual invasion or infringement of
the right of the [servient] owner." Trunnell v. Ward, 86 Idaho 555, 559,389 P.2d 221,
223 (1964). Furthermore, if the use is with the permission of the servient landowner,
no prescriptive easement can be acquired. In this though, the dominant landowner is
aided by a presumption: "proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of
the claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use
began, raises the presumption that the use was adverse [as opposed to permissive]
and under a claim of right." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557, 511 P.2d at 1333
(footnote omitted)." Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 51, 704 P.2d 950, 955 (1985).
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Plaintiff adequately meets this burden through the testimony of many, many individuals
who lived in the area and regularly used County Road No. 32.
1. Mr. William Jensen is expected to testify that he logged in the area and hauled logs
across the road in question for Mr. Trunnell's predecessors in interest. Mr. Jensen
will testify that he logged for predecessors in interest Mr. Louis Neumann (owned
the property from 1963 to 1995), Karl Neumann (owned the property in 2000) and
Kathy Neumann (owned the property beginning in 2000).
2. Mr. John Painter has lived in the area his entire life and is expected to testify that he
has used the road in question for his entire life.
3. Mr. Randy Painter owned property adjacent to Ms. Fergel's property. He is expected
to testify that he resided in the area beginning in 1967. Mr. Painter will testify that he
regularly worked on the road in question by hauling gravel, putting in culverts,
ditching off the water and later installing a cattle guard on the property. Mr. Painter
will testify that he maintained the road year-round until he moved away in 2002.
Since then, Mr. Painter has retained a single parcel of property which depends upon
access through Ms. Fergel's property as well.
4. Mr. Trunnell is expected to testify how he has attempted to use the road in question
but has been denied access across Ms. Fergel's property.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is able to prove that County Road No. 32 was validly created and accepted by the
Bonner County Board of Commissioners in 1908. This County road was subsequently
created, improved and used through 1963 at which time it could no longer be abandoned by
a showing of non-use and non-maintenance. The Plaintiffs have provided multiple witnesses
showing that Mr. Trunnell's predecessors in interest used the road in question for access in a
'JGfrmtm £4w j'frm Qo{
'Danid P. :Tutlierston
'Brent C. !fUlt!ierSto1l!
~P. :Tut/ierston
SarufraJ. ~
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manner that was open, notorious, continuous and hostile for a time exceeding twenty years.
Based upon these facts, Mr. Trunnell requests that this Court find that Mr. Trunnell is
entitled to access along County Road No. 32 and Ms. Fergel is enjoined from prohibiting
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such access across a public road way or alternatively that Mr. Trunnell is entitled to access
along the road in question through a prescriptive easement.
DATED this 21 st day of April 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

By

~-----

STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 21 st day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
[ ]
[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]

Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

. r71-.dt/ lL~

By____L~'~-----.~~~L/------------
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Brent C. Featherston, ISB No. 4602
Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Tel: (208) 263-6866
Fax: (208) 263-0400
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-1292
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE

----------------------------)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent Featherston
and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the following
written request for judicial notice pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 201.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

This is a request for judicial notice of the Complaint, Answer and Counter Claim and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Bonner County Court Case Lund. V SUta, Case
Jiut6mtm Law !firm a.L
'Daniel p. 7i<otlierston

#3184 (1930). These items were disclosed previously to opposing counsel as Exhibits in

'Brtnt C. :FUtfrerston*
Jert11r!I P. :Futlierston
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Plaintiff s Exhibit List.
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Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, a judicially noticed fact "must be one not subject
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." LR.E. Rule 201 (b).
The previous court cases are within the scope of facts available for judicial notice as
the previous court pleadings are (1) within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court (2)
authentic and cared for in a consistent and careful manner by the clerk of the Bonner County
court and (3) not subject to reasonable dispute.
Specifically the pleadings and findings in Lund v. SUta are subject to discretionary
and mandatory judicial notice.
LR.E. 201 (c): "When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether

requested or not. When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or
transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court shall identify
the specific documents or items that were so noticed. "
LR.E. 201(d): "When Mandatory. When a party makes an oral or written request

that a court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file
in the same or separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items
for which the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on
all partaies (sic) copies ofsuch documents or items. A court shall take judicial notice
~ .Uzw 11nn cr.L
'lJ1l1IieI P. :Futirerstoll

if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information. "
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Here the matters requested for judicial notice are pleadings filed in a previous
Bonner County court case. These records are held by the clerk of the Bonner County court in
the manner customary for adjudicated proceedings. The Plaintiff is prepared to offer
certified copies of these documents as further evidence of their authenticity and reliability at
the time of hearing of this motion.
DATED this 27th day of April 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

BY'_~C::~:::::::::::::===-STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 27th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
[ ]
[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]

Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-1292
J

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST

COME NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his counsel undersigned, and

in compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order makes the following disclosure concerning
exhibits for trial:

EXHIBITS:
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1. The Plaintiff reserves the right to present as exhibits any and all documents or material
disclosed in response to Plaintiffs discovery requests and in the course of depositions
conducted in this matter.
2. Google Aerial Photo, 2008
3. Quitclaim deeds from J.W. Roylance Construction, Inc. to Paul Trunnell dated August 6,
2007, instrument numbers 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho.
th
4. Quitclaim deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell dated February 13 , 2008,
instrument number 746201 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho.
5. Road Creation Documents including
a. Right of Way Deed for County Road No. 32 dated August 24, 1908.
b. Viewer's Report
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Field Notes of the Survey of County Road No. 32.
d. Public Road Petition Approval
6. Lund v. Silta, Bonner County District Court case #3184 (1928) Complaint and Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law
7. Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving an easement for ingress, egress
and utilities, recorded December 31 st, 1975 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as
instrument number 171685.
8. Right of Way Deed between Frank and Fanny Lund and Bonner County, dated June 9th ,
1934 and found in the records of Bonner County, Idaho as instrument number 85319.
9. Bonner County Road List, December 2008.
10. U.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 24th, 1958
11. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Map
12. Bonneville Power Map
13. Bonner County Metsker Map
14. Affidavit of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer
15. Deposition of Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer
16. Affidavit of Jacob Jeppsen
17. Affidavit of Ron Hager
18. Affidavit of Michael Creegan
19. Affidavit of Britt Ivey
20. Affidavit of Dmitry Borisov
21. Affidavit of Michael Cavanaugh
22. Affidavit of David Miller
23. Affidavit of Randy Painter
24. Affidavit of Karleen Neumann
C.

DATED this 13 th day of April, 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM
By:_---.!!=_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Stephen T. Snedden
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATION
hereby certify that on the 13 th day of April, 2009, I filed the foregoing Exhibit List with the
lerk of the Bonner County Court and I hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing to the
efendant with hand delivery on April 14th, 2009:
onathon Cottrell
o Box 874
andpoint, 1D 83864

?---Stephen T. Snedden
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SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST
CASE 07-1292
DATE

~

A12ril 29 l 2009

/

PLAINTIFF: _ _--!.T.!.!:R~UNN~=:.EL~L~_ _ __
DEFENDANT:

FERGEL

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF:

Ste12hen T. Snedden

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

Jonathon Trunnell
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Google Map-, 2009 with Markings
County Road No. 32, Viewer's Report
County Road No. 32, Bond of Road Petitioners
County Road No. 32, Engineer's Report
Certified Copy of County Road No. 32, Viewer's Report
Certified Copy of County Road No. 32, Bond of Road Pet
Certified Copy of County Road No. 32, Engineer's
Report
Certified Copy of Bonner County Commissioner Minutes
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonner
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All documents or material disclosed in response to
Plaintiff's discovery requests and in the course of
depositions conducted in this matter
Google Aerial Photos, 2008 and Google Aerial Photo
with Markings, 2008
Quitclaim Deeds from J.W. Roylance Construction, Inc.
to Paul Trunnell dated August 6, 2007; instrument
numbers 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner
County, Idaho
Quitclaim deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell
dated February 13 th , 2008; instrument number 746201 in
the records of Bonner County, Idaho
Road Creation Documents
Lund v. Silta, Bonner County District Court Case #3184
(1928/1930) Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving
and easement for ingress, egress and utilities recorded
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December 31 st, 1975 in the records of Bonner County,
Idaho as instrument number 171685
Right of way deed between Frank and Fanny Lund and
Bonner County dated June 9th , 1934; instrument number
85319 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho.
Bonner County Road List, December 2008
U.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 24"\ 1958
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Map
Bonneville Power Map
Bonner County Metsker Map
Affidavit of Ron Self, County Cartographer
Deposition of Ron Self, County Cartographer
Affidavit of Jacob Jeppsen
Affidavit of Ron Hagar
Affidavit of Michael Creegan
Affidavit of Britt Ivey
Affidavit of Dmitry Borisov
Affidavit of Michael Cavanaugh
Affidavit of David Miller
Affidavit of Randy Painter
Affidavit of Karleen Neumann
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Defendant I Respondent
Atty: JONATHAN COTIRELL
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONNER
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST.
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LAW FlRM, CHTD.
Brent C. Featherston, ISB No. 4602

Stc:phen T. Snedden., ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Tel: (208) 263-G866
Fax: (208) 263-0400
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .nJDICTAL D.ISTRICT OF Tm~
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COVNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an incUvidual;
Plalnl.itr.

v.
VERNA FEROEL. Ill1 individual;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-1292
PLA]NTDnrSSUPPLEMENTAL
TRIAL BRfJ~F

COMES NOW the Plaintiff;. Paul Trunnell. by and through his attorney•.Brent

Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the
following supplemental trial brief:

1.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Paul Trunnell has offered into evidence flve docwnenl.~ us proof of the
establishment of County Road No. 32 through order of the Board of Bonner County

,.,.,,,.Uzw !frm '*'
'/JIWt/'.t. ;r"nJimfllll

Commissioners. The documents arc dated between the years of 1908 and 1910. At the close

1JnrmG "..MIIIII·

~,..~II

StIn/,.,. .$"",,"
"1+vc4:

of Pluinlirrs evidence, Defendant moved the court for dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for

~'f.

"".......,..,"""

failure to prove the establishment of County Road No. 32.

U.".'I..s-.f;C,..

................. '''*ff._
(a.) .........
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MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS

A. Motion To DismiNN At Conclusion of Evidence

Rule 41 (b) of the Idaho Rules 0 f Civil Procedure allows invo! untary dismissal nt the end
ofPlaintift"s case.
"... After the plaintiff. in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed
the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence. the defendant.. without waiving the right
to offer evidence: in the evcnt the motion is nOL grdnted, may move for a di!t1Tlissal on
the: ground that upon the fuelS and the Jaw the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
The court as trier of the facts may then dctenninc: them and render judgment against
the plaintiff or may decline tQ render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
If tIle court renders judgment on tJ1l= merits asainst the plaintiff., the court shall make
findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the: court in its order for dismissaJ.
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule. other than a dismis..-;a\ for lack of jurisdiction or for failure
to join a party under Rule: 19. operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
B. Court Sit.'" A..eTrier of Fact

In a motion for dismis..~1 at the end of Plaintiff's case in a nonjury trial, the court sil.S a.o.;

a trier in fact. Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823,825,606 P.2d 473, 475 (1980). The court is
not requirt:d to construe all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable LO the
plaintiff. Sun Valley Shopping Center. Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92, 803 P .2d
993.997 (1991) "The court is not to make any special inferences in the plaintiffs favor nor
concern itself with whether plaintiff has made out a prima facie cm;e. Tn~tead, it is to weigh
the evidence, resolve any conflicts in 14 and decide for itself where the preponderance lies."
~.Grw1frm*

Keenan at 825, 475.

~f'.:f~

!IImu' 1tIIf/CIJImJ·
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ANALYSTS

A. Statutory Framework Governing Road Creation

The order of the Board to establish County Road No. 32 road was made in 1910. Idaho
Code § 73-101 governs the retroactive application of laws. Laws arc not to be applied
retroactively unless

state~

expressly. The requirements in 1910 for establishing a county

road were codified.
"Highways are roads laid out or erected by !.he pub1ic~ or if luid out or erected by othen;~
dedicated, or abandoned to the public/' C. S. § 1302.
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of commissioners. and
all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided the:: latter shall have been
worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or locuted and recorded by order or the
board of commissioners, are highways." C.S. § 1304.

B. Historical Development

Thc historical development and interpretation of C.S. § 1304 was dIscussed in Ross v.
Swearingen~

39 Idaho 3S, 22S P.1021 (1924), '"In order to establish·the existence ofapublic

road, it is necessary to show ei!.her (1) that prior to 1893 it had been Jaid out and recorded as
a highway by order of the board of commissioners, or that it had been used as such for a
period of five years. or (2) that, since 1893 the road was laid out and recorded as a highway
by order of the board of commissioners or that it has been used as such for a period of five

years, and bas been either worked and kept up at public expense or locutc:d and recorded by
~.Uzw 1frm '*'
~fI'.~
lIIrrmC. :T~

~:t.

order of the board of commission(:rs." ld.

f,.'''''tMI
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creation~
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nas added u third

requirement. I Defendant argues that the road creation must meet current Idaho law for
conveyances. 2.3

c.

Dedication and Acceptance

Statute C.S. § 1302 states that. "Highwd.ys are roads laid ouL or erected by the public, or
if laid out or erected by others, dedicated, or abandoned to the public" (emphasis added).

This statute on its face allows for dedication of riShl of way by a pri"ate property owner.

This is

confim'\I~d

by caselaw. Under the road creation scheme in existence in 1910, courts

Hbcral.1y construed parties' intentions to dedicate propr:rty for public roadwd.Ys. In Thiessen v.

City of Lf.>wiston. 26 Idaho 50S, 144 P. 548 (1914) the Idaho Supreme Court surveyed Lhe
requirements for dedication and acceptance of public roads.
'4But when properly established by evidence an oral dedication is valid and binding
upon the person making it when. duly accepted by thc public. It is announced in u
note to the case of¥orsan v. Chicago,& A. R. R. Co.,.9J5 U. 5. 216, 24 L...Ed. 743,
that: "A parol dedication is goo~ as well as one by deed or by unseuled writing. An
acceptance may bc pro"ed by parol, by long public usc. and by acts of recognition on

~;:m,,,,,,, rs.t

'.DrI""'lP. fau!/l!f$,.
~C.f"'~

~1'.:r""1Im
.$ltttI1fI,...~
.s~ 1: .'W:tIifm

..

..,..,.,."'' ' '
.... ,"

-'u.s. ..........."'''''.

~

I .Defendant cltcs to C &: G Tnt:. 11. Cunyon Highway Dis/fief No.4. 139 tdaho 140, 7S P.2d 194 (2003) for the
proposltlDn that Ii county cannot at:qulrc: n "rlBllt of way oycr private properl), by mcre fiat." See Delcndant's
Pre-Trittl Brlct: P. II. 'Howevcr the fum in C dC (; Inc. arc ve:ry dl1Tcrcnt than the: current ClSC. C &: G Inc.
inyolves tnyct'lic condclIumtion by II county In 1993 IU1d \hc court r:on!4idcrcd whcther the !ltutUlc or limitations
had run as nsoinst the private Inndowncr, prior to thc suit belns t:ommenced.
=Derendant's Pre-Trial Brief cites to cumnt Idaho Code §§ 55-601 (convC)lW\cc requires a deed or grant) and
8.801 (volunl./U'y conveyance I~ to be recordcd). $ltd Defendant':! Prc-1'rlal Bric~ P. t t. As cited in
Defcndw1t's brief: the cumnt version of I.C. § 55..001 wu..'t nOl adopted until 1989 and The current ventlon
conUlins no reU'oactivc expressIon of Inlent. Defendant's second cite., I.C. § 8-80 1. docs not C,'(lst.
" Defendant' S Pre-Trial Brief nlso add:! a fourth requirement, the: recardlltion 0 r rood creation documents with
the Count)' Recorder. HDwC'ler. Defendant fuils to consider the contexl of the Statute which liUltcs that "Roads
laid out und recorded ••• by order of commissioners ••• nre hiShwoys", C.S. § 1304. The naturallmcrprl:lallon
or the statute construes recording to be the act of crculins it record by the cammlsslonct'li, not II requirement
with lhe recorder's office. Dcfendant "Iso uses current code lIeclion 3 t -2402 with no exp lanatlon all to whether
It wos In effect in t 910.

~
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the part of proper public officers; or it may be presumed from the beneficial nature of
the dedication."
And in Rectgr v. Hartt, 8 Mo. 448 .....41 Am. Dec. 650. it is held that: '"The doctrine
seems well settled in America that an owncr of land may, without deed or writin!:,;,
dedicate it to public uses. No particular form or ceremony is necessary in the
dedication; all that is required is the n..~r:nl of the owner of the land, and the fact of
its being used for the public purposes intended by the appropriation."
... The authorities all bold that to complete the dedication it must be acc:ept&:d, but, .
as in the mattcr of the dedication, no formal acceptancc is required. "Uscr by the
public is a sufficient acceptance of a dedication for the purpose of a W'd.y to invest a
ri&ht of way to the public." Buchanan v. Curtis,.25 Wis. 99, 3 Am. Rep,. 23;"
Thie~~'en l'. Cil)J of LeWiston, 2G Idaho 505, 144 P. 548. SSO (1914)(omittinS some
intcrnal citations).
rl7ie.\·~·en

sets a vcry low bar.for dedication of public properties. As applied to the instant

case, ten lundowncrs sisncd a road petition. It is noted that all owners consented to a fifty
foot right of way except tor onc who requested a thirty-two foot right of way. Defendant has
argued that the lack of a highway right of way deed causes the creation ot County Rond No.
32 to fail. However, Thiessen is cleat. Dedication of a public road may be made by antI or
written dedication. Acceptancr: of the dedication is complete upon publie usc of the
dedicated property. 1bis is also conb;slenl with the highway statute in errect at Lhe time, C.
S. § 1302. Both caselaw and statute provide means for dedication of property for a highway.
A highway right of way deed is not required.

IV.
~,.&4w !finn dft{

CONCLUSION

Defendant's attempt to add the additional requirement of a deedcd conveyance to the

~!P.1tJlllimll.lll

~teftll~·
~~:TtiIl_fII!I
s-I"" •.,~

s'IJIim't.·WIMtt
~tIIl4I

creation of lit cOW'lty road is not supported by statute or caselaw. At the time, dedication of a
right of way could have been accomplished with an oral dedication. Here! the dedication

Ju.s.s-.t.,. ...
.fIHt<I''''''.I.IIM~
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was by the pelilion of ten landowners who signed documents requesting the county accept

County Road No. 32.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2009.

FEATI~TERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

By__

______
______
?------

-=~

~~

STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTU'ICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby eertify that on the 30dl day of April. 2009, 1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the fallowins manner:

Jonathan Cattrell, Chld.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, JD 83864

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Pn.1la.id
[ ] Overnight Mail
[X] Hand delivered
[[ J] Other:
Facsimile:
_ _ _ _ _ __

?----------

By______________________
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JONATHAN W. COTTRELL, Chartered
Attorney at Law
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(208) 263-7534
(208) 265-9226 Fax
ISB NO. 1353

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL and
BILL LOMU,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2007-1292
MOTION TO AMEND
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER

vs.
VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant.
Defendant moves the court pursuant to Rule 15(b) IRCP to amend the
answer herein to conform to the evidence, to include the defense that Defendant is a good
faith purchaser for value and entitled to the protections afforded by Idaho Code §55-812
as against the claims of Plaintiff that Defendant is subject to an unrecorded conveyance of
a public right of way.

MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER

255

This motion shall be brought before the court for hearing. At the time of
hearing, Defendant will present argument in support of the motion.
Dated this _(_ day of May, 2009.

nathan W. Cottrell
Attorney for Defendant

I certifY that on the

-L day of May, 2009, a true copy of the foregoing has

been served upon Stephen T. Snedden, Attorney at Law, by fax transmission to 263-0400.

MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v,

VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 07-1292
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO AMEND
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER

----------------------------)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent
Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the
following response to Motion To Amend Defendant's Answer:

I.

UNRECORDED CONVEYANCES PURSUANT TO I.e. § 55-812

Idaho Code § 55-812 states "Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a
term not exceeding one (1) year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
~ Law!Jfrm cfwi
'Daniel P. !Futlimto,.
'Brent C. !Fatlimto,.,
Jeremy P. :Tt4t1imton
Satufra:/. 'J1.+uc{
stephen 'T. SrrdJlm
Jt~

113 S.

of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration,
whose conveyance is first duly recorded."

.. t.Ginll

su:<>ruIJI.,..

s..,.,{point, I.£..rw 83864

(208) 26.3-6866
7"41((208) 263-0400

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER - 1

'lh.Q

I.

ARGUMENT
a. Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
Ms. Fergel asserts that her predecessors in interest or alternatively, Bonner County,

were obligated to record the conveyance of Bonner County Road No. 32. Ms. Fergel's
argument then appears to be that since her predecessor in interest and/or Bonner County did
not record the conveyance under I.e. § 55-812, the conveyance is void as against the
Plaintiff in this matter, Mr. Trunnell. Mr. Trunnell, including his predecessors in interest, are
not subsequent purchasers within the scope of I.C. § 55-812. Plaintiff had no obligation to
Defendant to record the road creation documents. Defendant's defense / counterclaim fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as the claim is against Defendant's
predecessors in interest and Bonner County.

b. Equitable Estoppel
Defendant is equitably estopped from asserting I.C. § 55-812 as a defense as Ms.
Fergel has actively sought to exclude Bonner County from this matter first by challenging
the inclusion of Bonner County as a party and second by supporting Bonner County's
Motion For Summary Judgment as against the Plaintiff. Defendant has sought to exclude the
very party affected by I.C. § 55-812.

c. Defendant and Defendant's Predecessors In Interest Had Actual
Knowledge
r.tf",.stm .£4w ,-Inn cl&
'lJanU{ '1'. 7etltliusttm
'Brmt C. 7utliuston'
Jeremy'1'. 7etltliuston
Stuufra:l. ~
SUpfIen'T. Sndim

Defendant claims that County Road No. 32 was not recorded in 1910 with the
Bonner County Recorder's office pursuant to I.e. § 55-812. Defendant has offered I.C. § 55-

Jttttmreys .t fill)

113 S. SecorufJ1Iw.
s.rufpoint, 144M 83864

(208) 2~-6866
:TIZI({208)26.HJ400

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER - 2
., .Li.ce1fSeti in

I,{a/io & 'Waslii'Wton

9.~g

812 for the proposition that the creation of County Road No. 32 without recordation is void
as to Ms. Fergel, a successive purchaser in interest.
"When a subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser has actual knowledge of a prior
interest, it makes no difference whether prior interest was properly acknowledged and
recorded." Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980).
"One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in
good faith and one who fails to investigate the open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot
take in good faith and thus may not, by first recording their conveyance, claim preference
over the prior purchaser or encumbrancer." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 526 P.2d 178
(1974).
Ms. Fergel testified that she lived in the area prior to moving to her current property.
During this period she was a witness to use of the property by the Russels. In addition, upon
moving to the property in 1991, there were existing wheel tracks over her property. It is
clear from Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann that individuals in the area were using
County Road No. 32 regularly including the Painters and the Neumanns. These parties were
using County Road No. 32 during the time that Ms. Fergel was living in the area. Ms. Fergel
also testified that multiple people were using County Road No. 32. Through testimony Ms.
Fergel has admitted actual knowledge of the existence of County Road No. 32.

'}tItItIimtm .JAw 1'(nn diIi
tJJaniL{ P. 7utfimton

'.Brent C. 7utfrerston'

Jertn1!I P. :Tutfimton
SaMra.1. 'J1.Tuck
Stepfrm 'T. Snufim
!l.ttomeys .. , l.iIIII
1135. 5ecorul J>.",.

54ru1p..i"', r.,aM 83864
(208) 263-6866
:1''''«(208) 26.H1400

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER - 3
• .License.d in
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d. Defendant and Defendant's Predecessors In Interest Had Constructive
Knowledge
It appears that Defendant is also asserting a lack of constructive knowledge because

County Road No. 32 was not recorded with the Bonner County Recorder's office at the time
of creation.
"A duly recorded interest is effective against prior unrecorded interest only where
recorded interest is taken for valuable consideration and without knowledge, either actual or
constructive, that unrecorded interests exist." Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney, 100
Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980). "One kind of constructive notice is notice which results
from a record or which is imputed by the recording statutes, and the other is notice which is
presumed because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should
impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate facts." Barton v. Cannon, 94 Idaho
422, 426, 489 P.2d 1021, 1025 (1971).
Constructive notice overcomes the requirement of recording a conveyance.
Constructive notice may be provided in a variety of fashions. For example, in the matter of
service by publication, constructive knowledge is accomplished by publication in the
newspaper of record. This is often true for other matters. Here the Defendant had both types
of constructive knowledge described above in Barton.
Defendant had knowledge of facts, including the public's use of County Road No. 32
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sufficient to place Defendant upon notice. These facts should have led Defendant to
investigate the fact and pursue the conclusion that County Road No. 32 was a public
roadway. Secondly, Defendant had constructive knowledge of actions taken by the Board of
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County Commissioners whose actions and records were in the public domain and held by
the County clerk.

II. CONCLUSION

Defendant has raised a defense against Bonner County after actively seeking to
exclude Bonner County from this matter. Further Defendant is not a predecessor in interest
under I.C. § 55-812 as to Plaintiff and therefore Defendant has failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. If the court permits this defense, then Defendant had actual
knowledge and constructive knowledge as demonstrated by the testimony taken at trial in
this matter.
DATED this 18th day of May 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

BY__

~~-=
__~______________-__
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 18th day of May, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Brent C. Featherston, ISB No. 4602
Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Tel: (208) 263-6866
Fax: (208) 263-0400
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.

VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 07-1292
PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL
BRIEF'

---------------------------)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his attorney, Brent
Featherston and Stephen Snedden of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and hereby submit the
following pre-trial brief:

I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a dispute over use of a road. It provides the only access to several parcels of
private property. To summarize Plaintiffs arguments, the road is either a public road or
'{tItIthmtm .LAw 1'Irm era
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alternatively, Plaintiff has obtained a prescriptive easement for use.
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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Trunnell is the owner of three parcels ofreal property near Clark Fork, Idaho. There are
no improvements on these parcels. Ms. Fergel purchased property in the area with her
husband in 1991. After her husband's death, Ms. Fergel took title solely. The access across
Defendant's property is currently the only means of access to Mr. Trunnell's properties. In
addition, the road provides access to another adjoining landowner, Mr. Randy Painter.

In 1908, ten landowners in the area petitioned Bonner County for a public road. As the road
crossed three private properties, several landowners agreed to relinquish their interests in the
properties for a public road. This road was accepted after a survey and viewer's report in
1908.

Subsequently the road was constructed and improved through great cost to Bonner County.
From previous litigation between landowners in the area, it appears that Bonner County
Road No. 32 was used and maintained regularly in the early part of the 20th century.

An aerial photo from 1958 shows a road across the Defendant's property. In addition,
previous owners of the Trunnell property speak about using County Road No. 32 prior to
1963. Plaintiffs intend to prove based on this evidence that County Road No. 32 has been
regularly used through 1963. In denying Defendant's previous motion for summary
~
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judgment, this court ruled that non-use and non-maintenance prior to 1963 are necessary for
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abandonment. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, dated June

After 1963, property owners in the area describe maintaining and improving the road.
Defendant has provided witnesses who conflictingly describe that no use or maintenance of
County Road No. 32 has occurred.

In 2007, Plaintiff was denied use of the road in question by the Defendant when Defendant
gated the road. After Plaintiff walked through the gate, Defendant pad-locked the gate and
threatened to shoot the Plaintiff. Seeing no other option, Mr. Trunell filed this action pro se.
Since early 2007 Plaintiff has been unable to access his property. This has caused multiple
problems including possible loss of the timber tax exemption for his properties and
destruction to the lands by beavers. The Plaintiffs claim of intentional interference with a
prospective economic advantage was bifurcated by Plaintiffs request in 2008.

III. ARGUMENT

a. The Creation of County Road No. 32
"In order to establish the existence of a public road, it is necessary to show either (1)
that prior to 1893 it had been laid out and recorded as a highway by order of the board of
commissioners, or that it had been used as such for a period of five years, or (2) that, since
~ .L:aw !firm rf&
'DatIUf P. 7e1ltliersw1I
'Brent C. 7eJltliersw1I*
~ent1t!! P. :TeIltliersW1I
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worked and kept up at public expense or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners." Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35, 225 P.I021 (1924) Creation of County
Road No. 32 was accomplished by action of the Bonner County Commissioners in 1910.
These documents are surprisingly complete considering their age.

1. Public Road Petition: Included in the documents is a 1908 road petition
addressed to the "Honorable Board of County Commissioners of Bonner County, Idaho".
The request was clear. The property owners intended to create a road running along the
North-South centerline of Section 34. It was signed by ten property owners of adjoining
lands. The landowners with affected properties agree to dedication of their land. See Exhibit
34.
2. Bond For Road Petition: It appears from the documents that the landowners
consented to a bond to verify their request. This "Bond for Road Petition" is Exhibit 36.
3. Right of Way Deed For County Road and Viewer's Report: From these same
documents it is evident that not only was County Road No. 32 laid out but that it was
verified through a viewer's report. The viewer's report is completed and signed. This same
viewer's report shows a stamp of approval by the Bonner County Commissioners. The
approval is dated January 17, 1910. See Exhibit 33.
4. Commissioners' Minutes: The action of the Bonner County Commissioners in
accepting County Road No. 32 is verified by the minutes from that same Commissioners
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description of the property and then shows that the Board saw a viewer's report and
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concluded "After due consideration, said report was by the Board approved, and the same is
hereby declared to be a County Road." See Exhibit 37.

b. Defendant's Attempt For Additional Road Creation Requirements
Defendant has attempted to add additional requirements to the creation of a county
road under the statutory scheme in effect in 1910. These additional requirements include
conveyance of the right of way through a deed and recordation of County Road No. 32 with
the Bonner County Recorder's Office.
Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief cites to current Idaho Code §§ 55-601 and 8-801 for the
proposition that a conveyance must be accomplished through deed. See Defendant's PreTrial Brief, P. 11. I Defendant also cites to C & G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4,
139 Idaho 140,75 P.2d 194 (2003) for the proposition that a county cannot acquire a "right
of way over private property by mere fiat." See Defendant's Pre-Trial Brief, P. II?
Both issues are discussed in length in Plaintiffs Supplement Trial Brief. In short,
under the statutory scheme in existence in 1910, conveyance of a right of way could be
accomplished through some dedication and acceptance of that right of way. This is met here
as it is clear from the road petition documents that the property owners intended to dedicate
their land for a public roadway. As discussed later, this roadway was accepted through
public use. Finally, the Defendant's alleged recordation requirement for creation of a county
road tortures the plain meaning of the road creation statute. C.S. § 1302 requires that a road
~L4w!ffrmcitl.
'Dartid P. 7e.atfrmton
'1Jrmt C. !T~tfrmtiln'
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I As cited in Defendant's brief, the current version ofl.C. § 55-601 was not adopted until 1989 and contains no
retroactive expression of intent. Defendant's second cite, I.e. § 8-801, does not exist.
2 The facts in C & G Inc. are very different than the current case. C & G Inc. involves inverse condemnation by
a county in 1993 and the court considered whether the statute of limitations had run as against the private
landowner, prior to the suit being commenced.
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be "laid out and recorded" by order of the commissioners. It is clear here that the
requirement for recording a highway pursuant to C.S. § 1302 was done by order of the
Bonner County Commissioners, not by the Bonner County Recorder's office.

c. County Road No. 32 Was Not Been Abandoned Prior to 1963

Defendant argues that if County Road No. 32 was accepted and created, it was
subsequently abandoned. As described in this Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion
For Summary Judgment, from 1887 to 1963, Idaho code provided that a road could only be
abandoned through non-maintenance and non-use for a period of five years. See Boise v.

Fails, 94 Idaho 840, 843-844, 499 P.2d 326, 329-30 (1972), Farrell v. Board of Com 'rs,
Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 385, 64 P.23d 304, 311 (2002). In 1963 this same code
section was amended so that only roads established by prescription could be abandoned after
a period of five years. See Floyd v. Board of Com 'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,
727, 52 P.3d 863, 872 (2002). In 1986, the state legislature adopted the current road
abandonment statutes which only allow road abandonment through a specific procedure. See

Ie § 40-203.
As County Road No. 32 was not established by prescription, it cannot be abandoned
subsequent to 1963 through non-use. Defendant has argued that County Road No. 32 was
abandoned prior to 1963. In order to prove this Defendant must show that there was no
'}'tIIt/imtm £4w 1'frm cf,o{

maintenance and no use of County Road No. 32 for a period of five years prior to 1963. In

'Dtlnkf'P. :Tut/ierston

'Brent C. :Tutlrerswn'
JtTt1If!J 'P. :Teatlierswn
Satufra:/. 'J#uck

addition, Defendant carries the burden of proof in this matter. John W Brown Properties v.

stepfrm To Srrdim

A.......,. ..

tiAfU

lLJ S. SeeDruI.JiI....

Sarulpol,," Ia4lio 83864
(208) 2~-6866

:1'-.;:(208) 2&.3.()4()(}

.. £U:ensu in
Itf4lio efT 'l¥<zs1ii'!ftD"

PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF - 6

26R

Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171,59 PJd 976 (2002). Farrell v. Board of Com'rs, Lemhi
County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002).
From the Viewer's Report, December 21 st, 1908, it is evident that the petitioners for
County Road No. 32 did in fact create a road. This is supported by a 1930 verified statement
of Matt Hakala, Ms. Fergel's predecessor in interest. In the Bonner County court case #3184,
Mr. Hakala alleges the right to cross onto Mr. Trunell's property. Mr. Hakala also alleges
that Bonner County Road No. 32 was created, improved and maintained at great expense to
Bonner County. See Lund v. Silta, Bonner County Case #3184 (1930).
The trial court in Lund skirts the issue of the validity of County Road No. 32 by
finding that such a determination is not material. However, the case of Lund v. Silta, Bonner
County #3184 (1930) is informative in that it shows two things. First, the case shows
improvement and construction of a road across the Defendant's property as of 1930.
Secondly, it shows use of County Road No. 32.
This early use of County Road No. 32 is verified by people living in the area.
Karleen Neumann moved to the area in 1955. She testified that she remembers use of
County Road No. 32 prior to 1965. She was there before Defense witness George Moore
who stated that he couldn't even remember the road in question even though it appeared on
a 1958 Forest Service picture. Karleen Neumann talked about the use of County Road No.
32 by individuals named Collins, Crane, McGee, Hubbard, Rocko, Painter, Neumann and
Russell, to name a few. These were farmers, loggers, water examiners, workers, and hunters.
~ £aw!Finn a.I.
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Their use of County Road No. 32 included use for water lines, hay field, cattle chutes,
horseback rides, fence maintenance and firewood. Karleen Neumann described that this use
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was by cattle trucks, pickups, jeeps and Studebaker dump trucks. Kathy Neumann,
predecessor in interest to the Trunnell Property, testified to the same or similar uses as
Karleen Neumann.
Defendants failed to show any definitive time period of five years prior to 1963
when County Road No. 32 was not used and have consequently failed to show abandonment
of County Road No. 32.
d. Use of County Road No. 32 After 1963/ Prescriptive Easement

Alternatively, Plaintiff has claimed a prescriptive easement over the Defendant's
property. Both Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann's testimony was clear. Plaintiffs
predecessors in interest used County Road No. 32 for a time exceeding the prescriptive
period subsequent to 1963.
1. Predecessors In Interest: Prescriptive use of County Road No. 32 was by Plaintiffs

predecessors in interest, Neumann, for a period of twenty years beginning in 1955
and continuing until at least 1999. This use also included use by Collins, Crane,
McGee, Hubbard, Rocko, Painter, Neumann and Russell, to name a few.
2. Actual and Continuous Use: County Road No. 32 was used for water lines, hay
fields, cattle chutes, horseback rides, fence maintenance and firewood. It was used
frequently by the Neumanns who owned Mr. Trunnell's property.
3. Visible and Notorious Use: Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann testified that
~ .caw 1''''''' cffIl
'Daniel P. 7~tlimton
'Brmt C. !Featlimton*
Jeremy P. 7~tlimton
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County Road No. 32 was used by cattle trucks, pickups, jeeps and Studebaker dump
trucks. It was mended by the Neumanns using shale rock from the mountain side.
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4. Adverse and Hostile Use: There is a presumption that the use was adverse and
hostile. Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann testified that County Road No. 32
was frequently used by the parties without any permission from Ms. Fergel's
predecessors in interest. Karl Neumann's testimony that each use by the Neumanns
was expressly authorized through a telephone call should be discounted by the rest of
Karl Neumann's testimony and Karl Neumann's interest in the property. It was clear
from Mr. Neumann's testimony that he has an interest in this property and has been
actively working to deny Karleen Neumann access to Mr. Trunnell's property.
Ms. Fergel's own testimony was conflicting on the issue. Ms. FergeI testified that
the use by Mr. Trunnell and his predecessors in interest was at times hostile. Ms.
Fergel stated that there was so much unauthorized use of County Road No. 32 that
she was required to place a gate across the road to control access. Despite this
measure, individuals continued to use County Road No. 32 without permission.

IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has proven that County Road No. 32 was validly created and accepted by
the Bonner County Board of Commissioners in 1910. This County road was subsequently
created, improved and used through 1963 at which time it could no longer be abandoned by
a showing of non-use and non-maintenance. The Plaintiffs have provided multiple witnesses
showing that Mr. Trunnell's predecessors in interest used the road in question for access in a
~ ..taw !Fmn cs.i
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manner that was open, notorious, continuous and hostile for a time exceeding twenty years.
Based upon these facts, Mr. Trunnell requests that this Court find that Mr. Trunnell is
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entitled to access along County Road No. 32 and Ms. Fergel is enjoined from prohibiting
such access across a public road way or alternatively that Mr. Trunnell is entitled to access
along the road in question through a prescriptive easement.
DATED this 18 th day of May 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

By__~~___________________
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of May, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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STATE OF ID!\HO
COUNTY OF Cufl1lE f'

;:-;;:;ST JUO:CL\I- ,,:'

JONATHAN W. COTTRELL, Chartered
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-7534
(208) 265-9226 Fax
ISB NO. 1353

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

Case No. CV-2007-1292

PAUL TRUNNELL and
BILL LOMU,

DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL
MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant.

ROAD CREATION BY STATUTE
The evidence at trial now confinns the following:
(a) On August 4, 1908, inhabitants of Road District 23 petitioned Bonner
County to establish a public road 50 feet in width. At that point, one of the petitioners,
"M. E. Mulvihill was unwilling to give the full proposed width. He was willing to allow
only 32 feet. [Ex. 34]
(b) At some point, a proposed right of way deed dated August 24, 1908,
was apparently deposited with the Bonner County Commissioners. This deed committed

DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

1

27~

to exonerate Kootenai County from paying any damages for the proposed right of way.
This deed, with unfilled blanks referring to possible future action with respect to the
proposed road, was never signed, acknowledged or recorded. [Ex. 33, pp. 2 and 3]
(c) On August 24, 1908, the Bonner County Commissioners decided to
pursue the petition by ordering a view and survey be made of the proposed route. The
Commissioners appointed three viewers, County Surveyor J. K. Ashley Jr., Simon
McBride and Gus Johnson to perform these tasks. [Commissioner's minutes, Ex. 33, p 4]
(d) On December 21, 1908, a viewers' report was submitted stating the
view had been conducted and that three "owners" (not including the dissenting M. E.
Mulvihill) had consented to give right of way for the proposed road. [Ex. 33, pp 5-8]
While it appears that two of the viewers signed the report the third, County Surveyor
Ashley, did not. The viewers' report contains no metes and bounds description. And the
place provided on the report for the plat of the proposed road is blank. [Ex. 33 at p. 8]
(e) There is no record of any surveyor plat ever having been submitted to
the Commissioners. An undated Engineer's Report [Ex. 35] states, "I include in this
report the names of persons claiming damages interested in the land effected by the
establishment of said proposed road; a map of said proposed road as laid out is on the
Road Plats, with the name of the owners of each tract of land written thereon; and also
any other data that 1 deem fundamental." This Report is undated and unsigned. It does
not include any map, plat or any other description of the proposed road. What it does say
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is that the dissenting property owner, Mike Mulvihill, was demanding $150 in damages
for any right of way which might be taken from him.
(f) There is no evidence that either the lack of a surveyor the lack of

acquisition of right of way was ever remedied.
(g) Nevertheless, Commissioners minutes ofa meeting on January 17, 1910
state that, based solely upon having received and approved a viewers report, "Road No.
32" was declared to be a County Road. [Ex. 37]
(h) There is no evidence that any of the documents discussed above were
ever recorded.

In fact, the unrebutted testimony of Dan Hunt, a title examiner with

Alliance Title Company, is that a search of all recorded documents in the Fergel chain of
title, from the formation of Idaho territory to the present, discloses that no instrument,
judgment, or any other document has ever been recorded establishing the alleged road.
(i) Moreover, although the County Clerk, as the Clerk of the Board of

County Commissioners, is the proper officer to keep and retain records of the official acts
of the Commissioners, by stipulation of Plaintiff during trial, the documents referred to
above were first filed with the County Clerk during the course of trial on April 29, 2009.
By that same stipulation, it is established that these documents were filed by the law firm
which represents Plaintiff.
At this point, Plaintiff's argument that the evidence is sufficient to establish
the creation of a road through the statutory process depends entirely upon Plaintiff's

DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

3
'll-j~

argument the provisions of the statute requiring that the road must be "laid out," i.e.
surveyed, and "recorded" should be ignored and effectively excised from the statute.
According to Plaintiff's argument, the "natural interpretation" of the statute dictates that
these provisions of the statute not be given the common and accepted meanings which
have been used consistently in the published cases in this State.

Plaintiff cites no

authority for this argument.
Plaintiff then proceeds to argue that a county can acquire public rights of
way over private property without either voluntary conveyance or an action in eminent
domain. As with Plaintiff's argument concerning "natural interpretation" of the road
creation statute, his claim that all that is needed to create a public right of way is an order
from the county commissioners freely invents his own concept of the law, contrary to
Constitution, Art. I and §14, Idaho Code §7-701 et seq., and the many cases decided
thereunder. Plaintiff urges that C & G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho
140, 75 P2d. 194 (2003) supports his novel theory of the law because that case turned
upon whether the landowner's case for inverse condemnation was time barred by the
statute of limitations. In making this argument, Plaintiff fails to recognize that in C & G

Inc., the county purported to do the very thing which Plaintiff claims it did in this case,
create a right of way by simple commission decision. If Plaintiff's interpretation of the
law were correct, the landowner in C & G Inc. would have had no cause of action against
the county, and therefore the issue in that case as to whether the statute of limitations

DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

4
,)"7~

against that action had run would have been immaterial.
The remaining arguments advanced by Plaintiff concerning the statutory
framework underlying the process of statutory road creation can only be described as
disingenuous. Plaintiff questions whether I.C. §55-60 1 which requires conveyances to be
in writing and signed, and I.C. §31-2402 which provides for them to be recorded with the
County Recorder, were in effect in 1910. While the compiler's historical notes to these
statutes should provide the answer, nevertheless a copy of the relevant provisions of the
Idaho Territory session laws of 1864 is annexed hereto for counsel's edification.
[Attachment A]

RIGHT OF WAY BY DEDICATION

By his Plaintiffs' Supplemental Trial Brief delivered in court on April 30 at
the close of Plaintiff s case, he apparently seeks to raise a cause of action which is neither
raised in the pleadings nor in his pretrial brief.

The complaint [Second Amended

Complaint, June 24, 2008] alleges a cause of action based upon statutory road creation:
"According to documents obtained from the Bonner County Assessor's
Office ('Road Creation Documents'), County Road 32 was created and
formally established on or about August 24, 1908. The Road Creation
Documents are attached herewith and incorporated into this Complaint as
nd

Exhibit 'B'." [2 Amend. Compl. Par 12]
Nowhere does the complaint mention a road created by dedication.
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Plaintiff s Pre-Trial Brief, confirms that his claim that a public road crosses
Fergel's property is based upon the formal process under the road creation statute:
"In 1908, ten land owners in the area petitioned Bonner County for a public
road. As the road crossed three properties, several land owners agreed to
relinquish their interests in the properties for a public road. This road was
accepted after a survey and viewer's report in 1908." [Brief at pg 2]

The brief then continues with an analysis of, "The Statutory Road Scheme in 1908."
[Brief at pp 5 and 6].

Again, there is no mention of any claim of a road created by

dedication.
Apparently, Plaintiff s concept is that if at the close of trial the claim which
one has pleaded has not been proved, one simply starts arguing another legal theory never
pleaded. Under the most liberal reading of the rules, adding a new claim at that late stage
in the proceedings would require that either a motion to amend be made during trial or a
showing that the unplead claim was actually tried by either express or implied consent.
Rule IS(b) IRCP.
But to avoid this becoming an impediment to a prompt resolution of this
matter, it may be just as well at this point to discuss why the facts of the case simply will
not support a claim of dedication. A beginning place is to note that Plaintiff makes no
apparent distinction between a statutory dedication and one made under the common law.
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Statutory Dedication
If plaintiff claims a statutory dedication, that claim fails for the same reason
that his claim of statutory road creations fails, i.e. lack of recording. During all dates
relevant in this case, statutory dedication has required (1) preparation of a plat, "which
shall accurately describe all the subdivisions of such tract or parcel of land, numbering
the same by progressive numbers, and giving the dimensions and length and breadth
thereof and the breadth and the courses of all streets as established therein," (2)
submission of the plat to the county commissioners for approval, and after such approval,
(3) recording that plat "in the office of the recorder of the proper county." Worley

Highway District v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219 at 222, 775 P.2d
111 at 114 (1989). The evidence is clear that none of this happened here. With no plat
and no recording, there is no statutory dedication.

Common Law Dedication
Although Plaintiff s supplemental trial brief never expressly states this, his
reliance upon Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho 505, 144 P. 548 (1914) suggests a
claim of common law dedication. "The essential elements of a common-law dedication
of land are (1) an offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or
acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to a public use, and (2) an acceptance of
the offer by the public." Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879 at 881, 655 P.2d 86 at 88 (et.
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App. 1983). The offer is usually expressed by the recording of a plat which lays out the
streets, roads and other areas dedicated to the public. Worley Highway District v. Yacht

Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219,775 P.2d III 1989); Boise City v. Hon, 14
Idaho 272, 94 P. 167 1908).

Acceptance is manifested by members of the public

purchasing lots under deeds made in reference to the plat. Boise City v. Hon, supra;

Hanson v. Proffer, 23 Idaho 705; 132 P. 573 (1913). In this case there clearly is no
evidence of a plat ever being recorded and no evidence of a conveyance ever being made
in reference to a plat. As discussed below, other elements of a common law dedication
are also lacking.
I - Clear and Unequivocal Intent to Dedicate
The intent to dedicate property to the public is never presumed. "[A] party
claiming a right by dedication bears the burden of proof on every material issue. The
intent of the owner to dedicate his land to public use must be clearly and unequivocally
shown and must never be presumed." State ex rei. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140 at 147,
594 P.2d 1093 at 1100 (1979). In determining whether intent to dedicate has been shown,
the courts look at the surrounding circumstances.

In this case, those circumstances

mitigate more against than in favor of a finding of such intent:
(a) In this case, at least one of the land owners expressed both disagreement with
the scope (width) of the proposed right of way and a demand that payment be
made before any right of way be given. There is no evidence that either of
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those concerns were ever resolved.
(b) None of the petitioners signed the proposed conveyance to transfer a right of
way.
(c)

Nothing was ever recorded.

Failure to record a purported dedication is

evidence of lack a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate.

Saddlehorn

Landowner's Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 677 at 682 (2009); West
Wood Investments Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75 at 87, 106 P.3d 401 at 413
(2009).
(d)

If there was any "offer" to dedicate, it was conditioned upon the county
following through with building the road. As the bond for the proposed road
states that if "the prayer of the said petitioners is not granted, and the road
finally not opened, then this obligation to be void." [Ex. 36 at p. 3]

(e) A fence constructed by Plaintiff's predecessors and others along their common
boundary has long been maintained on what is supposedly the centerline of the
alleged road.
(f) If the road had been built as proposed in the Petition, the east half of its width

would have been constructed across the west 25 feet of Plaintiff's own property
and also across the west 25 feet of Richard Hannah's to the north of Plaintiff.
But both Plaintiff and Hannah testified that there is no evidence that a road was
ever built over either of their properties.
(g) In 1934, Plaintiff's predecessors in title, Lund, granted a right of way to the
county for a road [Right of Way Deed, Ex. 8] over the same 25-foot strip where
Plaintiff now claims that a right of way had already been dedicated in 19081910. Had there been a dedicated road from 1910, the grant of a right of way
in 1934 would have been an unnecessary and meaningless act.
The foregoing circumstances indicate something substantially less than a clear and
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unequivocal intent to donate a right of way to the public.
II -

Dedication Must be by the Owner

Dedication can only be made by one who is at the time of dedication the
owner of the property. A purported dedication by one who at that time does not hold title
has no effect. Farrell v. Board of Commissioners of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378 at
384, 64 P.3d 304 at 310 (2002); Worthington v. Koss, 72 Idaho 132, 237 P.2d 1050
(1951).
In Farrell for example, certain miners who had constructed a road, recorded
a deed and plat dedicating the road to Lemhi County. Apparently assuming that the
representation of ownership in the deed was true, the county commissioners formally
accepted the dedication. When it turned out that in fact the miners did not in fact have
title to the property, the court held that the purported dedication was void.
The circumstances of the present case are parallel to those in Farrell. In
this case, some but not all of the petitioners purported to be owners of the property. One
of those, Gust (or Gus) Johnson, purported in the petition to be the owner of certain lands,
including the parcel now owned by Fergel.

Plaintiff has the burden on all matters

necessary to establish the alleged public road. Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35, 225 P.
1021 (1924).

This includes proof of legal capacity to dedicate. But Plaintiff submitted

no evidence that Johnson in fact had any title to dedicate, either in 1908 when the petition
was filed or in 1910 when such dedication was supposedly accepted. Nor could Plaintiff
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have done so for the reason that Johnson was not granted title until July 1910, two years
after the offer to dedicate was supposedly made, and six month after it was supposedly
accepted. See patent record, United States to Gust Johnson, July 18, 1910. [Attachment
B]. Having had no title to dedicate, a dedication now claimed by Plaintiff would have
had no effect.
But could the alleged acceptance by the county m January 1910
retroactively be made good by Johnson's later getting title?

No.

Acceptance must

follow, and cannot precede, the offer of dedication. 23 Am Jur 2d, Dedication §49.
There can be no acceptance of an offer of dedication before it is made. City of Santa

Clara v. Ivancovich, 118 P.2d 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).

III -Oral Dedication
Plaintiff cites Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho 505, 144 P. 548
(1914), a case in which the dedication was both unwritten and unrecorded, for what
Plaintiffs brief refers to as "a very low bar for dedication of public properties." In that
case, dedication was oral, and acceptance was deemed established by the fact that the
road had been "continuously, openly and uninterruptedly traveled by the public

* * * for

a period of more than 10 years prior to January 1, 1893." 26 Idaho at 510,144 P. at549.

Thiessen was decided on particular facts, and in a legal environment, both of which
significantly differ from those of the present case:
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(a) In Thiessen it was established that those who offered to dedicate owned the
land~

26 Idaho at 509-510, 144 P. at 549. In the present case, as discussed

above, the evidence does not support such a finding.
(b) In Thiessen, there was evidence of an oral offer, established by the testimony
of "a large number of witnesses" who evidently had heard the declaration
made. In the present case, there is no evidence of any oral statement by the
alleged dedicators.
(c) In Thiessen, the offer to dedicate was made in 1891. At that time, road had
already been in public use for over more than five years, specifically "for ten
years before 1893." Prior to 1883 there was no statute governing the manner in
which dedication of streets was to be made, and the statue which was in force
concerning establishment of public roads provided that a public right of way
could be acquired by simple prescriptive use for five years or more. By 1908,
when the earliest acts involved in our case took place, both of those laws had
changed. Dedication required a written plat, Boise City v. Bon, supra; and
creation of a public way by use required both public and public maintenance
for five years or more. Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780 (1908).
(d) Moreover, in Thiessen it was established that the road claimed as public was
within the 25-foot strip which Thiessen offered to dedicate. In the present case,
there is no evidence showing that any part of the road which Plaintiff now
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claims to be public is within the 25-foot strip proposed by the 1908 petition.

IV - Unrecorded Dedication is Subject to Rights ofSubsequent Purchaser
The requirements for proof of ownership and for public recording of road
establishment discussed above are not merely quaint, outdated and dry legal niceties. A
good faith purchaser for value whose deed is first recorded takes priority over an
unrecorded interest. I.C.§8-812. This applies as much to an unrecorded dedication as to
any other unrecorded interest. Just as it is the recording of a plat upon which subsequent
purchases of property in reference to the plat are entitled to rely to establish dedication,

Boise City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272,94 P. 167 (1908); Worley Highway District, supra; the
absence of a recording is a matter upon which a subsequent purchaser is entitled to rely as
well. Just as the failure to record a plat demonstrates a lack of clear and unequivocal
intent to dedicate, Saddlehorn Landowner's Inc. v. Dyer, supra; it also renders an
unrecorded dedication unenforceable against a bona fide purchaser for value.

Worthington v. Koss, supra; City of Spokane v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 206 P.2d
277 (Wa. 1949); Phillips v. Laguna Beach Co., 211 P. 225 (Ca. 1923); Green v. Miller,
76 S.E. 505 (N.C. 1912) [Attachment C].
In the present case, neither the alleged road creation nor the alleged
dedication was ever recorded.

Defendant Fergel and her husband purchased their

property in 1991. They purchased for value. Their deed [Ex. 0] was recorded September
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5, 1991. Fergel testified that she and her husband had no knowledge of any county road
running where Plaintiff now claims that there is one.
Of course, to stand in the shoes of a good faith purchaser for value requires
more than merely getting and recording a deed and having no actual knowledge of the
competing claim.

Under the doctrine of constructive notice, a person is held to have

knowledge of a certain fact, because he knows other facts from which it is concluded that
he either did in fact know, or ought to have known, the fact in question. Whether a party has
notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact,
and whether by prosecuting such inquiry he might have learned such fact, are questions of
fact for the Court. Pflueger v. Hoppel, 66 Idaho 152, 156 P .2d. 316(1945). One who
purchases property with sufficient knowledge to put them, or a reasonably prudent person,
on inquiry is not a bona fide purchaser. Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 291 P.2d 852

(1955); Froman v. Madden, 13 Idaho 138, 88 P. 894 (1907).
In this case there is no evidence of any circumstance that would have put a
reasonable person on notice that there might be a county road over the property purchased
by Fergel in 1991. Vema Fergel' s testimony is unrebutted that she had no knowledge at
that time of any purported County Road 32. No such road was disclosed in her deed. Nor
was it mentioned in the title company search upon which the deed was based.
Prior to purchasing, Vema had lived close to the property and had driven
past it frequently. In 1984, she rented the property next door (the property now owned by

DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
14
') R t!

Hannah), pastured her horses there, and kept up the fence between Hannah and the
property which she now owns. From her observation of the property before purchasing it,
there was no indication that a public road existed there then or ever had existed.
On visual inspection, both at the time of purchase and at the present,
nothing on the Fergel property bears any physical evidence of ever having been
constructed or worked by the County. Every witness who testified to any maintenance,
testified to maintenance solely done by private individuals and solely at private expense.
In fact the entire thrust of Plaintiffs argument concerning an alleged public road is to the
effect that there is no need to demonstrate that the County ever expended any work or
funds on this road.
There is nothing in the evidence in this case which reasonably suggests that
a prudent purchaser would have been put on notice to inquire whether a county road
existed where none appeared on the ground. Moreover, there is no evidence that an
inquiry would likely have produced such information.

From the testimony of Chuck

Spickelmire, it is known that the County Roads Department had no record of any county
road over the property which Fergel purchased.
There is no evidence that prior to the split-up of the Neumann farm in 2000
and 2001 anyone had ever claimed that the wheel tracks across Fergel' s property was any
kind of public road or ever spoke of it as such.
To whom, then, should Fergel have directed an inquiry about the possibility
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of this road, lane or track being a county road? Her neighbors, the Painters? The road ran
to their home in the southwest quarter of the section. There is no evidence that they ever
claimed this was a public road.

When they spoke her about their right to cross her

property, they claimed rights only under a private easement, one which was mentioned in
Fergel's deed.
What if Fergel had asked the County? As the evidence shows, the County
would have disavowed any connection with the road. (Indeed, the County did disavow
this in its answer to Plaintiffs complaint.)
Should she have asked Louis Neumann, who according to witnesses George
Moore and Karl Neumann came and went over either Painter Road or River Road? The
Painter-Fergel road does not run over or enter the former Neumann farm. No one has
testified that Neumann ever claimed any right to this road. It is unrebutted that when
Louis Neumann wanted to use the road over the Painter and Fergel properties, he asked
permission. From this it may logically be inferred that had Louis been asked, this would
not have disclosed the claim of right now asserted by Plaintiff.

In the absence of

evidence of an adverse claim by Neumann, any suggestion that he would have asserted
such a claim is entirely speculative.
Given that Kathy Neumann was by her own testimony absent from the area
from 1980 to 1997 and did not own any land there until 2001, there is no sense in
suggesting that Fergel should have asked her.
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Ultimately, the only witnesses in this entire proceeding who have testified
to any claim that this was a County Road are the Plaintiff himself and his as yet unpaid
vendor, Kathy Neumann. Both of them have a clear financial interest in the outcome of
the matter. According to both of these witnesses, their claim about a public road was
raised for the first time after Vema kicked Kathy Neumann off Vema's property because
of Kathy's failure to follow conditions under which Vema had given permission for
entry, and Vema's dislike of having "drunken men" who were coming and going at night
from Kathy's property.
In short, m the absence of any evidence that the County ever built,
maintained or made any claim to the road or that anyone else claimed that it was a County
Road, there is nothing upon which to base a duty to make such inquiry and nothing but
speculation to support the possibility of being apprised of the claim now being made.

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not claim a public right of way or
easement by prescription. As stated in Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief, "County Road No. 32
was not established by prescription." [Brief at pg 7]. Therefore, the claim is one of a
private prescriptive easement.
The burden is upon Plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence that
all of the elements of a private prescriptive easement have been established. The elements
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necessary to establish an easement by prescription are: (1) an open and notorious use of
the servient property by the claiming party; (2) done with the actual or imputed
knowledge of the owner of the servient property; (3) that the use be continued for a period
of five years without interruption or interference; and (4) that the use be done under a
claim of right. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 563 P.2d 50 (1977). The burden is
upon Plaintiff to establish each of these elements by "clear and convincing" evidence.

Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,946 P.2d 975 (1997). Plaintiffs evidence falls short of
establishing these elements.
Plaintiff s claim is based upon the testimony of Karleen Neumann, Kathy
Neumann, and the Plaintiff Paul Trunnell. Each of these witnesses testified to a variety of
uses of the claimed easement by different persons. Much of this testimony dealt with
uses made by the Painters and their successors in interest, the Reimers, and by other
neighboring owners named Hulquist and their predecessors in title. All of these persons
claimed a right of access to their property over the Fergel property by means of a reserved
easement for this purpose.

Plaintiff s witnesses also testified to use of the road by

Fergel's own predecessors in title, including the Russells. And Plaintiffs evidence shows
that other persons visiting the Painters, Reimers, Hulquists and Russells used this road.
Finally, Plaintiffs witnesses testified to use of the road by various other people who may
have had no connection with Painters, Reimers, Hulquists, Russells or Defendant, such as
occasional wood cutters, hunters or other sportsmen, some of whom were apparently
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known to the witnesses and many of whom were unknown.
None of such use, however, in any way supports Plaintiffs claim for the
reason that use by persons not in Plaintiff s chain of title or using the road by authority of
Plaintiff or his predecessors in title cannot confer any prescriptive right as an appurtenant
to Plaintiffs property. Use by one person does not give rise to a prescriptive easement in
favor of another. Use made by the claimant's neighbors, friends or strangers does not
accrue or inure to the benefit of the claimant. Carbon v. Moon, 68 Idaho 385, 195 P.2d
351 (1948); State ex rei. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,594 P.2d 1093 (1979; State v.

Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 8 P.3d 657 (et. App. 2000). As the court put it in State ex rei.
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,594 P.2d 1093 (1979),
"The fact that hundreds of individuals have made use of respondents'
property for the prescriptive period does not bar respondents from enjoining
all future trespass to the property. Nor does the use of respondents' property
by certain neighbors or friends or even total strangers accrue or inure to the
benefit of others." 100 Idaho at 146, 594 P.2d at 1099.
At all relevant times, the Plaintiff property was owned either by the George
MoorelLouis Neumann partnership, the partnership's successors Louis and Jean
Neumann, the Neumann Family Trust, which deeded to Kathy Neumann and then finally
Plaintiff himself. It is only use by these owners or those acting under their authority
which could support any claim to a prescriptive easement appurtenant to the Plaintiff
parcel.
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Evidence from the start of the MoorelNeumann partnership onward fails to
establish that there was ever a five year period of continuous use under a claim of right.
Karleen Neumann testified to having gone upon the road numerous times, mostly to assist
the Painters with maintenance. Karleen, however, never testified to any claim, either
expressed or privately held, that such entry by her was under a claim of right.

She

testified that her father had brought in or brought out cattle by means of a pen and loading
chute on the Painter property and had moved both those cattle and timber over the F ergel
property. But Karleen's testimony contained not one word that her father ever did this
under a claim of right.
Similarly, Kathy Neumann testified to frequent maintenance of the road,
especially in aid of the Painters. According to her, the cattle pen and chute of which
Karleen had spoken was located on the Russell property. Kathy, too, testified to many
occasions of going onto the Painter-Fergel road to do maintenance, according to her
testimony, as many as 50 times per year. While one must seriously question the reliability
of Kathy's testimony given her statement that she is unable to recall where she lived
during a 17 year period from 1980 to 1997, nevertheless there was never any claim in
Kathy's testimony that either her father or Moore ever claimed to use this road as a matter
of right.

Continued use of a road before the prescriptive period, without any other

explanation, may support a presumption that the use was adverse.

However, that

presumption is rebuttable, and when evidence is introduced which shows that the use was
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in fact not adverse, any presumption that the use was adverse is overcome. In the present
case, there is ample evidence that use by Moore and Neumann was not adverse.
First, George Moore, who was a partner with Louis Neumann for seven
years, five of them as a co-owner of the farm, testified that neither he nor his partner
made any use of the road over the Fergel property. Nor, according to Moore, would there
have been any need to so do. The farm had its own stock pens and loading chutes, one at
the western farmstead where Moore lived, and the other at the east end next to
Neumann's home. Moore unequivocally testified that the farm had no need to attempt to
ship cattle in or out over the Fergel property and never had done so. Moreover, during the
seven years that Moore was working on the farm, no other use was made of any way
across the Fergel property. Being actively engaged in operating the property on a daily
basis and having no stake in the outcome of this case, Moore's testimony is entitled to
substantial weight.
Karl Neumann, who was also involved in operating the farm on a daily
basis for a number of years and thereafter assisted his father regularly on weekends until
his father's death, and who was eventually placed in charge of administering the farm
under a family trust, also states that the farm shipped its cattle and other animals by
means of the pens at Painter Road at the west end, and the pens River Road at the east
end. According to Karl, there was no need to ship cattle over the Fergel property. Karl
did testifY to several occasions that Louis transported timber over the Painter and Fergel
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properties, but only after asking for the owners' pennission to do so. Never, according to
Karl, had his father ever claimed that he was entitled to cross the Fergel property as a
matter of right.
Finally, Richard Hanna, cousin to Karleen, Kathy and Karl, having worked
on the fann two or three summers, and having visited there often over many years
thereafter, testified to his memory that the cattle were received and shipped from the west
and east ends of the fann. During his time at the fann, cattle were never shipped in or out
over the Fergel property, nor did he ever witness any other use by the Neumanns of the
Painter-Fergel road.
Finally, the evidence is clear and unrebutted that the Moore-Neumann fann
was accessed by two well-maintained county roads, Painter Road on the east and River
Road on the west. All witnesses testifY that the entire fann was accessed from those
roads and by means of east-west trails or roads within the fann itself. By contrast, all
witnesses say that the road over the Painter and Fergel properties was in poor condition
and difficult to use. It was muddy and tended to flood, except during the very driest part
of the summer and in the dead of winter when it was frozen solid. Even the Painters
themselves sometimes were compelled to walk to make it out to River Road. With good
roads at his disposal there is no apparent reason why Neumann would have chosen to use
the far inferior route over the Painter-Fergel properties.
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The earliest evidence of any hostile claim to the road was by Kathy
Neumann, after the trust had distributed her share of the property to her in 2001.
According to Kathy, she arranged to have a trailer hauled onto her property for use as a
storage building. She makes no claim that it was taken there without Fergel's permission.
In fact, Fergel's testimony is unrebutted that it was brought in only after the driver who
was going to haul it in for Kathy sought and obtained Fergel's permission to do so. When
a use is begun by permission, it is presumed to continue under permission, until there is
unequivocal conduct which gives the servient estate owner notice of hostile and adverse
use. Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148 at 152,953 P.2d 588 at 592 (1998).
When Kathy began crossing the property in a manner not approved by
Vema, and when drunken men began crossing Fergel's property, she revoked her
permission. All witnesses then agree that Kathy removed the trailer and did not continue
to enter upon the property.

Kathy's use of the property, even if it had not been

permissive, was for less than the prescriptive period before it was interrupted.
The only other period of claimed averse entry has been by the Plaintiff Paul
Trunnell, himself, beginning according to his testimony in the spring of 2005. While
there is substantial disagreement between Trunnell and Fergel over the details of
Trunnell's invasion of the property, either personally or through trappers or other agents,
clearly Trunnell's use did not continue for more than the prescriptive period before the
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commencement of this action.
Dated this --/f5day of May, 2009.

Jonathan W. Cottrell
Attorney for Defendant Vema Fergel

I certifY that on the

I'S

day of May, 2009, a true copy and all attachments

of the foregoing were hand delivered to Stephen T. Snedden, Attorney at Law, 113 S.
Second Avenue, Sandpoint, ID 83864.
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Supreme Court of North Carolina.
GREEN et al.

v.
MILLER et al.
Nov. 27, 1912.
Appeal from
Webb, Judge.

Superior Court, Beaufort County;

Action for injunction by J. H. Green and others
against A. Miller and another. Judgment for
plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed.
West Headnotes

pears that his reference to streets was wholly for the
purpose of description and not intended as a dedication thereof.

Easements 141 €==>22

t 41 Easements
1411 Creation, Existence, and Termination
141 k20 Right as Against Purchasers of Servient Tenement
141 k22 k. Continuous and Apparent Easements, and Notice. Most Cited Cases
A purchaser is bound to take notice of an apparent
easement for a way.

Appeal and Error 30 €==>1008.1(1)

Vendor and Purchaser 400 €==>229(8)

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(l)3 Findings of Court
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General
30k I 008.1 In General
30kl008.1(l) k. In General.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 30kI008.1)
Where a finding in answer to an issue is permitted
to remain a part of the verdict, although the trial
court disregards its legal effect, the Supreme Court
cannot go behind the finding.

400 Vendor and Purchaser
400V Rights and Liabilities of Parties
400V(C) Bona Fide Purchasers
400k225 Notice
400k229 Constructive Notice, and
Facts Putting on Inquiry
400k229(8) k. Streets and Alleys.
Most Cited Cases
A purchaser of land is bound to take notice of an
apparent dedication of a street across the land.

Dedication 119 €==>19(5)
I 19 Dedication
1191 Nature and Requisites
119k 16 Acts Constituting Dedication
119k 19 Designation in Maps or Plats, and
Sale of Lots
119k 19(5) k. Sale of Lands with Reference to Map, Plat, or Survey. Most Cited Cases
Where an owner sells lots with reference to a plan
or map showing streets, he dedicates the streets to
the use of the purchasers, unless it expressly ap-

Vendor and Purchaser 400 €==>239(1)
400 Vendor and Purchaser
400V Rights and Liabilities of Parties
400V(C) Bona Fide Purchasers
400k239 Title and Rights Acquired by
Bona Fide Purchasers and Equities and Defenses
Against Them
400k239( I) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of
a dedication to individuals or to the public take it
free from such rights.

Vendor and Purchaser 400 €==>244
400 Vendor and Purchaser
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(Cite as: 161 N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505)
400V Rights and Liabilities of Parties
400V(C) Bona Fide Purchasers
400k241 Evidence as to Purchase in Good
Faith
400k244 k. Weight and Sufficiency.
Most Cited Cases
Evidence held to show that neither defendant nor
his grantor was chargeable with notice that a former
owner had sold lots to plaintiff with reference to a
plan showing a street.
*505 This action was brought by 1. H. Green, town
of Belhaven, Mary A. Woodward, A. W. Carty, and
others against the defendants, A. Miller and W. J.
Bullock, and the relief sought is a mandatory injunction compelling the defendants to desist from
obstructing any part of Pungo street, which lies
within the corporate limits of Belhaven, and to remove therefrom certain buildings or stables now
occupied by the defendant A. Miller. The jury returned the following verdict: "(1) Was ~the defendant Bullock in 1890 the owner*506 in fee of that
tract of land in what is now known as Belhaven,
bounded on the north by Pantego street, on the east
by Pamlico street, on the south by Clark or Front
street, and on the west by Allen or Union street?
Answer: Yes. (2) Did the defendant Bullock cause
this land or any part of it to be surveyed and plotted
into lots and streets? Answer: Yes. (3) If so, did the
defendant Bullock sell lots in this tract with reference to said plot or survey? Answer: Yes. (4) If this
tract or any part of it was surveyed and plotted into
lots and streets, did one of the streets so surveyed
and plotted correspond with what is now known as
Pungo street? Answer: Yes. (5) If what is known as
Pungo street was surveyed and plotted out, what
width was given it in the survey and plot, 80 feet;
and did it extend from Pamlico to Allen street? Answer: Yes. (6) Is there any obstruction in that lot of
land covered by Pungo street, yes; and if so, who
maintains it? Answer: A. Miller. (7) Did the defendant Miller have notice, at the time he purchased
the land covered by the deed introduced in this action, that any part of it was covered by Pungo street
or any street? Answer: No."
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Plaintiffs alleged that W. 1. Bullock, being the owner of certain land now embraced within the limits of
the town of Belhaven, caused the same to be surveyed and laid off into lots and streets, and that the
surveyor, at Bullock's request, made a map or plan
thereof, and the plaintiffs, other than the town of
Belhaven, bought several of the lots from him, according to the said plan or map, some of them being
represented on the map as bounded on Pungo street.
That one of the streets was designated on the map
and in the plan as Pungo street, and that the lots
were sold to plaintiffs, other than the town of Belhaven, and described as fronting on Pungo street,
which is the third street north of Pungo river; the
two intervening streets being Clark and Main.
Pungo street runs east and west, crossing Pamlico
street, and extends to Allen street and as far west as
Haslin street. This is what we gather from the allegations, the map, and the evidence, and, if not precisely accurate, is sufficiently so for all practical
purposes. The counsel did not agree as to the correctness of the map, and Pungo street, as claimed
by the plaintiffs, may extend north instead of west.
There is an allegation in the complaint that the
town of Belhaven had accepted the dedication of
Pungo street, and that it had become one of the public streets or thoroughfares of the town. The
plaintiffs further allege that Bullock sold to L. G.
Roper, and he to the defendant Miller, a parcel of
land west of Pamlico street, which includes a part
of Pungo street, and that defendant Miller has erected in Pungo street, west of Pamlico street, a building which he now occupies and which obstructs the
street and greatly interferes with the use thereof.
The defendant A. Miller denies all the material allegations of the complaint except the one that he
had bought a part of the land from Roper. He specially avers that he purchased from Roper for full
value, and if any plan or map of the land was made
for Bullock, or any street by the name of Pungo had
been dedicated to private or public use, or laid out
for either of such uses, he had no notice thereof, nor
did he have any notice that the land he bought embraced any part of what is well known and defined
on the east side of Pamlico street as Pungo street,
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nor that there was any such street or any street at all
extending across the place where he bought and
erected the buildings. It was stated at the hearing in
this court, as we understood, and it so appears in
the record, that none of the deeds referred to or
called for the map, but that the lots described in
several of them fronted on Pungo street. It appears
that the map was never seen by any purchaser of a
lot from Bullock except one 1. P. Clark, who found
it among his father's papers. Judgment was entered
upon the verdict, and the defendants appealed.
Small, McLean & McMullan, of Washington, for
appellants. John G. Tooly, of Belhaven, and Rodman & Rodman, of Washington, for appellees.

WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).
It is evident that this case must be decided upon the
single question as to whether defendant was a bona
fide purchaser for value and without notice of the
facts alleged by the plaintiffs to constitute an equitable estoppel, which means that if he is bound
thereby he is concluded from now asserting that he
is lawfully within the limits of Pungo street, west of
Pamlico street, and cannot continue to maintain his
stable or other structure. There was much controversy as to whether Pungo street, west of Pamlico
street, if represented as such on the Bullock map,
had ever actually been laid out by such physical
marks and boundaries as to constitute notice to the
world that the land corresponding to that so designated on the map had been appropriated for a street
and dedicated to the use of Bullock's grantees or to
the public. Bullock himself testified that Pungo
street, west of Pamlico, "had not been surveyed nor
opened up," nor did the surveyor plot all of the
land. He further stated that "the surveyor might
have surveyed East Pungo street-that is, east of
Pamlico street-but he did not survey west of that
street, and they did not open any street from Pamlico street westwardly to Haslin street. "He still further testified that he employed Mr. Tripp to make
the survey, who made a plot for him, but did not
plot it all. "It was more than the survey. I have never had the plot. The Clarks made the *507 street

themselves. Pamlico street is the only street which
has been left like I first cut them out. They have all
been changed more or less. Parties built without
knowing where the streets were. For instance, this
man Pettiford, the husband of Josephine Pettiford."W. W. Walker testified that he bought the
land where the stable is from Dr. Bullock; but it
seems that the deed was made by Dr. Bullock to L.
G. Roper, who in tum sold and conveyed to the defendant A. Miller. The witness Walker, who built
the stable, stated that there was no street west of
Pamlico, and nothing but a swamp. That the town
of Belhaven had notified him, by its proper officers,
and while he was setting the pillars, to desist from
completing the stable until a committee could be
appointed to condemn the street for the town. Afterwards the committee reported, and the commissioners of the town accepted the report as to Pungo
street, east of Pamlico, and rejected it as to the land
lying west of that street, and authorized him to proceed with his work and finish the building, which
he did. He listed the property for taxation and paid
the taxes assessed against it. When he was building
the stable, there was no street there, but a street
called Pungo was opened on the east side of PamIico. This is only some of the testimony bearing
upon the main question in the case. N. L. Sawyer
testified: "I live in Washington, and lived in Belhaven 13 years. I know where Miller's stables are.
When I lived there it was nothing but swamp and
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. I know when
Sir Walker built. There was no sign of any
street."There was much more testimony to the same
effect. With this evidence behind the verdict to sustain the finding of the jury upon the seventh issue,
the court, without disturbing the verdict in any respect, adjudged thereon that defendants remove the
buildings from the street called "Pungo," west of
Pamlico, enjoined them from maintaining any kind
of obstruction therein, and decreed that the street be
kept open and free from any impediments, for the
use of the inhabitants of the town of Belhaven,
without let or hindrance. In this we are of the opinion there was error, and the judgment should have
been the other way.
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Where the owner of real property lays out a town or
village upon it, or even a plot of ground, and divides it into blocks or squares, and subdivides it into lots or sites for residences, which are intersected
by streets, avenues, and alleys, and he sells and
conveys any of the lots with reference to a plan or
map made of the property, or where he sells or conveys according to a map of the city or town, in
which his land is so laid off, he thereby dedicates
the streets and alleys to the use of those who purchase the lots, and also to the public, under certain
circumstances not necessary to be now and here
stated, and this is so unless it appears, either by express statement in the conveyance or otherwise, that
the reference to or mention of the street or streets
was solely for the purpose of description and not
intended as a dedication thereof. 13 Cyc. 455. The
same rule is said to apply to such pieces or parcels
of the land marked on the plot or map as squares,
courts, or parks. The reason for the rule is that the
grantor, by making such a conveyance of his property, induces the purchasers to believe that the
streets and alleys, squares, courts, and parks will be
kept open for their use and benefit; and having acted upon the faith of his implied representations,
based upon his conduct in plotting the land and
selling accordingly, he is equitably estopped, as
well in reference to the public as to his grantees,
from denying the existence of the easement thus
created. 13 Cyc. 457, and notes. Many authorities
sustain the principle, and the dedication, when once
fully made, is held to be irrevocable. Moose v. Carson, 104 N. C. 431,10 S. E. 689,7 L. R. A. 548,17
Am. St. Rep. 681, and numerous authorities cited in
the opinion of the court by Justice Avery, and also
at the end of the case in the annotated edition by the
present Chief Justice. Davis v. Morris, 132 N. C.
436, 43 S. E. 950; Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 460,
46 S. E. 956, 47 S. E. 462; Milliken v. Denny, 135
N. C. 22, 47 S. E. 132; s. c., 141 N. C. 227, 53 S. E.
867; Hester v. Traction Co., 138 N. C. 293,50 S. E.
711, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 981; State v. Fisher, 117 N.
C. 740,23 S. E. 158; Tise v. Whitaker, 144 N. C.
514, 57 S. E. 210; Collins v. Land Co., 128 N. C.
563, 39 S. E. 21, 83 Am. St. Rep. 720; Bailliere v.
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Shingle Co., 150 N. C. 627, 64 S. E. 754; and other
authorities cited in the briefs of counsel in this case,
to which access may be had by those wishing to
pursue the investigation further.
But, while the rule is well established, It IS necessary that in some way notice of the dedication thus
made be fixed upon those who may buy any part of
the property which is subject to or charged with the
easement, or of the rights of others flowing from
the dedication. It would be unjust that a rule, which
is based upon an equitable doctrine, should, in its
application, deprive a man of property bought in
good faith, for value, and without notice of the right
to the easement. Parties who claim the benefit of
the easement by virtue of the implied dedication
can easily protect their right and interest in it by
having proper reference made to the map in their
deeds, and, if they fail to do so, it is their own fault,
and they should not be permitted to visit its consequences upon an innocent purchaser who was
misled by their laches. It is said that the original
grantor, who sold by the map or the diagram of the
land as laid out into blocks and lots,. streets and avenues, and those claiming under him, are estopped
to deny the right of prior purchasers of lots to an
easement in the streets represented on the map; but
it is not a strict estoppel, *508 but one arising out of
the conduct of the party, who originally owned the
land and plotted it for the purpose of selling the
lots, and is predicated upon the idea of bad faith in
him, or those claiming under him, with knowledge
of the facts, or with notice thereof, either express or
constructive, to repudiate his implied representation
that the streets and alleys, parks and places, will be
kept open and unobstructed for the use of those
who may buy from him. So far as the owner is concerned, it would be fraudulent for him to contest the
right of his grantees; but as to those who have
bought without notice, actual or constructive, of the
facts, and the equitable estoppel fastened upon him,
the estoppel grounded, as we have said, in an equitable principle completely fails. The same general
principle of equity that raises the estoppel will protect him as an innocent purchaser from its opera-
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tion, and this is but just and right. But we are not
without direct authority upon this point, although
the proposition seems to be somewhat new, or
rather cases presenting it are rare, but it is at last
but the application of a conceded rule of equity to
the special facts of the case. One who buys property
of another without notice that some third person has
a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays a
full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of such other in the property (5 Cyc. 719),
takes the same free from the right of the other, because he is regarded as an innocent purchaser and
entitled to the equitable consideration of the court.
It is a perfectly just rule, and it would be strange if
the law were otherwise.
It is said in 13 Cyc. pp. 492, 493, that, with the exception of bona fide purchasers without notice, all
parties holding under a dedicator take only his title.
"The general rules as to the title taken by bona fide
purchasers without notice apply where the incumbrance is a dedication to the public use. Usually the
state of the property or the records constitute notice
by which the purchaser is bound, whether his
knowledge of the easement be actual or not."The
question was directly raised in'Schuchman v. Borough of Homestead, 111 Pa. 48, 2 Atl. 407, and
after stating that a bona fide purchaser without notice is unaffected by notice to his vendor (Bond v.
Stroup, 3 Bin. [Pa.] 66), and therefore, if the defendants in that case purchased the land without notice, even if Phillips, their immediate vendor, had
been notified of the dedication before his purchase,
their title would be good, it was there said by the
court: "It is reasonably certain that the Homestead
Bank & Life Insurance Company dedicated the land
to the public, and that a number of persons purchased lots expecting to enjoy the resulting advantage. However, nothing in the plan, or in the course
of title, or on the ground, was a warning to Ormsby
Phillips of such dedication, and therefore he acquired a good title. The citizens of the borough suffer serious loss under the operation of a rule which
applies to them as it would to an individual under
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similar circumstances." So in Harbor v. Smith. 85
Md. 542. 37 Atl. 29, the court asserted the same
principle as applying to cases of dedication, saying:
"It may be conceded that, if there were any owners
of lots who purchased under such circumstances
and without notice of the contract or the agreement
between the Patapsco and Brooklyn Companies,
they would have a standing in a court of
equity."We think the same doctrine was impliedly
recognized by this court in Collins v. Land Co., 128
N. C. at margin page 567 (Anno. Ed.), 39 S. E. 21,
83 Am. St. Rep. 720.
In this case there is no reference in the deeds, as set
out in the record, to the map of Bullock, and no
deed in defendant's chain of title referring to the
map. The testimony given by defendant's witnesses,
a part of which we have recited, tends to show that
there was nothing "on the ground" to warn Miller
or Roper, his vendor, of any dedication. It is true
there was testimony to the contrary, but the court
submitted the seventh issue to the jury, and, upon a
presumably fair consideration of the evidence, they
answered it in favor of defendants. The court let
that issue stand and gave judgment on the entire
verdict. Plaintiff did not ask that it be set aside as to
the seventh issue, which application, if made,
would have been addressed to the discretion of the
court. There is no exception upon which the verdict
as to that issue can now be assailed, and there could
not well be as plaintiff did not appeal, but defendants did. The court simply disregarded the legal effect of the seventh issue, and, we presume, for the
reason that he did not think it prevented a recovery
by the plaintiff, or, in other words, that the doctrine
of bona fide purchaser without notice did not apply
to the case. Even if the judge thought there was
constructive or legal notice to defendant of the dedication, which there was not, as we have shown, he
should have set aside the verdict upon that ground,
so that defendant could review his ruling.
As the issue and answer thereto were pennitted to
remain a part of the verdict, we cannot go behind it
to inquire whether there was actual or constructive
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notice, as we give judgment, not upon evidence, but
upon the findings of fact or the verdict of the jury.
If the court was of opinion that there was no evidence to support the finding upon the seventh issue,
or that it was against the weight of the evidence, the
remedy was to set it or the entire verdict aside. In
the absence of such a course of procedure, we cannot ignore the fmding, nor could the judge, but
must accept it as true and correct. There was strong
and, if believed by the jury, which seems to have
been the case, convincing proof to sustain their
finding upon that issue. The plan or map made by
Tripp, *509 the surveyor, for Dr. Bullock was never
attached to any of the deeds. It may be a fact that
lots were sold to plaintiffs, except the town, and to
others with reference to the plan, but the evidence
shows that it was never made public, but was found
by J. P. Clark, plaintiffs' witness, among the papers
of his father when the latter died.
Looking at the whole case, we find that there was
evidence for the jury, under instructions from the
court, by which they were warranted in finding that
there was "nothing in the plan, or in the course of
(defendant's) title, or on the ground," to notify
Miller or Roper of any dedication of land west of
Pamlico street for another street to be called
"Pungo," and therefore, if in fact there was such a
dedication, he purchased bona fide and without notice of it. Schuchman v. Borough of Homestead,
supra. The deeds are not set out in the record, but
only extracts therefrom showing the description.
Some of them call for Pungo street as the boundary
of the lots conveyed thereby, but there is nothing in
them to indicate where it is on the map, as the latter
is not referred to.
If they had referred to the map and it delineated the
street, or if the jury had found that there were physical marks on the ground of such a nature that defendant must have known of the dedication, a different question would be presented, as a purchaser
is bound to take notice of an apparent easement,
servitude, or dedication for a street or other way;
and, if he fails to do so, he buys at his peril and
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takes his title subject thereto. But all this, as we
have said, was for the jury to consider before the
verdict was returned, and under proper instructions
from the court. The verdict only finds that Bullock
owned the land covering the locus in quo; that he
caused it to be surveyed and plotted into lots and
streets and sold lots with reference to the plot, and
that, on the map, what is known as Pungo street is
designated as extending from Pamlico to Allen
streets, and that defendant A. Miller has obstructed
it; but that he purchased his lot without any notice
of the dedication of the street. But there is no evidence that he ever saw the map or heard of it, and
the mere fact that Bullock conveyed according to a
hidden or concealed map, and without reference
thereto in his deeds, as far as appears, is certainly
not legal notice to Miller of the dedication and location of the street. So that the important fact is
omitted from the verdict that Bullock in contemplation of law conveyed by the map-that is, by referring to it-and there is absolutely no evidence that
Miller or Roper actually knew of the map or had
ever heard of it. If there was, the jury were not influenced by it in making up their verdict, and it is
for them to say what the facts are. In truth, they
seemed to have repudiated the plaintiffs testimony
as to there being any street known as Pungo, west
of Pamlico, and to have accepted what defendants'
witnesses testified in regard to that matter, viz., that
the land was swampy and subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide.
Upon the verdict and the whole case, the court, in
our opinion, should have given judgment for the defendants, and erred in entering judgment for the
plaintiffs upon the verdict. This reverses the judgment, and the court below will enter judgment for
the defendants accordingly.
We have not considered the other serious questions
as to the right of plaintiffs to an injunction, as we
have not found it essential to do so. It may be that a
municipal corporation, like the town of Belhaven, is
entitled to have an obstruction in its streets removed, and for that purpose to have a mandatory
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injunction in a proper case. It has been held that it
can bring ejectment where a street, or a part thereof, is illegally withheld, and some courts hold that
an injunction will lie as the more speedy and convenient remedy. We will decide those questions
when properly and necessarily presented to us. If
the town of Belhaven requires the land of the defendant Miller for public use as a street, it may be
acquired by condemnation.
Reversed.
N.C. 1912.
Green v. Miller
16 I N.C. 24, 76 S.E. 505,44 L.R.A.N.S. 231
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
Case No. CV-2007-1292

PAUL TRUNNELL and
BILL LOMU,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO AMEND

vs.
VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant.
Defendant's motion to amend the answer to allege that Defendant is a good
faith purchaser for value and entitled to the protections afforded by Idaho Code §55-812
as against the claims of Plaintiff came before the court for hearing May 20,2009.
Having reviewed said motion and Plaintiff s statement of opposition thereto
and having received oral argument, now, therefore, in the exercise of the discretion
afforded the court under Rule 15(b) IRCP, it is ordered that Defendant's motion is
granted.

So ordered

thiS~y of May, 2009.
Steve Verby
District Judge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND

I certifY that on the _ _ day of May, 2009, a true copy of the foregoing has
been deposited into the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stephen T. Snedden
Featherston Law Finn, Chtd
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Jonathan W. Cottrell, Chartered
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ClerklDeputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,)

Case No. CV 2007-0001292

)

Plaintiff,

v.

) ORDER WITHDRAWING DECISION
)
AND REQUIRING ADDITIONAL
BRIEFING
)
)

VERNA FERGEL, an individual, )
)

Defendant.

)

------------------------)
The Court, after announcing its decision, conducted additional research on the issue
addressed. Based on the research, the Court concludes that it is best to withdraw the decision
and require the parties to submit additional briefs on the determinative issue of the
interpretation of the phrase "Roads laid out and recorded as highways," as it is used in the
Idaho statute in effect in 1910, C.S. § 1304.

On September 4, 2009, this matter came before the Court for the announcement of a
decision. The Court ruled that the determinative factor was the interpretation of the phrase
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways," as it is used in Idaho Compiled Statutes § 1304,
which was in effect at the time the Board of Bonner County Commissioners approved County
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Road 32. Section 1304 provides in part:

Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of
commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided
the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or
located and recorded by order of the board of commissioners, are highways .
... " (emphasis added).
The plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, attempting to prove the establishment of County Road
No. 32 in 1910, asserts that this public "highway" was established of record when the county
commissioners approved the legal description and the Viewer's Report in the minutes of the
Board of Bonner County Commissioners. Thus, Mr. Trunnell claims that the term "recorded,"
as it is used in C.S. § 1304, means recordation in the Board of Bonner County
Commissioners'minutes. Conversely, the defendant, Verna Fergel, denying the establishment
of such a road across her property, argues that "recorded" in the statute should have a different
meaning, and thus, the term refers to recordation in the Bonner County Recorder's Office.
The Court initially ruled that C.S. § 1304 does not require the recording of the survey
and/or ordinance declaring the road to be a public highway in the county recorder's office, but
that "recording" in the board of county commissioners' minutes is sufficient.
After announcing the decision, the Court conducted additional research during the
Labor Day weekend of both case law and statutory law, including: Galli v. Idaho County, 146
Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 (2008); Burrup v. Stanger, 114 Idaho 50, 753 P.2d 261 (Ct. App.

1988); Cardwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 665 P .2d 1081 (Ct. App. 1983); Pugmire v. Johnson,
102 Idaho 882, 643 P.2d 832 (1982); and Boise City By and Through Amyx v. Fails, 94 Idaho
840, 499 P.2d 326 (1972). In Boise City By and Through Amyx, supra, the Idaho Supreme
Court traced the legislative history of the applicable statute, going back to the 11 th Territorial
ORDER WITHDRAWING DECISION
AND REQUIRING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING - 2 -

Session in 1880-1881. The following cases, Nicolaus v. Bodine, 92 Idaho 639, 448 P.2d 645
(1968); Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335,362 P.2d 1088 (1961); State v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1,310

P.2d 787 (1957); Kootenai County v. Kinman, 56 Idaho 1, 47 P.2d 887 (1935); Ross v.
Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35, 225 P. 1021 (1924); Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780

(1908), also seem to have applicability as to the interpretation of the term "recorded," either
from custom, application, or as applied by the court in the decision.
Upon review of these cases and other law, and as authorized by I.R.C.P. 60, the Court
has decided to withdraw the September 4,2009, decision sua sponte, and to request additional
briefing from the parties on the determinative issue.

Part of the reason for making this

decision to withdraw the decision is the prior experience of the undersigned while in private
practice. It is usually more equitable to give each side an opportunity to present law in
support of the proposition advanced. By withdrawing the decision, each party will be able to
argue the determinative issue.
Specifically, the Court would like the parties to provide legal authority and argument
on the following: (1) whether Idaho, and/or any other jurisdiction, has addressed the issue of a
recordation requirement for the establishment of a public road/highway, either by requiring
recording in the county recorder's office or by ordinance or in the minutes of the county
commissioners' meetings; (2) what rules of statutory construction should the Court apply in
interpreting the term "recorded," as it is used in the statute; (3) each party's proposed
conclusions on this issue; and (4) the public policy issues in regard to the effect of the
"recording statutes." In addition, there are questions as to whether or not a survey of County
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Road 32 was ever completed, and if so, was any survey recorded which refers to County Road
32.
The parties' briefs must be submitted on or before Friday, October 16,2009.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

/

~ay of September, 2009.

4~~W
District Judge
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facsimile, and mailed, postage prepaid, this 1I-tI\ day of September, 2009, to:

Stephen T. Snedden
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Fax #: (208) 263-6St5004-00
Jonathan W. Cottrell
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 874
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Fax #: (208) 265-9226

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual
Plaintiff;
vs.
VERNA FERGEL, an individual
Defendant;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV-2007-0001292
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

)

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through its counsel, Stephen T. Snedden,
and submits the following Brief:

I.

ST ATEMENT OF FACTS

A bifurcated, non-jury trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter on April 28
2009. The Court, having considered the testimony presented from April 28

th
,

th
,

2009.

through April 30 th , 2009, and such other evidence to which the Court took judicial
notice, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record ("decision") entered
September 4th, 2009. Shortly thereafter the court issued an order withdrawing its ruling
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The creation of County Road No. 32 is controlled by Idaho statutes in effect at the time
of the asserted creation. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment. In determining whether Bonner County, County Road No. 32 was a public
road, this court ruled that a determinative factor was the interpretation of the phrase,
"Roads laid out and recorded as highways" as used in the Idaho Compiles Statutes

§ 1304. Plaintiff previously argued that the term "recorded" as used in C.S. § 1304
meant recorded in the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners. To this extent,
Plaintiff submitted minutes of the Commissioner's meeting stating, "After due
consideration, said report was by the Board approved, and the same is hereby declared
to be a County Road." See Plaintiffs Exhibit 37. The Plaintiff also submitted
documents showing a Viewer's Report stamped "County Commissioners APPROVED
January 17,1910". See Plaintiffs Exhibit 34.

Defendant previously argued that the term "recorded" required the act of recordation in
the Bonner County Recorder's Office. This court initially found that declaration of the
county road as a public highway in the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners
was sufficient. The Court however; withdrew its opinion and requested further research
by the parties. Specifically the Court requested the following: (1) Whether Idaho and/or
any other jurisdiction has addressed the issue of a recordation requirement for the
establishment of a public road/highway either by requiring recording in the county
recorder's office, by ordinance, or in the minutes of the county commissioners'
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meeting; (2) what rules of statutory construction should the court apply in interpreting
the term "recorded" as used in the statute; (3) Each party's proposed conclusion on the
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issue; and (4) the public policy issues in regard to the effect of the "recording statutes".
The court further asked if any survey had been recorded referring to County Road 32.

II.

HISTORICAL

DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

ROAD

CREATION

STATUTE
There have been relatively few changes to Idaho's road creation statute over the last
century. The substance of the statute is largely unchanged since 1893.) The 1893 statute
provided:
Section 850. Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laid out or
erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or abandoned
to the public.
Section 851. Roads are laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board
of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided
the later shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public or
located and recorded by order of the board of commissioners, are highways. . .
." 1893 Idaho Sess. Laws at p. 12, § 1 (then codified at Rev. Stat. of Idaho Terr.
§ 851)

Subsequently, the statute was amended to read in 1901:
Section 1137. What Are Highways: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others,
dedicated or abandoned to the public.
Section 1138. Further Enumeration: Roads laid out and recorded as highways,
by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period
of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up at the
expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways .... " Idaho Code Ann. (Political Code) §§ 1137,
1138 (1901)(underline used to show amended portions of the statute)

~. . .Caw ~(m cML
'DanielP. :Tutlierswn
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Earlier versions of the road creation statute can be traced back to 1864.
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Section 874. Highways Defined: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others,
dedicated or abandoned to the public.
Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out and recorded as
highways, by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such
for a period of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up
at the expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways.
. . . " 1 Idaho Code Ann. §§ 874, 875
(1908)(underline used to show amended portions of the statute)
In 1911, the statute was amended to exclude Section 875 and read:
"Section 1: Highways are roads, streets, alleys and bridges, laid out or erected
by the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public .... " 1911 Idaho Session
Laws ch. 55 § 1 (the Highway District Act of 1911)(underline used to show
amended portions of the statute) 2
In 1918, the statute reverted back to the 1908 version:
Section 874. Highways Defined: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others,
dedicated or abandoned to the public.
Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out and recorded as
highways, by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such
for a period of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up
at the expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways. . .. " 1 Compiled Laws of Idaho. §§ 874, 875
(l918)(underline used to show amended portions of the statute) 3

In the current codification, these provisions are repeated largely in the same form but in
two different locations, the definition section,
section,

I.e.

§ 40- 109(5) and the substantive

I.e. § 40-202(3).4

This amendment to 1137 and 1138 was not codified. In addition, the language of Section 1138 did not
appear in this amendment. In subsequent years the code reverted to the language of sections 1 J 37 and
1138.
2
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C.S. § 1304 was not actually adopted until 1919 as 1 Compiled Stat. ofIdaho §§ 1302 (1919). C.S. §§
1302 and 1304 contained no changes to the 1918 statute except for re-numbering.

3

I.C. § 40-202(3): Highways are laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this
section by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used for a period of five (5) years,
4
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During the trial and in briefing, counsels have referred to C.S. § 1304. The proper
version of the statute, in effect in 1910 is the 1908 statute, 1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875
(1908) though C.S. § 1304 is nearly identical. The statute in effect at the time of the
asserted creation is as follows:
Section 874. Highways Defined: Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and
bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others,
dedicated or abandoned to the public.
Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out and recorded as
highways, by order of the board of commissioners, and all roads used as such
for a period of five years, provided the later shall have been worked and kept up
at the expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways .... " 1 Idaho Code Ann. §§ 874 and 875 (1908)

Plaintiff continues to assert that the term "recorded" as used in 1 Idaho Code Ann. §
875 (1908) means recorded in the minutes of the Board of County Commissioners and
Plaintiff's argument in support of such assertion follows.

III.

ARGUMENT

A. The Caselaw of Other States Supports Plaintiff's Interpretation Of
Recordation As An Act of The County Commissioners
Precedent from other states shows that early county· commISSIOner boards were
frequently referred to as courts of the county commissioners. These commissioner
courts issued orders and created a record of their findings. When recordation with the
~ ..t:6W !firm QIi
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provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded
by order of the board of commissioners, are highways ...."
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county recorder's office was a requirement for the creation of a public road, the
requirement explicitly referenced the recorder's office.

When looking to other jurisdictions in addressing the issue of a recordation requirement
for the establishment of a public road or highway, the Texas courts were very helpful.
In the case, Eastex Wildlife Conservation Ass 'n v. Jasper et aI, 450 S. W. 2d 904 (1970)
the court quoting Judge Gaines in Worthington v. Wade, 82 Tex 26,17 S.W. 550 (1891)
states the rule relating to the establishment of public roads: "All roads which have been
laid out and established by authority of the commissioners' courts are public roads."
Worthington, 82 Tex 26 (1891). The Texas courts further found " ... In establishing

public roads, the county can act only through the Commissioners' Court, the individual
commissioners having no authority to bind the county by their separate actions.
Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex 169,214 S.W. 2d 451,455 (1948). The commissioners'

court is a court of record, and speaks through its minutes, and not by the mouths of the
members of the body. Gano v. County o/Palo Pinto, 71 Tex. 99, 8 S.W. 634 (1888).

Under Texas precedent, the Commissioner's Court is a court of record and the meeting
minutes are representative of such record. Thereby the language "recorded by order of
the b()ard of commissioners" as interpreted through the Texas Courts signifies formal
~ .LAw 11m cr.L

action accomplished within the minutes of the meeting of the board.
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The Alabama courts gave similar power and authority to the Board of Commissioners.
In Sultzner v. State, 43 Ala. 24, 1869 WL 474 (1869) the court in acknowledgment of
revised code declared that no public road shall be established, changed or discontinued,
except on application to the court of county commissioners ... "

Section 1359 of the

relevant Alabama Code required the probate judges to keep road books, records
containing a complete list of all the public roads in their counties, their names, grades,
and the road precincts, so that an easy reference could be had at all times to them.
Section 1372 of the relevant Alabama Code provided that any order of the court of
county commissioners, by which a road is recognized as a public road, is presumptive
evidence thereof. Sultzner, 43 Ala 24 (1869). Again, it is clear that the term recorded
referred to the commissioners' action of written declaration of a public road in the
records of the board of commissioners, specifically in the road book which was
available as a public record providing notice of such acts.

In Green v. Road Board of Bibb County, 126 Ga 693, 56 S. E. 59 (1906), the
recordation requirements for a new road were clearly stated. Again this authority was
granted to the County Board of Commissioners. Under the provisions of section 21,
subsection 3 of the act of 1873, the county board of commissioners had exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of establishing, altering, or abolishing all roads,
bridges, and ferries, in conformity to law.
~ Law ~frm dit&
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Before it can be said that the county

commissioners have established a [public] road as to render it obligatory upon the part
of other county authorities to clear and work the same for use by the traveling public,
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there must be, in the office of the county commissioners, a record of the establishment
by appropriate order, and the road must be described in that record with such
particularity as that the same ... may actually be located from that record.

See

generally, Green, 126 Ga 693 (1906). Under Georgia law in a similar time period, the
word "record" distinctly described permanent documentation stored in the office of the
board of county commissioners.

In the North Carolina case, Merrell v. Bridges, 213 N.C. 123, 195 S.E. 374 (1938) the
court held that the statutory method in force in 1914 for laying out and establishing
public roads in the relevant county gave to the board of county commissioners the
power and authority to layout all new roads, with power of condemnation. Such
method was prescribed as follows: "Whenever said board shall be of the opinion that it
is necessary and for the public good that any new road or cartway shall be made,

***

said board shall so declare, and shall appoint one or more of its members, who, together
with the road engineer or a competent surveyor to be designated for that purpose, shall
view the premises and layout the same, and they shall make report of their action to the
board. The board shall either approve or disapprove said report at its next regular
meeting." Bridges, 213 N.C. 123 (1938). The plaintiffs in Bridges, to establish the
existence of a public road, offered into evidence the minute book of the Board of
County Commissioners, showing the official action relative to the road in question, as
r.tfi,,:stm .tAw :firm cML

therein recorded, as follows: "Ordered that engineer and county commissioner be sent
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to Leicester Township to layout a public road over the lands of J.F. Radcliff, J.E.
Roberson and N.H. Waldrop to the lands of J.F. Radcliff." Id.

The Washington case, Gregory v. County Commissioners

0/ Kitsap County,

110 Wash

476, 188 P. 761 (1920) highlighted the Washington Legislature's passing of Chapter
54, Laws of 1911:
"An act relating to the establishment and widening of county roads and to the
exercise of the right of eminent domain by counties in condemning land and other
property for county roads and to secure property containing gravel, stone or other
road building materials, and rights of way in and to such property and repealing all
acts in conflict herewith. This act provides that county roads shall be laid out and
established by order of the county commissioners and when deemed advisable that a
road be established the board of county commissioners shall at a regular meeting by
unanimous vote pass a resolution and enter same on the minutes of the board, which
resolution shall describe the terminal points of such proposed road and the width and
general course of the same.***The resolution shall declare that the laying out and
establishment of the road is considered a public necessity ... " Gregory, 110 Wash
476 (1920).

In Rocky Mountain Sheep Co., v Board o/County Commissioners o/Carbon County, 73
Wyo. 11, 269 P.2d 314 (1954) recordation requirements were also specifically set
forth. Pursuant to

w.e.s.

1945 §48-322 a county road cannot be established without

there being placed of record a plat of the survey of such road together with the
proceedings in relation to its location, establishment or alteration. The statute further
prescribed the kind of record which was required to be made as follows:
~ LAW 1frmcML
'Dtutiel'P. :Fetztkrston
'.BTltItc. :T_tNnttm'
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"If... the board of county commissioners shall decide to layout or alter any
road, they shall cause the county surveyor to make an accurate survey thereof, if
such survey is necessary, and to plat the same in books to be provided by the
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county for such purpose, and the county clerk shall record in the same books
opposite or near to such plat so that the same may be easily ascertained to be
concerning the platted road, the proceeding of the said board in relation to the
location, establishment or alteration of said road, in order to keep in a separate
book a record of all the county roads of that county." Rocky Mountain Sheep
Co., 73 Wyo 11 (1954).
The few jurisdictions requiring recordation in a county recorders' office specifically
state such requirement. It is not left to open interpretation. To conclude that the term
"recorded" without more implies that the declaration of the public road be recorded in
the County Recorders' Office is to negate the power of the Board of County
Commissioners in establishing public roads and is to imply that the Legislature failed to
clarify such a critical step in the process of establishing public roads.

By way of example, Board of Commissioners of Weld County v. Ingram, 31 Colo. 319,
73 P. 37 (1903) clearly states such relevant law. Section 2384 of the General Laws of
1877 declares as follows: "Whenever the viewers of any road shall have completed
their labors, and returned to the county commissioners their final report on any road, it
shall be the duty of said board of commissioners to have all of said report, including
plat of said road, put upon record in their respective counties in the office of the
recorder of deeds for such county."

When reviewing cases from a similar time period the authority and power given to a
~..uw 1frm a.l
'D4nie1'.P. !FtIltliersttm
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commissioners' boards used judicial terminology and procedures. The term recorded
and its current association with recordation in a recorder's office distracts from its
intended interpretation as written. To infer a recordation requirement in the county
recorder's office when one is not specified is to diminish the authority of the
commissioners and overlook the prevailing view of commissioner courts in 1910.
What was important in 1910 was that there was permanent, written evidence of the
declaration of County Road 32 as a public road. This was accomplished by the county
commissioners' order in the minutes of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners.

B. The Principles of Statutory Construction Conclude Recording Is An Act Of

The County Commissioners

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect
to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133
Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978
P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App.
2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules
of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389,3 P.3d at 67.

'fttItf-DIn .LAw ~irm cW.
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.54n4rt1~.~

Steplim 'T. Snuftfm
~

..tiltll

1.lo3 s. Seco.u .>tw.
S. ...point, 14_&31164

11

PLAINTIFF/S BRIEF

(208) 2#ii;3-6866
:F1U((208) 2&3.owo

.. Liunse4 in
lUlU> dr 'W.asIiUw .....

32S

688. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the
statute and its legislative history. ld. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an
interpretation that will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22
P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). A construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd
result is disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521,525 (2004); State v.

Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004).

There are two possible meanings to the term recorded. The literal use of the words
within the statute, the context of the words, the legislative history and public policy
favor recording as an act accomplished uniquely by the county commissioners.

1. The literal words of the statute specify that the acts of laying out and
recording of highways are acts of the county commissioners.
"When punctuation discloses a proper legislative intent or conveys a clear meaning the
courts should give weight to it as evidence." State v. Nab, 112 Idaho 1139, 1141,739
P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.15 at 157 (4th ed. 1984))

"Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of county
commissioners . . . . " uses a comma to designate "by order of the board of county
~. . .JAw !firm dit&
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commissioners". With the additional punctuation it is clear that recordation and laying
out were accomplished by action within the meeting of commissioners. "[B]y order of
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the board of county commissioners" is descriptive of the word "recorded" just as it is
descriptive of the term "laid out". If the legislature had intended to denote recording as
an act of the recorder's office, the legislature could have used language similar to
Colorado which specifies recording as an act of the recorder'S office. However, the
current language is the best way of specifying the duties of the commissioners to create
a record, similar to ajudicial record, of the action taken by the commissioners.

What is most important in interpreting the term "recorded" within the 1910 statute is as
stated above, to give effect to legislative intent. In deciphering such intent it is critical
to use the literal meaning of the word recorded and not to be persuaded by meaning
attached through passage of time. The literal definition of the term "recorded" under
Merriam-Webster Dictionary is: "to set down in writing: furnish written evidence of. ,.
If you placed this literal meaning within the statute it would read: roads laid out and set
down in writing as highways, by order of the board of commissioners. Modem times
have created our association with the term "recorded" to infer recorded in the County
Recorder's Office. But there is no indication of this intent within the language of the
statute. The word recorded is simply used to establish permanent documentation of the
road or highway as public.

2. The context of the words supports recording as an act of the county
commissioners.
~.JAw:Firm diItl
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Section 875 which is titled, "Recorded and Worked Highways". The terms "Recorded"
and "Worked" are then described within the statute. "Recorded" roads are those that are
laid out and recorded by order of the board of commissioners. "Worked" roads are
those that are traveled for five years. If the road is created through the five year period
it can be recognized if kept up at public expense or "located and recorded by order of
the board of commissioners".5

Defendant's argument requires this court to dually define the word recorded with two
separate and distinct meanings. Defendant's interpretation would lead this court to
conclude that recording as used in the statute is a specific type of road created by action
of the county commissioners and the act of recording road documents with the county
recorder's office. Under Defendant's interpretation of the statute, the term "recorded"
would, confusingly, have two meanings within the same statute.

The clearer interpretation is that "recorded" has a single meaning - the act of the county
commissioners in documenting a new road. This is consistent with the statutory use of
the term, "recorded", each time in conjunction with the use of the term "by order of the
board of commissioners".

~.lAw~cMt{
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It is believed that the statutory distinction between roads "laid out and recorded" and roads "located and
recorded" is to permit the county commission to accept a road prior to its construction (i.e. when it is
merely "laid out" or marked off on the ground) or after a road has been constructed and used as a public
road for five years and then "located" (i.e. identified) by the county commission.
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3. Legislative history indicates that the term recorded referred to the
type of road created by the county commissioners.

Committee notes and session minutes are not kept for laws prior to approximately
1960. The best indicator of legislative history is the progression of the relevant statute
through multiple amendments. The 1908 statute amended the same statute previously
adopted in 1901. The statute makes one significant change in 1908 with the adoption of
a new heading stating, "Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways." The previous
version was titled "Section 1138. Further Enumeration." The adoption of the new
heading clarifies the intent of the legislature that "Recorded" highways was a term
referring to a type of road created by act of the county commissioners and not a
requirement with the county recorder's office.

C. County Commissioners Have Jurisdiction Over The Creation Of Roads.

This court cites several cases for further review including Nicolaus v. Bodine, 92 Idaho
639, 448 P.2d 645 (1968)(distinguished on other grounds). In Nicolaus the Idaho
Supreme Court addresses the duties of highway commissioners to repair a bridge after
complaint. The Court notes that the duties of highway commissioners are those of the
county commissioners and in dicta cites the duties of county commissioners in regards
to the highway system. See Nicolaus, footnote 5.

The powers and duties of commissioners are created by statute. "County commissioners
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o/Com'rs of Twin Falls County, 1912,22 Idaho 598,127 P. 175. The statutory powers
of the county commission in 1910 were broadly defined by the Revised Code of Idaho

§ 1917 (1908).
"The boards of commissioners in their respective counties have jurisdiction and
power, under such limitations and restrictions as are prescribed by law. .. (4)
To layout, maintain control and manager (sic) public roads, turnpikes, ferries
and bridges within the county, and levy such tax therefore as authorized by law.
. , ." Idaho Rev. Code § 1917 (1908).
Further, the court was authorized in the same section" ... To do and perform all other
acts and things required by law not in this title enumerated, or which may be necessary
to the full discharge of the chief executive authority of the county government." Idaho
Rev. Code § 1917(22) (1908).

Through Idaho Rev. Code § 1917(4) the county commissioners were given jurisdiction
over county roads. Idaho Rev. Code § 1917(22) (1908)

then specifically gives the

county authority to do all steps necessary to carry out their duties as a required by law.
1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875 (1908) then directs the county commissioners to create a
record of the creation of any new road. To conclude otherwise, limits the powers of the
county commissioners in a way inconsistent with the statutory authority of the
commissioners.
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D. Public Policy Supports Recordation By Act Of The County Commissioners.
The Wyoming courts specifically addressed policy issues behind recording statutes for
public roads. As such, those cases, derived from similar territory, are referenced herein
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in support of our understanding of Idaho's own documentation. Like the road system in
many states in the American West, the road system in Wyoming developed from a
haphazard diagram of trails established by Native Americans, pioneers, stockmen,
miners and loggers, and more "proper" roads set out by railroads, stagecoaches, the
federal government, and territorial, state, and local governments. As early as 1869, the
Territorial Legislature enacted a law, seeking to bring some sense of order to this
system. Wyoming law provided for the recognition of public roads through declaration
by the Territorial Legislative Assembly or the relevant board of county commissioners.
In 1877 the Territorial Legislature amended Chapter 102 of the 1869 law and gave the
board of county commissioners broad powers to declare public roads. See generally,
Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241 (2003). Wyoming legislation of 1919 required that roads

recognized as public to be made of record, supporting its prior policy that it should be
made certain and definite as to what were public roads. Nikon v. Edwards, 72 Wyo.
274 P.2d 287 (1953). What was important in the west, a land of many rural roads, was
that order was made out of chaos and that documentation of public roads was
accurately evidenced.

This power was distinctly given to the board of county

commissioners.

At the time, Idaho public policy favored simple and easy methods for road creation. In
1875 and again in 1881 the Idaho Territorial Legislature issued blanket declarations
~'*'" L4w 1'fmJ cit{
'DtuIielP. !/"eatlimton
'Brtnt C. ~sttm'
Jerrm!J P. !/"eatfruston
Sluufrtl.7. ~
Steplren To SntDm

that all roads then in use as such were public roads. See Compiled and Revised Laws of
the Territory of Idaho, at p. 677, § 1 (1875)(repealed) and Gen. Laws of Territory of
Idaho at P. 277, § 1 (1881)(repealed). These blanket declarations show that the public
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policy goal at the time was to encourage the creation of public roads. There is no
indication in any of these blanket declarations that the created roads were to be
recorded with the recorder's office. In fact, the blanket declarations did not even require
an order ofthe county commissioners.

The overarching concern and public policy consideration created by Defendant's
argument is that the imposition of a recording requirement has the potential to throw
the public status of many early roads into question. In this instance, it is fairly easy to
determine the time of creation of this road due to excellent documentation. However,
for many roads in Bonner County, including the roads adopted under the blanket public
declarations, this is not the case. As almost all early versions of the road creation statute
reference recording, the effect will certainly be to invalidate some public roads created
through the blanket declarations or alternatively through public use and public
expenditure for a period of five years. This is primarily due to the fact that both of these
methods of road creation required little or no documentation and therefore would be
extremely susceptible to a recorder's office requirement.

The duties of road creation and supervision were delegated to the board of county
commissioners. As such, recordation within the commissioners' office is clearly
intended and sufficient. Anything to the contrary would be evident. Plaintiff can
establish that public policy behind recording statutes was to provide public, written
~ .£4W :Firm Q,,{
'Daniel P. !Tetltlierston
'.Brent C. !TUltMrston'
Jeremy P. !Tutlierston
s-lra:/. 'W7tIck
stepfren T. Sndien

documentation of roads to facilitate the creation of roads for the benefit of the public.
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E. Recordation Of The Survey Notes In The County's Road Index Book Was
Accomplished By The County Commissioners
This court requested more research as to a notation on Plaintiff's Exhibit "33" which
states in handwriting, "Survey S. Rec. Book Pg. 44". The statement refers to the
"County Roads Book". Page 44 of the County Roads Book is titled "Field Notes of the
Survey of Road No. 32". Following this description is the handwritten notation
"Platted" .

This County Roads Book document was not entered into evidence but was included in
Plaintiff's original trial materials. At trial, opposing counsel challenged the validity of
all the road creation materials. After reviewing the original road creation documents
with opposing counsel, Plaintiff's counsel submitted new copies of the road creation
documents in a different sequence which appeared to better reflect the original
documentation. At this time, the County Roads Book materials were excluded. A
certified copy of the County Roads Book is submitted accompanying this Brief along
with a Motion To Reopen Evidence.

The notation in question on Plaintiff's Exhibit "33" states that the survey was recorded
on page 44. On page 44 of the County Roads Book, there is a legal description of
County Road No. 32 as completed by the two viewers. The term "Rec." is used in
'{ttItftmtm £I!IW 1'inn cs.&
'lJanie{ P.

76.tlierswn

'1Jrtnt C. :TeatlierstQn'
JUDIf!j P. :Tutlierstun

San4ra.J. ~

Exhibit "33" to describe the action taken in the County Roads Book. From these
documents it is clear that recordation was not a requirement with the county recorder's

Stepnen To Srwftfot
Jt""""3" lit ""'"

19

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

Ll3 S. SeeD"" Jt.....
ScM!",;"', /I'GIio 83864
(208) 263-6860
7"1((208) 2&3-0400
·£~n.sedin

Jtfa/io 0- 'JiIl&.Slii'lf'"''

336

office but an act by the county commissioners of creating the road and recording the
documentation in Bonner County's road book. This evidence clearly shows the
statutory requirements to define recordation as being an act by the county
commissioners and not the Bonner County Recorder's office. Even if this court denies
Plaintiffs Motion To Reopen Evidence, Plaintiff requests this court uphold the court's
previous conclusion that satisfaction of the recordation requirement is met by the
documents already in evidence which reference the County Roads Book and
recordation therein.

IV.

PLAINTIFF'S CONCLUSION

County Road No. 32 is well documented and clearly established. This court's record
contains a formal petition for County Road No. 32 signed by the affected landowners.
In consideration of the petition, the county commissioners appointed several viewers.
The viewers returned a viewer's report of the road and the board then approved the road
as a county road by formal action at a county commissioner meeting. A legal
description of the road was recorded in the county's road book as County Road No. 32.
The process from beginning to end lasted over one year and four months.

The commissioners' actions should be considered in searching for the appropriate
statutory interpretation. It is obvious that the commissioners were familiar with the
!foat/imtm.lAw 1'frmcr.L

requirement imposed by the road creation statute. It is also obvious that there was a

'Dtmief P. 7utkrston
'lJrmt C. 7etltliersw,,·
Jertt1IJ!J P. 7utliersw"

formal process for creation of a road as is evidenced by the pre-printed road petition

Stuulra 7· 'l#uc.{
steplim To sndien

documents used by the landowners and viewers. All indications point to the fact that the

~ ..tJAfll

113 So Seco",{Jt ....
StI",{poi ..t, f 4ahiJ 83864

20

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

(208) 263-6866

7''''((20/1) 2tiJ.(J4(]()

.. .£.i.un..scu{ in

l"tUrD

dr 'Waslii'l9ton

337

commissioners were diligent and preCIse m the exercise of their duties. Under
Plaintiff s interpretation of the statute, the commissioners executed the requirements of
the statute exactly, even stamping approved on the viewer's report after order by the
commissioners. Defendant argues that the commissioners, after executing their duties
carefully, were negligent as to the very last requirement of creating County Road No.
32. However, this doesn't comport with their previous actions. The record shows
diligence by the commissioners in executing their duties and a complete record of the
creation of County Road No. 32. The accuracy and exactness of the commissioner's
actions during each step of the road creation process should be considered in
determining that the applicable statute was performed and satisfied.

In conclusion, it is evident in logic and law that the term recorded as used in the
relevant statute was intended to mean an act of the Bonner County Board of
Commissioners, specifically the act of documenting the road in Bonner County's Road
Book. The Commissioners were given distinct authority over the establishment of such
roads and documentation of such declarations was an act performed within its office.
The term "recorded" must be given its literal interpretation as applicable with the time
when the statute was written. The legislature was clear in its intent. The evidence and
actions of the Board of Bonner County Commissioners creates statutory requirements
creates sufficient record of the establishment of County Road No. 32 as a public road
~ L4w!/frmcMl

pursuant to the requirements of 1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875 (1908).
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DATED this 16th day of October, 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHID.

---

STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:

[K) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

[
[
[
[

r.tIimtm .£aw 'firm dtIi
'1Janid'.P. !Futlierston
'Brent C. :Tt!lZtlierston*
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]
]
]
]

Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile
Other: _ _ _ _ _ __

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
sts@featherstonlaw.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual
Plaintiff;
vs.
VERNA FERGEL, an individual
Defendant;

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV-2007-0001292
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
REOPEN EVIDENCE and
NOTICE OF HEARING

)

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through its counsel, Stephen T. Snedden,
and submits the following Plaintiff's Motion To Reopen Evidence:

Motions to reopen evidence are according to the standard set forth in 1.R.c.P. 59(a). In
this instance, Plaintiff requests the court permit materials not entered into evidence at
trial under 1.R.c.P. 59(a)(3) and 59(a)(4).

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(3), Plaintiff should be permitted to enter evidence at trial if
there was "Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
!}#tIIIimtm .JAw 1frm cML
'Dtmielf'. :Fu.tlierston
:Tatlierston·
Jert1t1!If'. :Te4t1imton
Stuufra J. ~
steplim T. Sndien
'lJrtnt C.

against." Here, Plaintiff submitted trial materials to the opposing counsel prior to trial
which included copies from the County Road Book. The entirety of the road creation
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documents and the excerpt from Bonner County' Road Creation book were submitted
as a single evidentiary item.

At trial opposing counsel objected to the order of the road creation documents.
Plaintiffs counsel then divided the documents into multiple exhibits for entry into the
record. During this time, the documents for the Bonner County Road Book were
inadvertently excluded from the re-ordered documents.

In addition, , Plaintiff should be permitted to reopen evidence if pursuant to 1.R.c.P.
59(a)(7) there was "Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against the law." In this case, the court has requested supplementary
information supporting a finding of fact. In issuing its decision the court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the notations on the bottom of Plaintiff s Exhibit 33
showed recording. Subsequently, the court withdrew its decision and requested research
on the existence of a survey as referred to in Plaintiffs Exhibit 33. Here, Plaintiff is
providing this information to the court through this Motion To Reopen Evidence.

Based upon the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff kindly requests the court reopen the
evidence to clarify the intent of the statute in requiring recording.

'ftrIt/imtm .£4w !finn cSIL
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DATED this 16th day of October, 2009.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF HEARING
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the undersigned, as attorney for the above-named
Plaintiffs, will call for hearing at the Bonner County Courthouse, Sandpoint, Idaho before
the Honorable Steve Yerby, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen Evidence on'Dtr •.
2009, at

~3~l

\ \ '..a.)C\.Y-"., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this 16th day of October, 2009.

FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

~- --"""""---STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:

~.JAw ~fnn eM{
'Daniel'1'. 7eatliersttm
'Bmrt c. 7ut1rmttm·
JemtI!I '1'. 7eatlierston

[Y-.} U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail

Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

[ ] Hand delivered
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _- ~
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONN R
FIRST JUDICIAL 01 T.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Brent C. Featherston, ISB No. 4602
Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Ave.
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864
Tel: (208) 263-6866
Fax: (208) 263-0400

lCOq DEC 3 I A II:

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,
v.
VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-1292
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO REOPEN EVIDENCE

--------------------.----}
A bifurcated, non-jury trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter on April 28
The Court, having considered the testimony presented from April 28

th

,

th
•

2009.

2009, through April

30 th , 2009 and subsequently issued findings of fact and judgment on the matter. On September
11, 2009 the Court withdrew its decision and requested supplemental briefing. In response,
Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen evidence. The court heard oral arguments on Plaintiff s
Motion To Reopen Evidence on December 10, 2009 and found good cause to reopen the
evidence in this matter.
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l

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the evidence in this matter shall be reopened at a date and
time scheduled by the Court.

DATED this 3Id-day of December, 2009.

DISTRICT COURT JU

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the .;; I$I" day of December, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:

r><l

Stephen T. Snedden, Esq.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint,ID 83864

[
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
]

N

Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No. (208) 263-0400
Courthouse Mail
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
Hand delivered
Facsimile No.
Other: _ _ _ _- - - -

FEA THERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Brent C. Featherston, ISB No. 4602
Stephen T. Snedden, ISB No. 7554
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Tel: (208) 263-6866
Fax: (208) 263-0400

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CASE NO. CV 07-1292

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PAUL TRUNNELL an individual,
Plaintiffs,
VERNA FERGEL, an individual,
Defendant.

NOTICE OF SERVICE

---------------------------,)
COME NOW the Plaintiff, PAUL TRUNNELL, by and through his attorney of record
undersigned, and notifY the Court that on the 11~day of December, 2009, they served the following
document(s) upon the Defendant's attorney, Jonathon Cottrell:
Plaintiff s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents
That said document(s) were delivered to the office of Jonathon Cottrell via hand delivery.
DA TED this 17"'day of December, 2009.
FEA THERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

BY~~T~DE-N--------Attorney for Plaintiff
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
215 S. FIRST .iftNJ.JItF IOM10
SANDPOINT, RiltiIifi Yfl)8"61 0NNE R

FTRSiJUDICIAL DIST.

ZOUq NOV - 5 P ,: 4 3
Paul Trunnell, et al.

)
hl-,i\i': Lv; Case No: CV-2007-0001292

CLERK OIST leT COUFri

vs.

__ AMENDED
NOTICE OF HEARING

---:::-=-::-::~-

OEP TY

Verna Fergel, et al.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby reset for:

Motion to Reopen Evidence
Judge:
Courtroom:

Thursday, December 10,2009
Steve Yerby
1

11:00 AM

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court
and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Thursday,
November 05, 2009:

Jonathan W. Cottrell
Attorney at Law
PO Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

/

Mailed

Hand Delivered

Stephen T. Snedden
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

/

Mailed

Hand Delivered

Dated: November 5th, 2009
Marie Scott
Clerk of the District Court
By:
Deputy Clerk
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3
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BOHNER
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST.

STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN
Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd.
708 Superior Street, Ste. B
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Telephone: (208)263-4748
Facsimile: (208)263-7557
Idaho State Bar No. 7554

I

2010 JAN I I I A II: 01
~
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5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

6
7
8

9

Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF
COUNSEL

10

vs.

11

VERNA FERGEL, an individual;

12

13
14
15

O. CV 2007-001292

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;

Defendant,
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, of the law firm BERG &
McLAUGHLIN, CHTD., hereby associates with BRENT FEATHERSTON of the law firm
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM as counsel for the Plaintiff PAUL TRUNNELL in the above

16

entitled action.
17

18
19

20

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that all papers to be served on Plaintiff shall be served
on STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, at Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd., 708 Superior Street, Ste B,
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864, and BRENT FEATHERSTON, at Featherston Law Firm, 113 South
Second Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho 83864, until further notice or order of the Court.

21

DATED this

-2 day of January, 2010.

22

23

BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD.

24

BY:/
25

~N T. SNEDDEN
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

~

.....
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

2

On January ~ , 2010, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the

3

following methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last known address for the
4

listed party:
5

6
7

8
9

10

11

Brent C. Featherston
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-0400

Attorneysfor the Plaintiff
Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-7534

oo ByBy Hand
Delivery
U.S. Mail

o By Overnight Mail

~By Facsimile Transmission

o By Hand Delivery
o By U.S. Mail
8{Y Overnight Mail
By Facsimile Transmission

12
13

Attorneys for the Defendant

14

15

:~~
. ~
, ~~~

16

Stephanie G. Allen

17
18
19

20

21
22

23
24

25

NOTICE OF ASSOCIA nON - 2
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2
3

4

Stephen T. Snedden
Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd.
708 Superior Street, Ste. B
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Telephone: (208)263-4748
Facsimile: (208)263-7557
Idaho Bar No. 7554

5

6

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

8

9

NO. CV 2007-1292

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,
10

Plaintiff,
11

12
13

vs.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES
AND EVIDENCE

VERNA FERGEL, an individual.

Defendant,

14
15

COMES NOW, Plaintiff PAUL TRUNNELL through his counsel of record, Stephe

16

Snedden of the law firm Berg & McLaughlin, Chtd., and moves the Court for an Order excludin

17

the testimony of witnesses and any evidence. This motion is supported by the Memorandum

18

Law and the Affidavit of Stephen Snedden, Affidavit of Stephanie Allen, submitted herewith
and the records and files herein.

19
20

DATED this 29 th day of January, 2009.

21
22

23
24

0

BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD.

~
Stephen T. Snedden, Attorneys for Plaintiff

25

MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE - 1
~"(\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
3

On January

zt,

2010, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the

4

following methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last known address for the

5

listed party:

6

Jonathon Cottrell
POBox 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864

7
8
9

10

1121 By Hand Delivery
r0 By U.S. Mail
D By Overnight Mail
D By Facsimile Transmission
/

Brent Featherston
113 S. 2 nd Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

~ By Hand Delivery

/' ;: By U.S. Mail
?= By Overnight Mail
By Facsimile Transmission

11

?--

12

Stephen Snedden

13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

25
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
brent@featherstonlaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

i '/":. )'
CL::-:~:;

I'

ie,

•

.

BERG & MCLAUGHLIN, CHTD.
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, ISB No. 7554
708 Superior Street, Ste. B
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Tel: (208)263-4748
Fax: (208)263-7557
stephen@sandpointlaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

11

12

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual
13

Plaintiff;
14
VS.

15
16

2010 fEB 2b P u: O?

VERNA FERGEL, an individual
Defendant;

17

18

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV-2007-000I292

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND
POST-TRIAL BRIEF

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, by and through his counsel, Brent C.

Fp~tl.,prc,tA"'"

19

and Stephen T. Snedden, and submits the following Post-Trial Brief:
20

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

21

A bifurcated, non-jury trial was conducted in the above-entitled matter on April 28, 2009
22
23

The Court heard testimony presented April 28, 2009, through April 30, 2009. On May 1, 2009

24

Defendant moved to amend her answer to include the defense as good faith purchaser for

25

under Idaho Code 55-812.

On September 4, 2009, the Court issued Findings of Fact
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Conclusions of Law on the record ("Decision") and shortly thereafter the Court withdrew it
2

ruling and requested supplementary briefmg on definition of "recorded" contained in th

3

pertinent statute. On February 11 th, the Court heard supplementary testimony and requeste

4

5

briefing on the newly-raised defense of Ms. Fergel as a bona fide purchaser.

It

ISSUE

6

The statute in effect at the time of Road 32 was created is as follows:
7

8

Section 874. Highways Defmed: Highways are roads, streets or
alleys, and bridges, laid out or erected by the public, or if laid out
or erected by others, dedicated or abandoned to the public.

9
10
I 1

12

Section 875. Recorded and Worked Highways: Roads laid out
and recorded as highways, by order of the board of commissioners,
and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided the
later shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the
public or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways. . ..

13

1 Idaho Code Ann. §§ 874 and 875 (1908)
14
15

Plaintiff continues to assert that the term "recorded" as used above means recorded in th

16

minutes of the Board of County Commissioners. The undisputed evidence presented two (2

17
18

weeks ago is that none of the public roads created in that era were recorded in the county Ian
title records. The evidence in this case shows entry of Road 32 into the Commissioner's minute

19

and Road Book, fulfilling the statutory requirements to create a public road set forth above.
20

Defendant argues she is a bona fide purchaser for value with no notice of the Road 32 a
21

the time of her purchase in 1991. (Def.' sEx. "0") Defendant amended her answer by motio
22
23
24
25

and order of the Court, after the initial court trial, to raise these defenses.
The issues before the Court are as follows:
(1)

Whether the County Commissioners validly create a public road calle
Road 32 under the statute?
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(2)

Whether Vema Fergel qualifies as a bona fide purchaser without actual
constructive notice of Public Road 327; and,

(3)

Whether statutory protections for subsequent bona fide purchasers applie
to public rights of way created in 1910.

0

2

3
4

5
6

III.

IDAHO CODE IS CONSISTENT IN ITS BROAD GRANT OF POWERS TO
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR THE CREATION OF PUBLIC ROADS
Throughout the history of Idaho, the legislature has consistently granted broad powers t

7

County Commissioners in the creation of public roads. Idaho Code does not require the Coun

8

Commissioners to record roads in the County's land title records or Grantor-Grantee index.

9

10

11
12
13
14

15
16
17

A.

Current Idaho Code Does Not Create An Absolute Duty To Record A Public
Road In The Grantor-Grantee Recording Index

Under Idaho Code § 40-202, an interest in a right of way acquired by the Coun
Commissioners may be either recorded or added to the official highway map.
If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real
(2)
property for highway or public right-of-way purposes, the
respective commissioners shall:
(a)
Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or
other document establishing an interest in the property for
their highway system purposes to be recorded in the county
records; or

19

(b)
Cause the official map of the county or highway
district system to be amended as affected by the acceptance
ofthe highway or public right-of-way.

20

I.e. § 40-202.

18

21

Even current law does not require the Commissioners to "record" public rights of way'

22

the land records or grantor-grantee index, rather it may occur by simple addition to the coun

23

official map. By inference, this current statute defeats Defendant Fergel's contention that th

24

historic statute's use of "record" can only mean recordation in the land title records.

25
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Also of note, the current statute states in subsection (a) that the Commissioners rna
2

cause any order, resolution or deed "establishing an interest in the property for their highwa

3

system purposes to be recorded in the county records" an apparent reference to recording wi

4

5
6

the land title records.
By comparison, the historic statute in effect at the time of creating Road 32 requires onI
that roads be "laid out and recorded, by order of the board of commissioners". The languag

7

"recorded" referring to the act or "order" of the board of commissioners. The comparativ
8

inference the Court should draw when interpreting the statutory language is that the histori
9

statute in effect in 1908 did not intend the term "record" to refer to the land title records. (Se
10

II

discussion of statutory construction Subsection "C", below)

12

It is clear from these Code sections that current Idaho Code

13

recordation of public rights of way in the grantor-grantee recording index.

14

B.

Idaho Has Historically Granted Commissioners Very Broad Powers To
Create Public Roads

15

The County Commissioner's broad powers to create public roads process has bee
16

17

18

consistent through history. During the time of creation of County Road No. 32, the powers
the commissioners were broadly defmed by the Revised Code of Idaho § 1917 (1908).

21

The boards of commissioners in their respective counties have
jurisdiction and power, under such limitations and restrictions as
are prescribed by law. .. (4) To layout, maintain control and
manager (sic) public roads, turnpikes, ferries and bridges within
the county, and levy such tax therefore as authorized by law....

22

Idaho Rev. Code § 1917 (1908).

19

20

23
24

0

Further, the County was authorized in the same section" ... To do and perform all othe
acts and things required by law not in this title enumerated, or which may be necessary to the ful

25
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discharge of the chief executive authority of the county government." Idaho Rev. Code §
2

1917(22) (1908).

3

Through Idaho Rev. Code § 1917(4) the County Commissioners were given j urisdictio

4

over county roads. Idaho Rev. Code §1917(22) (1908) then specifically gives the count

5

6

authority to do all steps necessary to carry out their duties as required by law. The Defendant'
contention that a road must be recorded in the grantor-grantee recording index in order to b

7

valid against subsequent purchasers clearly conflicts with legislative intent to grant broad power
8

and jurisdiction to the commissioners over the creation of those same public roads.
9

10

C.

The Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Favor an Absurd Result

II

When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain th

12

legislative intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 68

13

688 (1999). To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statut

14

be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and it

15

legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation that will no

16

render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001).

17
18

construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd result is disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idab
271,275,92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,690,85 P.3d 656,666 (2004).

19

The recording statutes should be interpreted in the context of other statutes and legislativ
20

intent. Early roads in Bonner County were created through legislative decree without any sort 0
21

22
23
24

25

recording. In 1875 and again in 1881 the Idaho Territorial Legislature issued blanket declaration
that all roads then in use as such were public roads. See Compiled and Revised Laws of th
Territory ofIdaho, at p. 677, § 1 (1875)(repealed) and Gen. Laws of Territory ofIdaho at P. 277
§ 1 (1 881)(repealed).
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The roads created by the 1875 and 1881 legislative decrees along with early county road
2

were not recorded. In the most recent supplementary hearing, the Court heard testimony fro

3

Ron Self, Bonner County Cartographer, that, in no instance did Bonner County record publi

4

rights of way during the early part of the twentieth century. Mr. Self testified that at some poin

5

much later after the creation of County Road No. 32, the practice of recording rights of wa
6

began to be the norm. This appears consistent with the legislative history and intent at the time
7

of encouraging the creation of county roads and facilitating their adoption.
8

Applying Idaho Code §§ 55-606 and 55-812 as suggested by Ms. Fergel to public rights

9
10

0

way, will have the effect of invalidating every road created by legislative decree in 1875, eve

II

road created by legislative decree in 1881 and every road created by commissioner decree in th

12

early part of the twentieth century.
This is an absurd result construction of the statutes and not supported by Idaho law.

13

14
15

16

IV.

THE COUNTY ROAD BOOK AND COUNTY MINUTE BOOK SATISFY ANY
RECORDING REQUIREMENTS
There is a presumption of regularity in performance of official duties by public officers

17

Homer v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985). Unde

18

the Revised Statutes of 1887, Section 1754 the Bonner County Board of Commissioners ar

19

required to keep a "Minute Book" and "Road Book". In considering whether the appointment 0

20

a road overseer was properly recorded in the county Minute Book or the county Road Book, th

21

Idaho Supreme Court stated:

22
23
24

25

Under the provisions of section 1754, Rev. St. 1887, the board is
required to keep a minute book in which must be recorded all
orders and decisions made by them, and the daily proceedings had
at all regular and special sessions; and under the Laws 1899, p.
248, the board of county commissioners, at the adjournment of
each session of the board, is required to publish a statement such as
will clearly give notice to the public of all acts and proceedings of
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the board. Said "Minute Book," if it contains all orders and
decisions made by the board, certainly is the book of original entry
as to the appointment of road overseers, although a "Road Book" is
required to show that fact also. If all the original orders and
proceedings are first entered in the "Minute Book," that certainly
would be the best evidence, or equal evidence, of the appointment
of a road overseer to that of the "Road Book." We do not think the
court erred in admitting said "Minute Book" showing the
appointment of said road overseer.

2

3

4
5
6

Meservey v. Guilliford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780, 784
(1908) [emphasis added]

7
8

In construing the action of the Bonner County Commissioners in regard to Road 32, ther

9

is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by public officers. Homer v

10

Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114,695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985).

11
12

It is instructive then that the Meservey court refers to the act of "recording" in the Minut

Book and Road Book under the same Idaho laws in effect at the time of creation of County Ro

13

No. 32.
14

Finally, the Court is asked to review Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335, 362 P.2d 108
15

(1961), where the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs' evidence consisting of the order of th
16
17

18

commissioners declaring the road public entered in the commissioner's minutes, satisfied th
requirements to create a public road as "laid out and recorded" under the statute. The Burdic

19

Court makes no mention of the need for proof of recording in the land title record or grantor

20

grantee index.

21

The Bonner County Road Book containing County Road No. 32, along with th

22

commissioner's minutes recognizing County Road No. 32, are the act of recordation of a publi

23

right of way within the requirements of Idaho law at that time.

24

25
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v.
2

3
4

5
6

7
8
9

10

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
Defendant argues that Idaho Code provides assurances for bona fide purchasers fro

previous unrecorded conveyances.
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded."
I.C. § 55-606
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease fora term not
exceeding one (1) year, is void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof,
in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance
is first duly recorded.

11

I.e. § 55-812

12

Idaho Code § 55-606 was originally adopted as R.S. 1887 § 2929 and later as

R.c.

190

13

§ 3114. Idaho Code § 55-812 was adopted in 1864 as the Idaho Territorial Session Laws of 1864
14

15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23

24

25

P. 528 § 25. Regardless of recording, an "unrecorded instrument is valid as between the partie
thereto and those who have notice thereof." Idaho Code § 55-815. The Supreme Court h
characterized the function of Idaho Code §§ 55-812 and 55-815 as primarily for notice purposes.
The only function which recording performs is to impart
constructive notice of a prior interest in real property, I.C. § 55811. One who has either actual or constructive notice that an
unrecorded interest exists cannot be a bona fide purchaser "in good
faith," as provided in I.C. §§ 55-812 and -815.
Villager Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co.,
121 Idaho 986, 990,829 P.2d 1335, 1339 (1992)
(quoting Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220,526 P.2d 178,
180 (1974)) (internal citations and footnotes omitted)
Defense counsel argues that the Defendant is a good faith purchaser for value constitutin
an affirmative defense to the claims raised by the Plaintiff in his Complaint.
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VI.

THE DEFENDANT HAD ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE
RIGHT OF WAY

2

3
4

5

Actual or constructive notice overcomes the recording requirement. In a situatio
regarding the public use and maintenance of a county road in the early 1900's the court state
that public use could be shown by circumstantial evidence.

6

A.

7

"When a subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser has actual knowledge of a prior interest

Use Of The Easement On Defendant's Property Constituted Actual Notice

8

it makes no difference whether prior interest was properly acknowledged and recorded." F

9

Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980). "A duly recorde

10

11

interest is effective against prior unrecorded interest only where recorded interest is taken fo
valuable consideration and without knowledge, either actual or constructive, that unrecorde

12

interests exist." Id.[itaIics added]
13

"One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take .
14

15
16

17
18

good faith and one who fails to investigate the open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot take .
good faith and thus may not, by first recording their conveyance, claim preference over the prio
purchaser or encumbrancer." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218,526 P.2d 178 (1974).
Ms. Fergel testified that she lived in the area prior to moving to the subject prope

19

affected by County Road No. 32. During the period that Mrs. Fergellived in the area, she was

20

witness to use of the property by the Russels. Kathy Neumann and Karleen Neumann testifie

21

that individuals in the area were using County Road No. 32 regularly. This included use

22

23

0

County Road No. 32 by the Painters and the Neumanns. In addition, upon moving to the propert
in 1991, Mrs. Fergel testified that there were existing wheel tracks over her property in th

24

location of County Road No. 32. In fact, Ms. Fergel's own testimony stated that multiple peopl
25

were using County Road No. 32 which is why she was required to put a gate across the road. Ms
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Fergel's own actions, her history in the area prior to moving to the property and the testimony 0
2

3
4

witnesses living in the area show the Defendant's actual knowledge of County Road No. 32.
Finally, Verna Fergel's own evidence proves she had actual and constructive knowledg
of the public road. Defendant's Exhibits A through D are aerial photographs from August 24

5

1958 (A through C) and Google Earth aerial from 2008 (Ex. D)
6

B.

Use By the Russells Provided the Defendant With Actual Notice

7

In this instance the Russels were granted an easement over and across County Road No.
8
9
10

32. The easement is wider than County Road No. 32, completely encompassing the publi
portion or the roadway. However, the Supreme Court has found that use of a road by adjacen

11

landowners qualifies as public use. :...:A==d=a....:C:::.:o"-'un=~==.::.l..-=..:=-'-'---=:"O='-===::.....=~==="'-'1

12

LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 367-68, 179 P.3d 323, 330-31 (2008); Aztec Ltd. Inc. v. Creeksid

13

Investment Co., 100 Idaho 566, 602 P.2d 64 (1979).

14
15
16
17

In Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 17
P.3d 323 (2008), the Ada County Highway District argued that it had acquired an alley as
public highway through regular maintenance and public use of the property. In ruling, th
Supreme Court found that landowners use of the area for trashcans and businesses deliveries i

18

the alley, though the uses were by adjacent landowners, constituted public use. Ada Coun
19

Highway Dist.at 367 and 330.
20

In this instance, the use by the adjacent landowners, the Russels along with the use by th
21

22
23

Neumanns and Painters, provided actual notice to Mrs. Fergel of the existence of County Roa
No. 32. To conclude that the use of the easement was exclusive to the easement and didn't als

24

constitute use of the public road would encourage landowners to grant private easements ove

25

public roadways in an effort to mask use or avoid claims.
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C.

The Defendant Had Constructive Knowledge

"A duly recorded interest is effective against prior unrecorded interest only wher

2

3

recorded interest is taken for valuable consideration and without knowledge, either actual

4

constructive, that unrecorded interests exist." Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc. v. Carney, 10

5

6

0

Idaho 745, 605 P.2d 509 (1980). "One kind of constructive notice is notice which results from
record or which is imputed by the recording statutes, and the other is notice which is presume

7

because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should impart to him,

0

8

lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate facts." Barton v. Cannon, 94 Idaho 422, 426, 489 P.2
9

10

1021, 1025 (1971).
Constructive notice overcomes the requirement of recording a conveyance. Here

11

12

documents related to County Road No. 32 were contained in the Commissioner's Minutes an

13

the County Road Book. Further, portions of County Road No. 32 have been re-named and ar

14

used by neighbors across the highway from the Defendant.

15
16
17
18

Defendant had knowledge of facts, including the existence of and the public's use

0

County Road No. 32 sufficient to place Defendant upon notice. These facts should have Ie
Defendant to investigate the fact and pursue the conclusion that County Road No. 32 was
public roadway. Secondly, Defendant had constructive knowledge of actions taken by the Boar

19

of County Commissioners whose actions and records were in the public domain and held by th
20

County Clerk.
21
22

23

VII.

THERE IS NO JUDICIAL HISTORY SUPPORTING THE APPLICATION OF
BONA FIDE PURCHASER PROTECTIONS TO INVALIDATE PUBLIC
RIGHT80FWAY

24

There is not a single case in Idaho's judicial history that applies the bO.na fide purchase

25

protections to invalidate a public right of way such as County Road No. 32. Consistently, case
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3fl1

involving subsequent bona fide purchaser protections have been applied by the courts t
2

subsequent recording of property interests after sale to a purchaser. See Froman v. Madden, 13

3

Idaho 138,88 P. 894 (1907); Gem State Lumber v. School District No.8.

4

Other cases dealing with public rights of way are not applicable here. The Idaho Suprem

5

Court has previous decided that a grant of disputed public easement to a highway district an
6

subsequent suit for against previous property owners does not constitute a breach of titl
7

warranties. Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 100 Idaho 790, 605 P.2d 968 (1980). Where th
8
9

10

railroad neglected to create any documentation of its right of way and failed to take possession 0
the property for 17 years but filed a map 8 days before the property was claimed and the Ian

11

patent for the subdivision granted, the railroad had abandoned its right to claim the grounds

12

Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Stalker, 14 Idaho 362, 94 P. 56 (1907). Where a purchaser of

13

irrigation easement fails to record the right, the grant is invalid as against a subsequen

14

purchaser. Swank v. Sweetwater Irrigation & Power Co., 15 Idaho 353, 98 P. 297 (1908).

15
16
17

However, the case of Schurger v. Moorman, 20 Idaho 97, 117 P.122 (1911) is helpful .
deciding the instant situation. The Carey act granted easements and rights of way for irrigatio
purposes across any public land. In Schurger, a subsequent landowner purchased public propert

18

with an existing irrigation ditch and sued the previous owners for breach of the covenants of title
19

In dicta, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that Carey Act easements are recorded with the stat
20
21
22

23
24

25

land board, not the grantor-grantee recording index, but that purchasers of Carey Act lands hav
notice through the legislative acts of the easements. In drawing this conclusion, the
Supreme Court compared Carey Act easements to public roads.
In addition to that, section 1630 of the Revised Codes of this state,
which is a part of the act of the state Legislature accepting the
provisions of the Carey act (Act Congo Aug. 18, 1894), provides
that the maps and plats of Carey act lands filed with the state land
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362

2

3
4
5
6

7
8
9

board shall show the location of all the canals, ditches, and laterals,
and that all lands filed upon shall be subject to rights of way for
such canals. It must therefore be considered that every person who
deals with or contracts in reference to any lands in this state
reclaimed under the Carey act of Congress and the acts of the
Legislature accepting the provisions thereof does so with notice that
easements and rights of way are granted through and over such
lands both by the general government and by the acts of the
Legislature ..... In this state such ditches and canals are as essential
and necessary as are roads and highways. Without water the settler
could not reside on the land. It would be of no use to him whatever.
If he cannot reside on or cultivate the land or make a livelihood on
the land, he has but little use for roads and highways. In this state a
purchaser of land is fully as chargeable with notice of the existence
of an irrigation canal on a tract of land he is about to purchase, as
he is chargeable with notice ofthe existence ofa highway.

10
11

Schurger at 124 (emphasis added).
In ruling the Schurger court found that an unrecorded irrigation easement (and by th

12

court's comparison - a public road) did not raise a bona fide purchaser issue because purchaser
13

were on notice of the public acts by the legislature:
14

18

In view of the fact that irrigation ditches and canals are a prime
necessity in this state and that many of them are constructed over
public lands while the title to the same is still in the government or
state and for which purpose the act of Congress and likewise the
act of the Legislature grant an easement and right of way, we are
fully satisfied that such an easement and servitude should not be
held to constitute a breach of covenant against encumbrances.

19

It certainly cannot be said that the contracting parties when

15
16
17

20

21
22

inserting in their contract a covenant against encumbrances had in
mind an easement for an irrigation canal any more than they
contemplated including therein a highway. It is reasonable to
suppose that they did not contemplate either, and the history of the
conditions and circumstances of the country support us in this
assumption.

23

Schurger at 126.

24

In Newmyer v. Roush, 21 Idaho 106, 120 P. 464 (1912), the Idaho Supreme Co
25

explored the limits of Schurger, and refused to apply the notion that an unrecorded "publi
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easement is not an encumbrance" reasoning to private easements.

In so ruling the Co

2

distinguished the case from the Schurger ruling, separating public rights of way from privat

3

easements.

4

5

6
7
8
9

10
11

1

We think, therefore, that under the authorities there is a clear
distinction between the case now under consideration and the case
of Schurger v. Moorman, and that in the cases in which it is held
that a public highway is not an encumbrance, such decisions have
so held by reason of the peculiar nature of the highway easements,
or the understarIding between the parties with reference to the
same, and that the courts have only gone to the extent of holding
that even a public highway is not an encumbrance, except in such
cases where the public highway is of such a character as to
publicly give notice of its public character and use, and because of
such public character the purchaser deals with the property
recognizing that an easement has been created across or over such
land.
Newmyer at 468-469.

12
13

Idaho Code §§ 55-606 and 55-812 pertain exclusively to the conclusiveness of a privat

14

conveyance which has been recorded as against an earlier private conveyance which i

15

unrecorded. This statutory provision mandates the priority for and conclusiveness of instrument

16

which are recorded. These statutory provisions bear no relationship to the causes of action whic

17
18

are brought by the Plaintiff in this action.
VIII. INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY ARE FREQUENTLY UNRECORDED

19

The Defendant argues that public roads created under Idaho Code must be recorded in th
20

grantor-grantee index or be subject to attack upon conveyance of the real property. This i
21

inconsistent with (1) previous legislative acts; (2) common law claims; and (3) other exercises 0
22
23

police powers. The bona fide purchaser statutes contain inherent limitations.

24

25

1 In Campagna v. Parker, 116 Idaho 734, 779 P.2d 409 (1989) the Idaho Supreme Court limited the rulings 0
whether a public right of way constitutes a breach of the warranty of title by applying the "rule of reason" to publi
rights of way. A public right of way constitutes a breach of title if it is not necessary to the property and does no
enhance its value. Campagna at 414, 739.
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Previous legislative acts have created roads by decree without recording. In 1875 an
2

again in 1881 the Idaho Territorial Legislature issued blanket declarations that all roads then i

3

use as such were public roads. See Compiled and Revised Laws of the Territory of Idaho, at p.

4

677, § 1 (l875)(repealed) and Gen. Laws of Territory ofIdaho at P. 277, § 1 (1881)(repealed).

5

fmding that the recordation of public rights of way is a requirement under Idaho Cod
6

collaterally attacks these legislative acts.
7

If the bona fide purchaser statute were applied without scrutiny, it would act to abolish al
8
9

10

common law claims of easement by necessity, easement by implication, prescriptive easement
boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. The Courts have not, of course, extended th

11

bona fide purchaser to that conclusion, in large part because of the visible, obvious and apparen

12

nature of the encumbrance at the time of the bona fide purchaser's acquisition.
Finally, real property is frequently affected by local or state decisions under the polic

13
14

powers of Idaho's Constitution Article XII, Section 2. Zoning changes limit use of a piece of re

15

property but are not recorded in the grantor-grantee index. Building setbacks limit the use

16
17

0

property but are not recorded in the grantor-grantee index. Property is declared restricte
wetlands by legislation. All of these are examples of public property restrictions which are no

18

recorded in the grantor-grantee index.
19

IX.

CONCLUSION

20

Public rights of way are a separate and distinct entity not subject to
21

22

purchaser protections. If bona fide purchaser protections were applied as broadly an

23

indiscriminately as suggested by the Defendant, it would challenge past legislative actions, an

24

usurp commissioner authority to oversee the creation of roads and eliminate many common la

25

claims such as adverse possession.
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Even in the instance that public rights of way are found to be subject to bona tid
2

purchaser protections, the Defendant had actual and constructive knowledge of the existence

3

County Road No. 32 through use by the public and by the adjacent landowners.

4

0

DATED this 26 th day of February, 2010.

5

6
7
8

Attorney for Plaintiff

9

BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD.

~

10

By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--I
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

11

12
l3

14
15
16

17
18
19

20

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of February, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 0
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person in the following manner:
Jonathan Cottrell, Esq.
105 Pine Street
P.O. Box 874
Sandpoint, ill 83864

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
~ Hand delivered
[ ] Facsimile No. (208) 265-9226
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Brent C. Featherston, ISB No. 4602
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Tel: (208) 263-6866
Fax: (208) 263-0400

BERG & MCLAUGHLIN, CHTD.
STEPHEN T. SNEDDEN, ISB No. 7554
708 Superior Street, Ste. B
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Tel: (208)263-4748
Fax: (208)263-7557
stephen@sandpointlaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual;
Plaintiff,

v.
VERNA FERGEL, an individual;
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-1292

PLAINTIFF'S
REPLY BRIEF

---------------------------)
The Court previously ordered simultaneous briefmg in regard to the Defendant's
defense as a bona fide purchaser. Plaintiff received Defendant's law memorandum regarding
bona fide purchaser after hours on February 26th , 2010.

The Defendant's reliance upon two

two cases, specifically in the State of Colorado and the State of Washington, require a response
~ Law 1'fnn cfc{
!DaniefP. :FtIltherston
'.Brmt C. !FutherstonJmmy P. :FtIltherston

from the Plaintiff.

itttomtys Qt fAw
113 S, Seco.,{ .>lv<,
S.tufpoint, I if",",83864
(208) 26,3·61/66
7"'C(208)263.()4(}(}

• £icensetfin
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I'

The Defendant relies heavily upon the case of City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817
P.2d 90 (Colo. 1991) and the case of Ellingsen v. Franklin County, 810 P.2d 910 (Wa 1991).
The Defendant quotes significantly from Mavromatis from the Colorado Supreme Court.
However, the factual circumstances in Mavromatis are distinguishable from the case before this
Court. Mavromatis concerned an unimproved strip of land described as the "Tally Ho strip"
which was adjacent to the well established public street known as "West Alameda Avenue".
Mavromatis acquired the Tally Ho strip together with other property in 19972 without any
notice of a road petition and dedication which had not been recorded in the grantor-grantee
index in 1888 when it was filed with the county clerk. The case before the Colorado Supreme
Court initially arose when the county sought to widen Alameda Avenue to include that portion
known as the Tally Ho strip which had been dedicated as a public road in 1888 but not
recorded in the grantor-grantee index. City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 92 (Colo.
1991).
While the Defendant F ergel has correctly cited the Court's holding that Mavromatis and
the other fee title holders of the Tally Ho Strip were not on notice, constructive or actual, of the
1888 dedication, Defendant Fergel failed to note that the real property at issue in Mavromatis
was not improvemented and thus the landowners had no notice of the county's claim pursuant
to the 1888 dedication.
Notably absent from the Defendant Fergel's brief is the closing paragraph and holding
of the Colorado Supreme Court in Mavromatis making clear that a different outcome would be
~L4W1'{rmcJtt{
1JanidP. !FutfrerstDn
'1lrmt C. !Featfrersum'
Jeremy P. !Futliuston
!lIttomeys at £AU)

expected where, as in this case, the road is built and improvements made to the dedicated road:
"Absent the opening of a road across the land in question or some other
activity suggesting the existence of third party rights, there is no reason that a

113 S. Second:."".
Sltndpoint, Iaalio 83864
(208) 26..3-6866
7a'C (208) 26.NJ400
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subsequent purchaser would expect suspect the existence of such rights
unless the road petition appeared in the real property records."
City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 101 (Colo. 1991)
The closing paragraph of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision quoted above makes it
imminently clear that Ms. Fergel's good faith purchaser defense is not well taken. Where a
landowner can observe a roadway across the land in question or other activities that suggest
claims inconsistent with the landowner's fee title ownership; they are no longer a "good faith"
purchaser.
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the similar reasoning as found in Mavromatis.
In Fajen v. Powlus, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that where the tenant and purchaser (under
an unrecorded purchase agreement) is visibly in possession of the real property premises and
operating a business thereon, the subsequent purchaser for value cannot prevail as a good faith
purchaser as against the prior unrecorded conveyance. Fajen v. Powlus, 96 Idaho 625, 533
P.2d 746 (1975).

The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "there was sufficient evidence to

support the trial court's conclusion that appellant had 'constructive notice', i.e. knowledge of
sufficient facts to require an inquiry of the Powlus' of any claim which they had to the property.
Having failed to make such an inquiry, appellant cannot claim the benefit of I.C. §55-812".
Fajen v. Powlus, 96 Idaho at 627-8 (1975).
The Court need only look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and Defendant's Exhibit D, both of
which are Google aerial photographs clearly showing the subject road crossing the east 30 feet
of Defendant Fergel's property passing south to Plaintiffs' property and beyond.
~ LIlW !firm Cid
'lJtmidP. :Tutiruston
'Brmt C. !Festlierston*
Jerony P. :TutlierstJJn
Jlttorneys at Ltzw

Additionally, Defendant's Exhibits A, B and C, all aerial photographs from 1958,
clearly show the subject roadway passing through the Fergel property and serving the Plaintiff's

11.3 S . .5u:cmf ~"..

Sanapoin', I dllflo lI.J864
(208) 26..3-6866

!Till( (208) 263-0400
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property some fifty (50) years prior to this litigation when the property was farmed and owned
by the Neumann family.
It is, frankly, unimaginable that the Defendant Fergel today claims to be a "good faith

purchaser" with no constructive notice of the road when that roadway was clear, apparent and
visible over three decades before Ms. Fergel purchased her property in 1991. Additionally, the
record reflects that this road was indirectly the subject of litigation in 1928 in Lund v. Silta.

As noted in Mavromatis, Ms. Fergel's defense of good faith purchaser must be weighed
against the circumstances at the time of Fergel's purchase and whether those circumstances
reasonably and objectively suggest the existence of third party rights. There is no question that
the well established road across the east 30 feet of the Fergel property placed her on notice such
that she knew or should have known through a reasonable investigation that Neumanns (now
Trunnel) had claims of easement or should have lead Fergel to a reasonable investigation which
would have revealed the public road.
The testimony presented at trial establishes a road petition in commissioner's minutes
and viewer's reports, all of which are matters of public record kept in a recorder's office and the
assessor's office. There is also indication from the testimony that all parties were aware that the
road travelled north and south beyond the Fergel property and served various other properties.
The testimony and evidence established that numerous parties, including the general public,
utilized the roadway travelling to the Fergel property at the time of and decades before Ms.
Fergel's purchase in 1991.
~ .lAw !FIrm cStL
'lJanid P. !Featliuston
'Brent C. !Ft4t1iuston*

Jtre1tUj P. !Featliuston
fIIttDmnfS Qt Law

The Idaho Supreme Court has further noted as follows:
"One buying property in possession of a third party is put on notice of any
claim of title or right of possession by such third party, which a reasonable

113 S. Suoml-""".
Slamlpolnt, fa""" 8.3864
(208) 26.3-6866
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investigation would reveal." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220, 526
P.2d 178, 180 (1974).
In the instant case, the testimony of Mr. Self from the assessor's office indicates that he
has often been called upon to provide and produce the records available through his and the
recorder'slclerk's office regarding public roadways, whether or not the same are of record in the
grantor/grantee index.
It would appear that the Defendant Fergel's position is that, unless the matter is of
record in the Grantor/Grantee index, that she, as a purchaser, is under no obligation to make
further investigations. Idaho case law disagrees with Ms. Fergel's position. Idaho case law as
well as the Colorado and Washington Supreme Court cases cited by Ms. Fergel in her
Memorandum all establish that Ms. Fergel is not entitled to ignore the visible and apparent
occupation and use of the east thirty feet of her property by a roadway in use by the general
public and by Trunnell and his predecessors, in particular. Ms. Fergel need only have inquired
of the county offices to determine that, indeed, a public roadway existed on the east thirty feet.
Good faith purchaser for value is not a defense which permits the "ostrich" Defendant
to place her head in the sand ignoring the obvious and apparent signals of a third party
conflicting claim. Therefore, the good faith purchaser defense is unavailing. This Court should
find for the Plaintiffs.

t1

DATED this/"'zday of March, 2010.

~ Law !firm cr.i
'Daniel P. !FtIltlierston
'Brent C. 7l!1ltlierston*
JeTem!f P. !FtIltlierston
Attmney.s at i.JnJI

Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certifY that on the \d--day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:

[ ] u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
rM Facsimile 208-265-9226
(] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Jonathan Cottrell, Chtd.
Attorney at Law
POBox 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BOHNER
FIRST JUDICIAL DIST.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual, )

Case No. CV 2007-0001292

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

AMENDED
MEMORANDUM DECISION

)
)
)

VERNA FERGEL, an individual,

)
)

Defendant.

)
)

Bonner County established County Road 32 in the beginning of the last
century, over 100 years ago. No action was taken, however, to record the
legal description of the road. It is no longer considered a county road and it is
not listed as such by Bonner County. In a case of first impression, the court
holds that Vema Fergel, a bona fide purchaser for value, who acquired title
without actual or constructive notice of the existence of a county road, takes
title free and clear of Mr. Trunnell's "county road" claim.

Having heard additional testimony presented by the parties, reviewed the evidence
submitted, and considered the parties' post-trial briefs, this Amended Memorandum
Decision shall serve as additional and amended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 4, 2009, a decision was made that one of the determinative factors in
resolving the issues in this case was the interpretation of the phrase "Roads laid out and
recorded as highways," as it is used in 1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875, which was in effect at the
time the Board of Bonner County Commissioners approved County Road 32. Section 875
provides in part:
Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of
commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, provided
the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or
located and recorded by order of the board of commissioners, are highways.

The plaintiff, Paul Trunnell, who is attempting to prove the establishment of County
Road 32 in 1910, asserts that County Road 32 became a public "highway" of record when
the county commissioners approved the legal description and the "Viewer's Report" in the
minutes of the Board of Bonner County Commissioners. Thus, Mr. Trunnell claims that the
term "recorded," as it is used in § 875, means recordation in either the Board of Bonner
County Commissioners' minutes or in the "Road Book" maintained by the county.
Conversely, the defendant, Vema Fergel, argues that the term "recorded" in the statute
means recordation in the Bonner County Recorder's Office.
The Court initially ruled that the applicable statute does not require the recording of
the survey and/or ordinance declaring the road to be a public highway in the county
recorder's office, but that "recording" in the board of county commissioners' minutes is
sufficient.
After announcing the decision, however, the Court conducted additional research of
both case law and statutory law. Upon review of these sources, and as authorized by Idaho
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION - 2 -
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Rule of Civil Procedure 60, the Court withdrew the September 4, 2009, decision sua sponte,
and requested briefs from the parties on the issue of whether Idaho, and/or any other
jurisdiction, has addressed the recordation requirement for the establishment of a public
road/highway. Each party was asked to present authority demonstrating how to interpret the
applicable Idaho statute or similar statutes of other states. The parties responded and filed
briefs.
After the completion of testimony, on May 1, 2009, the defendant moved to amend
her answer to include that she was a good faith purchaser for value.
amendment was granted by an order dated May 20, 2009.

The requested

On October 16, 2009, Paul

Trunnell filed a motion to reopen the evidence. The Court reopened the matter in order to
allow both sides to present additional testimony and to allow the parties to litigate the
additional defense.
On February 11, 2010, the Court heard further testimony. At the conclusion of this
last part of the trial, the parties were asked to submit briefs on the newly raised defense of
bona fide purchaser. After receipt of the briefs, the Court took the matter under advisement.

II. ANALYSIS
A.

The Law Regarding the Recordation Requirement
1.

The History 0 f the "Highway" Enactment Statute

The Idaho Supreme Court, in Boise City By and Through Amyx v. Fails, 94 Idaho
840, 499 P.2d 326 (1972), recites the history of Revised Statute § 851 (C.S. § 1304), as
follows:
[T]he 14th Session of the Territorial Legislature enacted the Revised Statutes
of Idaho .... The Revised Statutes of 1887 provided:
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Section 850. Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laid out
or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or
abandoned to the public.
Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the
Board of Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five
years, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll bridge or
a turnpike, plank or common wagon road is dissolved, or discontinues
the road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge or road
becomes a highway.
Section 852. A road not worked or used for the period of five years
ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever.
What was initially Rev. Statutes § 850 remained the law until it was repealed
by S.L.1950 (1st E.S.), Ch. 87, § 24, p. 117. Rev. Statutes 851 was amended
by S.L.1893, p. 12, § 1, to read as follows:
Section 851. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the
board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five
years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the
expense of the public or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways. Whenever any corporation owning a tollbridge, or a turnpike, plank, or common wagon road is dissolved or
discontinues the road or bridge, or has expired by limitation, the bridge
or road becomes a highway.' (Amended portion underscored.)

Id at 843,499 P.2d 329, at fu.2.
Revised Statutes § 851, as amended by S.L.1893, p. 12, § 1, was subsequently
codified as Revised Code § 875, and later as Compiled Statutes § 1304.
2.

The Creation of a Public Highway in 1908

Pursuant to Revised Code Section 875, which was in effect when County Road 32
was being considered by Bonner County, a highway could be established in two ways: (l) by
being "worked and kept up at the expense of the public," or (2) by being "laid out and
recorded as highways, by order of the board of commissioners."
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3.

John W Brown Properties v. Blaine County

Vema Fergel cites John WBrown Properties v. Blaine County, 129 Idaho 740, 932
P.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1997) and states that the Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled on the
requirement of "recording" with the county recorder's office and implies that such recording
is mandatory to create a county road. The operative language of the case as it relates to the
recording requirements in effect at the time the district court made its decision is set forth as
follows:
Under these provisions, public highways may be created by three means: (1)
A public road is created if it is laid out, recorded and opened as a highway in
the manner described in I.C. § 40-202(2), which includes either recordation
of any order, resolution or other documents establishing the county's interest
in the property for a highway system or inclusion of the road on the official
map of the county or highway district system; (2) A road may become a
public road if it is publicly used and maintained at public expense for a
period of five years; (3) A road will be deemed public if it is used by the
public for a period of five years and is located and recorded by order of the
county commissioners.

Id. at 743, 932 P.2d at 371.
In the Brown case, the district court concluded that the complaint alleged the
establishment of Grove Road as a county road based only on the methods which require
recordation by the board of commissioners and that the complaint did not plead a theory
based on the second statutory method, public use and county maintenance.

Through

affidavits, the defendants established that there was no recorded document indicating the
acceptance or creation of a public right of way over Grove Road by the commissioners of
Blaine County or its predecessor, Alturas County.

When Brown failed to refute this

evidence of lack of recordation, the district court granted summary judgment. 129 Idaho at
743,932 P.2d at 371.
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In conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals held:
Based upon the foregoing, the summary judgment issued by the district court
must be reversed with respect to Brown's claim that Grove Road became
established as a county road through public use and public maintenance. The
summary judgment is affirmed, however, insofar as it dismisses any claim
that is based upon creation of a public road through recordation of documents
by order of the county commissioners.
129 Idaho at 745,932 P.2d at 373.
The Brown case was appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did
not address the recordation issue, but did state in dicta:
The defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that Grove Road was
not a public road. The district court granted summary judgment on the
ground that Grove Road had not been established as a county road through
the recordation of documents. The court did not rule on the theory that Grove
Road had become a county road through public use and maintenance, which
the district court determined had not been raised specifically in the complaint.
When Brown appealed the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals held
that Brown's complaint was sufficient to encompass a claim that Grove Road
was rendered a public highway through public use and county maintenance
for a period of more than five years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
summary judgment only insofar as it dismissed any claim based upon the
creation of a public road through recordation of documents or by order o/the
county commissioners.
John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171, 173,59 P.3d 976, 978 (2002).
(Emphasis supplied).

By this dicta, it appears that the Idaho Supreme Court facility recognizes that a
county road can be created "by order of the county commissioners" without the necessity of
"recording" documents with the county recorder's office.
After reviewing the briefs submitted on appeal by Appellant John W. Brown
Properties, it does not appear that the same issue raised in Trunnell v. Fergel was raised in
the Brown Properties v. Blaine County case. No argument was urged by the appellant in the
Brown case that there are two potentially different interpretations of the word "recorded."
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION - 6 -

Thus, the interpretation of the tenn "recorded," as presented in this litigation, appears to be a
matter of first impression.

B.

The Creation of County Road 32
The evidence in this case shows that a fonnal petition for County Road 32 was

signed by affected landowners.

The county commissioners appointed "viewers." The

viewers returned a viewer's report ofthe road. The board then approved the road as a county
road by fonnal action at a county commissioners meeting. The road was recorded in the
county's "Road Book" as County Road No. 32. The process from beginning to end took
over one year and four months.
In detennining what was meant by the legislature'S use of the common word
"recorded," it is helpful to look at sources which existed around the time County Road 32
was being addressed.

Was the tenn "recorded" being used in the context of the

commissioner's "Minute Book," or was it used as it is used in today's legal parlance, to refer
to filing with the county recorder's office? One of the few sources that touch on the subject
is the case of Meservey v. Guilliford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 780 (1908). Pursuant to the
Revised Statutes of 1887, Section 1754, all of the boards of county commissioners were
required to keep a "Minute Book" and a "Road Book" at the time County Road 32 was being
considered. In deciding whether the appointment of a road overseer was properly "recorded"
in the county Minute Book or the county Road Book, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in
Meservey v. Guilliford:
It appears from the record that the minutes of the board of county

commissioners contained a record of the appointment of the respondent road
overseer, and that record was introduced in evidence, supplementing the
testimony of the road overseer himself to the effect that he had been duly
appointed road overseer. It is contended that under our law (section 1754,
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION - 7 -

Rev. St. 1887) that the board is required to have kept a book known as the
"Road Book," which must contain all proceedings and adjudications relating
to the establishment, maintenance, change, and discontinuance of roads and
road districts and overseers thereof, their reports and acts, and that that book
was the best evidence of the appointment of said road overseer, and under the
provisions of section 853, Rev. St., the clerk of the board of county
commissioners is required to keep a book in which he must record separately
all proceedings of the board relative to each road district, including orders,
laying out, altering, and opening roads, etc., and it is contended that such
books are the primary and best evidence of the appointment of a road
overseer. Under the provisions of section 1754, Rev. St. 1887, the board is
required to keep a minute book in which must be recorded all orders and
decisions made by them, and the daily proceedings had at all regular and
special sessions; and under the Laws 1899, p. 248, the board of county
commissioners, at the adjournment of each session of the board, is required to
publish a statement such as will clearly give notice to the public of all acts
and proceedings of the board. Said "Minute Book," if it contains all orders
and decisions made by the board, certainly is the book of original entry as to
the appointment of road overseers, although a "Road Book" is required to
show that fact also. (Emphasis added).
Id., at 144-145, 93 P. 780, 783-784 (1908). (Emphasis supplied).
In addition, the commissioners' actions should be considered in searching for the

appropriate statutory interpretation. It is obvious the commissioners were familiar with the
requirement imposed by the road creation statute. It is also obvious from the pre-printed
road petition documents used by the landowners and viewers that there was a formal process
for the creation of a road. All indications point to the fact that the commissioners were
diligent in the exercise of their duties. The commissioners followed the requirements of the
existing statute, even stamping "approved" on the viewer's report.
In construing the action of the Bonner County Commissioners in regard to Road 32,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by public officers.
Homer v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114,695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985).

From examining the sources available and after due consideration of the parties'
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legal arguments, the conclusion is reached that the term "recorded," as used in the relevant
statute, was intended to mean an act undertaken by the board of county commissioners. The
term "recorded," in the context of the commissioners' actions, means the act of recording the
decision to accept the road in the minutes and/or recording it in Bonner County's Road
Book. The term "recorded" is to be given its literal interpretation as applicable to the time
when the statute was written.
The evidence presented and the actions of the Bonner County Commissioners create
a satisfactory record showing the establishment of County Road No. 32 as a public road
pursuant to the requirements of 1 Idaho Code Ann. § 875, which was the operative law in
1908.

This court again concludes that the phrase "recorded by order of the board of

commissioners" does not mandate the recording of the road description or the recording of
the actions of the county commissioners in the recorder's office.
By this reference, the court also adopts the reasoning set forth in the Plaintiff s brief
which was filed on October 16,2009, to reach this legal conclusion.
Having reached the conclusion that County Road 32 was created does not end the
discussion. The additional issue of the defense of a "Bona Fide Purchaser" was tried in
February of2010.

C.

Bona Fide Purchaser Defense
1.

Legal Precepts

Idaho Code § 55-810 states:
Grants and conveyances absolute in terms, are to be recorded in one set of
books and mortgages in another or in an approved electronic storage system
containing segregated searchable and retrieval files.
Idaho Code § 55-811 provides:
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Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified,
and recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder
for record, is constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent
purchasers and mortgage e)es.
Every conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified,
and recorded as prescribed by law, and which is executed by one who
thereafter acquires an interest in said real property by a conveyance which is
constructive notice as aforesaid, is, from the time such latter conveyance is
filed with the recorder for record, constructive notice of the contents thereof
to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees.
Idaho Code § 55-812 states:
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding
one (1) year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the
same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded .
•

Idaho Code § 55-813 defines the term "conveyance":
The term "conveyance" as used in this chapter, embraces every instrument in
writing by which any estate or interest in real property is created, alienated,
mortgaged or encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be
affected, except wills.
Idaho Code § 55-603 provides that if an easement encumbers real property, such
easement passes with the land:
A transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates
in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person whose
estate is transferred, in the same manner and to the same extent as such
property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is
transferred, for the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed
upon or completed.
The purpose of the recording requirement is to make recorded interests effective
against unrecorded interests. To be effective, however, the recorded interest must be taken
for consideration and in good faith, i.e., without knowledge, either actual or constructive,
that an unrecorded interest exists. Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220, 526 P.2d 178,
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180 (1974). In order to be a "good faith purchaser" pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-812, one
may not purchase real property with notice of inconsistent claims. Estate of Skvorak v.
Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16,22,89 P.3d 856, 862 (2004) (citing Langroise v.
Becker, supra).

A person who purchases with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in good
faith, and a purchaser who fails to investigate the open or obviously inconsistent claims
cannot take title in "good faith." Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho at 221, 526 P2d at 181. If a
reasonable investigation of the real property would reveal the existence of a conflicting
claim, a person cannot be a good faith purchaser. Id
In regard to what "notice" the purchaser must observe, one claiming title is
chargeable with notice of everything which appears on the face of any recorded deed
forming an essential link in the chain of title. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 196, 30
P.3d 970,974 (2001).
In Kalange v. Rencher, the Idaho Supreme Court went on to explain:
The primary purpose of the recording statutes is to give notice to others that
an interest is claimed in real property. The design of the recording statutes
compels the recording of instruments affecting title, for the ultimate purpose
of permitting purchasers to rely upon the record title. In addition to giving
notice to others that an interest is claimed in real property, the recording
statutes give protection against bonafide third parties who may be dealing in
the same property. See Haugh v. Smelick, 126 Idaho 481, 887 P.2d 26
(1993), quoting Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 761, 572 P.2d 861, 864
(1977).

Id.

2.

Additional Findings of Fact

This section of the decision sets forth additional findings of fact.
The unrebutted testimony of Dan Hunt, a title examiner with Alliance Title
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Company, is that a search of all recorded documents in the Fergel chain of title, from the
formation of the Idaho Territory to the present, discloses that no instrument, judgment, or
any other document has ever been recorded either establishing or otherwise mentioning
County Road 32.
Verna Fergel and her husband purchased their real property in 1991. The Fergel' s
deed, Exhibit 0, was recorded on September 5, 1991.
Verna Fergel's uncontroverted testimony is that she and her husband had no
knowledge of any county road being where Mr. Trunnell now claims that there is one. The
Fergels received and reviewed a title search report before purchasing their property. This
report did not mention County Road 32 or any other public right of way, except the east-west
county road which is known as River Road, along the parcel's north boundary. Similarly,
their deed makes no mention of County Road 32 or any other public right of way.
A physical inspection of the real property would not have caused a prudent person to
believe that there was a public right of way, i.e., a "county road" across Ms. Fergel's
property. There were no traffic controls, signs, or markings, and there were also no culverts,
bridges, ditches, or other structures. Unlike county roads nearby, the two wheel tracks
across the property showed no sign of public work or maintenance. Nothing about the wheel
tracks distinguished this "road" or "lane" in any way from any other private driveway or
road.
The two wheel tracks lead southwest, away from the property now owned by Mr.
Trunnell, and to a home owned by the Painters. Both Verna Fergel and Paul Trunnell
testified that the wheel tracks were entirely outside the fence between the Trunnell and
Painter properties and that they did not run over any part of the Trunnell property. The
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Fergels would have had no reason to inquire whether the lane indicated an interest held by
the public because her title report and deed disclosed that there were private easement rights
over this route.
No witness claims to have ever seen any public employee, workman, contractor,
machine, equipment, tool, material, or supplies anywhere on or along the wheel tracks that
cross the Fergel property. Every witness who testified to any maintenance of the road
testified to maintenance done solely by private individuals and solely at private expense.
Karleen Neumann testified that sportsmen, wood cutters, and others crossed the
property occasionally. There was no evidence that any such person did so regularly and
continuously or on a daily basis. There 'is no evidence that Verna Fergel ever saw any such
use of the road before she and her husband purchased the real property.
There is no evidence that before the break up of the Neumann farm in 2000 and 2001
that anyone had ever claimed that the lane across Ms. Fergel's property was any kind of
public road or that anyone referred to it as a public road.
It is unrebutted that when a neighbor, Louis Neumann, wanted to use the road over
the Painter and Fergel properties, he asked permission.
The road petition, the commissioners' order, and the commissioners' minutes are
"official documents" and "public records." They are "on file" in the office of the county
clerk and/or the county assessor. But as testified to and stipulated, these documents have not
been recorded with the county recorder.
None of the records creating County Road 32 are indexed in the manner provided for
in Idaho Code § 31-2404. The minutes of the county commissioner's proceedings are kept
in the county recorder's vault. The uncontested testimony of Chief Deputy Recorder Cindy
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Brannon is that these are not "recorded;" they are not assigned a "reception number;" and
they are not indexed by grantor, grantee, geographic location, subject matter, or in any other
way. As Ms. Brannon testified, the only way to find anything in these minutes is to read
through them page by page and line by line.
Even if an individual tried to determine whether the road was public, there would be
problems. Chuck Spickelmire, who was the Director of Public Works for Bonner County,
testified that he was in charge of all public roads and public rights of way in Bonner County
before he retired. Specific records relating to roads were kept under his supervision. He
stated that Bonner County is required to note in its "Road Book" and on the "County Road
Map" all of the public roads of the county. There is no county road listed in either source as
County Road 32. The county roads department had no record of any county road over the
Fergel real property. Had the Fergels inquired as to whether the lane on the property was a
"county road," they would have been told that it was not by the county road supervisor,
whose responsibility it was to know the answer to the inquiry. Judicial notice is also taken
of the fact that in this litigation, when the county was a party, Bonner County denied that the
access in question was a county road.
3.

Discussion

As outlined above, the Fergels purchased their real property without any knowledge,
actual or constructive, that Bonner County had at one time accepted "County Road 32." Mr.
Trunnell, however, researched some of the county records and found that such a county road
did exist. He believes that the county road still exists because there has been no action
undertaken that would result in the cessation of the existence of County Road 32. Thus, a
conflict arises in regard to the effect of the recording statutes as contrasted with the effect the
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road creation statutes will have on prospective purchasers. Unfortunately, in very real terms,
both Mr. Trunnell and Ms. Fergel are paying the price in attorneys' fees to have this issue
decided. As is often the case in a relatively young state which is not heavily populated, the
issue presented in this case has not been decided by any Idaho appellate court.
The public policy conflict raised by the circumstances in this case are readily
apparent. If a road number is placed in a "Road Book" in the early part of the last century
and the description of the road is not recorded, what notice is given to prospective
purchasers or encumbrancers? To make such a record without indexing it in the grantor and
grantee indices makes it part of a plethora of records which are almost impossible to search.
The Recording Act's purpose is to provide "notice." In order to do so an "electronic
storage system" which contains "segregated searchable and retrievable files is an option."
Idaho Code § 55-810. Once documents are filed with the county recorder for record, such is
constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. Idaho
Code § 55-811.
The main thrust of Mr. Trunnell's position is that the actions of the county
commissioners in 1910 in accepting County Road 32 should result in notice, or, at the very
least, "constructive" notice of the road to all citizens. Such an interpretation is certainly
logical for the year of 1910. But what consequences would such a rule of law have on
business and society if all documents maintained "of record" by county and state officials are
to result in notice or constructive notice of their contents even though they have never been
recorded? Holding that such documents provides "record notice" would wreak havoc on the
stability and certainty of land titles for land purchasers, real estate brokers, and title
insurance companies. The end result would be chaos if every piece of paper or computer file
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in every governmental office is to be "of record" in relation to land titles, encumbrances, and
interests.
It seems far more prudent to require that "notice" and "constructive notice" must

come from entries made in the "Books of Record" identified in Idaho Code § 55-810 and
that such Books of Record serve as notice pursuant to Idaho Code § 55-811. From the briefs
submitted by the parties and a review of the cases cited, three states have adopted this
position. See City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P .2d 90 (Colo. 1991), State v. Anderson,
241 Ind. 184,170 N.E. 2d, 812 (1960), and Ellingsen v. Franklin County, 117 Wash, 2d 24,
810 P.2d 910 (1991).
III. CONCLUSION

County Road 32 was designated as a county road by the county commissioners in
1910.

Substantial compliance with the then existing applicable statutes regarding the

creation of county roads occurred.

Neither the legal description of the road nor the

ordinance approving the road was recorded, however.
Under the facts presented, Vema Fergel took title without actual or constructive
notice of the county road and was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration. Pursuant
to the reasoning set forth in this decision, Ms. Fergel took title free and clear of any
encumbrance of County Road 32.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

ZGf'1-day of May, 2010.
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ISB NO. 1353
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
PAUL TRUNNELL and
BILL LOMU,

Case No. CV-2007-1292
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant.
The above captioned cause having been tried to the court, and the court
having made findings of fact and conclusions thereon,
Now, therefore, judgment is hereby entered that:
1.

Defendant Vema Fergel is the owner in fee of the following described

real property, hereafter referred to herein as the Fergel Property:
That portion of the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 34, Township 55 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian,
Bonner County, Idaho, described as follows:
COMMENCING at the Southwest comer of said Northeast Quarter
of the Southwest Quarter;
THENCE East along the South line of said Northeast Quarter of the
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Southwest Quarter a distance of 590 feet to the True Point of
Beginning;
THENCE North 883 feet more or less, to the Southerly right of way
of the existing county road;
THENCE Southeast along said right of way 781 feet, more or less, to
the East line of said Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter;
THENCE South along said line 605 feet more or less, to the South
line of said Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter;
THENCE West along said line 725 feet, more or less, to the True
Point of Beginning.
2. Plaintiff Paul Trunnell is the owner in fee of the following described real
property, hereafter referred to herein as the Trunnell Property:
PARCEL 1 Government Lot 3, Section 3, Township 54 North,
Range 3 East, Boise Meridian; and
Government Lot 2, Section 3, Township 54 North, Range 3 East,
Boise Meridian, except that part of said Government Lot 2 described
as follows:
Beginning at the northwest comer of said Government Lot 2; thence
South to the Southwest comer of said Government Lot 2;
Thence East 12 rods;
Thence North parallel to the West line of said Government Lot 2 to
the North line of said Government Lot 2;
Thence West to the Place of Beginning;
Except existing county road right-of-way.
PARCEL 2 the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 34, Township 55 North, Range 3 East, Boise Meridian,
Bonner County, Idaho;
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Except existing county road right-of-way.
3. The Fergel Property is not encumbered by or servient to any public
easement or other right of way for what has previously been designated in the minutes
and records of the Bonner County Commissioners as County Road 32.
4. There is no easement or other right, in favor of or appurtenant to the
Trunnell Property, which is an encumbrance upon the Fergel Property or of which the
F ergel Property is the servient estate.
5. Plaintiffs hold no right, title or interest in the Fergel Property.
6. All claims of Plaintiffs against Defendant, including Plaintiffs' claims
alleging intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage and alleging
injury to the Trunnell Property, are dismissed with prejudice.
7. The Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party.
Dated this

t;/PL.day of J ~

,

2010.

~~
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
Date signed: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Brent C. Featherston
Attorney for Plaintiff Paul Trunnell
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113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
ClerklDeputy Clerk

A/I j, /ar ,I-

'1YJt{!/ IeI' Aisit-Ief ~wf

JUDGMENT

4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,)

Case No. CV 2007-0001292

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

VERNA FERGEL, an individual, )
)

Defendant.

)

----------------------)
With respect to the issues detennined by the Judgment entered on July 6, 2010, it is
hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, that
the court has detennined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment
and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment shall be a final judgment
upon which an appeal may' be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this

~ day of July, 2010.
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prepaId, thIS -I- day of July, 2010, to:
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Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
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P.O. Box 874
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Fax #: (208) 265-9226

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,
Plaintiff!Appellant,
VERNA FERGEL,
DefendantlRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2007-1292

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

-----------------------------)
TO:
THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, VERNA FERGEL, AND YOUR
ATTORNEY, JONATHAN COTTRELL, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Paul Trunnell, appeals against the above-named

Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment entered in the aboveentitled action on July 6, 2010, and certified as final pursuant to 1.R.c.P. 54(b) on July 7,
~ .£Jzw 1'{rm """
'l:JatULf P. !JtIltfrmton
'.8Tt1lt C. 7t1ltlierston*

Jeremy P.

2010, by the Honorable District Judge Steve Verby presiding.

!JtIltfrmton

Attorneys .t lAW
113 S. Second J1w .
.54n4point; 140M 83864
(208) 263·6866
~aJC(208}

26.HUOO

.. Li.c4!n.seiin.
ILa./io &' .rw4Sliinllton

NOTICE OF APPEAL - I

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant
to Rule 11 (a),I.A.R.
3.

Appellant submits the following issues on appeal and also reserves right to

identify issues on appeal at a later date:
a.

Did the District Court err in permitting the Defendant to amend her

Answer three (3) weeks after the trial to add a defense of Bona Fide Purchaser under I.e. §
55-812?
b.

Did the District Court err in its Amended Memorandum Decision by

finding that the Defendant's Bona Fide Purchaser defense defeats a validly created public
road?
c.

Did the District Court err in finding that Ms. Fergel was a Bona Fide

Purchaser when the road was visible and in use for in excess of fifty (50) years and was the
subject of prior litigation nearly seventy (70) years ago?
d.

Did the District court err in finding that Ms. Fergel was a Bona Fide

Purchaser because the road lacked traffic controls, signs or markings or other indications of
the road's "public" nature to distinguish it from a "private" road?
e.

Did the District Court err in finding that Ms. Fergel's Bona Fide

Purchaser defense defeats a validly created public road because Ms. Fergel was not on notice
of the "public" nature of the existing roadway?
~ Law j'frm cMl
'Danid P. :Teathmtmt
'.Brent C. 7"t!Ilthmwn'
,ernny P. :Teathmtmt

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

J4ttqmeys at lA'uI

U3 S. Seco"" .It"..
S4m1point; I d'alio 83864
(208J 263-6866

7tV({208) 263-0400

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested?

Yes.

(b)

The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript:
1.

The Reporter's Standard Transcript, Rille 25( c), I.A.R.,

including the following specific hearings or proceedings:

6.

a.

Trial proceedings April 28-30, 2009;

b.

Defendant's Motion to Amend May 20, 2009;

c.

Closing Arguments July 8, 2009

d.

Court's Decision September 4, 2009

e.

Plaintiffs Motion to Reopen Evidence December 10,
2009; and

f.

Subsequent trial February 11,2010.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's

Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
Clerk's Standard Record per I.A.R. 28 together with all pretrial and post-trial briefs
submitted by the parties.
7.

I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter.
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for the

preparation of the reporter's transcript upon receipt of such estimate from the Court Reporter.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid or
will be paid upon receipt of such estimate.
'f;tRIimtm .£4w ,-Inn cs.i

(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

1JanidP. 7t1ltliersum
'BrtlIt C.

:Tt!Iltlimton'

Jert1tI!/ P. 7t1ltlimton
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H3 S. Secotuf.!tw.
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(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

DATED this .a.1ay of August, 2010.
W FIRM, CHTD.

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Plaintiff!Appellant

CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered this
day of August, 2010, to the following people in the manner indicated:
Ms. Marie Scott
Clerk of the Court
Bonner County Courthouse
P.O. Box 1336
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Overnight mail
[,f Hand delivered
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ __

Ms. Val Larson
Official Court Reporter
First Judicial District
215 S. First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Overnight mail
[vf Hand delivered
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ __

Jonathan W. Cottrell, Esq.
JONATHAN W. COTTRELL, Chtd.
P.O. Box 874
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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TO:

Clerk of the Court
Bonner County Courthouse
215 South First Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

M!\,~IE SCUTT

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

D£frry

CASE NO. CV 2007-1292
DOCKET NO.
37984-2010
PAUL TRUNNELL
vs
VERNA FERGEL

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on November 12, 2010,

I

lodged the transcripts from the Court Trial held on April
28-30, 2009 (498 Pages); Defendant's Motion to Amend on May 20,
2009 (22 Pages); Closing Arguments on July 8, 2009 (29 Pages);
Court's Decision on September 4, 2009 (16 Pages); Plaintiff's
Motion to Reopen Evidence December 10, 2009 (18 Pages); and
Subsequent Court Trial on February 11, 2010 (129 Pages),
proceedings totaling 712 pages for the above-referenced case
with the District Court Clerk of the County of Bonner in the
First JUdicial District.

~tr~
Va~ie

. arson
November 12, 2010

VALERIE E. LARSON
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
BONNER COUNTY COURTHOUSE
215 SOUTH FIRST AVENUE
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864
PHONE: (208) 265-1445

November 12, 2010

STATEMENT
Appeal transcripts in the case of Paul Trunnell v Verna Fergel,
Case No. CV 2007-1292.
Docket No. 37984-2010
Ap r i 1 2 8 - 3 0 , 2009 499 Pages @ $3.25
Court Trial
May 20, 2009
23 Pages @ $3.25
Defendant's Motion to Amend
July 8, 2009
30 Pages @ $3.25
Closing Arguments
17 Pages @ $3.25
September 4, 2009 Judge's Decision
December 10, 2009 19 Pages @ $3.25
Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Evidence
February 11, 2010 130 Pages @ $3.25
Subsequent Court Trial
TOTAL PAGES

718 Pages

@

$3.25

Lilli

$1,621.75
$

74.75

$

97.50

$

55.25

$

61.75

$

422.50

$2,333.50

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
SUPREME COURT NO 37984-2010

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is offered as the Clerk's
exhibit on appeal:
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Bonner County's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed October 24, 2008
Law Memorandum Regarding Recordation Requirement for Public Roads filed
October 19, 2009
Defendant's Law Memorandum Regarding Bona Fide Purchaser filed February 26,
2010
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this
of December, 2010.
Marie Scott
Clerk of the District Court

/
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits

In the upreme Court of the

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and

I'

BILL LOMU,

il

Plaintiff,

I

!

v.

II

VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant~ Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

of

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 37984-2010
Bonner County Docket No. 2007-1292

A MOTl(:!N TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT OF GROill,jns was
filed by counsel for Appellant on April 27, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below,
copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXHIBITS:
1. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 - Quitclaim Deeds from J.W. Roylance Construction, Inc. to Paul
Trunnell, filed on August 14, 2007 by the Bonner County Recorders Office as
Instrument Nos. 735129 and 735130 in the records of Bonner County, Idaho;
2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 - Quitclaim Deed from Kathy Neumann to Paul Trunnell filed on
February 13,2008 by the Bonner County Recorders Office as Instrument No. 746201 in
the records of Bonner County, Idaho;
3. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 - Warranty Deed between Johnson and Bethel reserving an
easement for ingress, egress and utilities recorded December 31, 1975 in the records of
Bonner County, Idaho s Instrument No. 171685;
4. Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 - Right of way Deed, Instrument No. 85319;
5. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 - U.S. Forest Service Aerial Photo dated August 24, 1958;
6. Plaintiff's Exhibit 25A - 20" x 24" Google Map - not attached because the map was not
capable of reproduction by the Bonner County Clerk, instead a smaller verSIOn,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25, is attached;
7. Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 - Right of Way Deed;
8. Plaintiff's Exhibit 34 - Public Road Petition;
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9. Plaintiffs Exhibit 35 - Engineer's Report;
10. Plaintiffs Exhibit 36 - Bond of Road Petitioners;
11. Plaintiffs Exhibit 37 - Board Minutes 1-17-1910;
12. Plaintiffs Exhibit 38 - Lund v. Silta, Bonner County Case No. 3184 (192811930)
Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
13. Plaintiffs Exhibit 39 - Index to County Road Photocopy;
14. Plaintiff's Exhibit 40 - Index to Court Road Photocopy;
15. Defendant's Exhibit A - Aerial Photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V";
16. Defendant's Exhibit B - Aerial Photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" area detail in S liz Sec 34;
17. Defendant's Exhibit C - Aerial Photo "8-25-58 DOR-9V" area detail with Fergel and
Trunnell properties;
18. Defendant's Exhibit D - Aerial Photo, Google 2008 Tele Atlas;
19. Defendant's Exhibit E - Area Map, USGS, Cabinet Quadrangle, ID-MT 1997;
20. Defendant's Exhibit F - Easement Huff to United States of America, for electric
transmission line, November 2, 1950, Gook 17 of Miscellaneous, Page 227, Instrument
No. 36425;
21. Defendant's Exhibit G - Easement Huff to Washington Water Power Company for
public utilities, recorded February 1, 1952, Book 18 of Miscellaneous, Page 193,
Instrument No. 40999;
22. Defendant's Exhibit H - Right of Way Deed, Huff to Bonner County for purpose of a
public highway (now named River Road), recorded June 11, 1957, Instrument No.
61367;
23. Defendant's Exhibit I - Warranty Deed Payne to Johnson, Instrument No. 171891;
24. Defendant's Exhibit J - Warranty Deed, Johnson to Bethel, easement reserved for
ingress, egress and utilities, recorded December 31, 1975, Instrument No. 171685;
25. Defendant's Exhibit K - Easement Antrosio to Lagerquist for maintenance, repair and
replacement of present water line, recorded October 31,1990, Instrument No. 382540;
26. Defendant's Exhibit L - Easement Angrosio to Painter for maintenance repair,
replacement of present water line, recorded November 13, 1990, Instrument No.
383041;
27. Defendant's Exhibit M - Agreement among Antrosio-Lagerquist-Painter regarding
maintenance of water supply, recorded January 16, 1991, Instrument No. 385466;
28. Defendant's Exhibit N - Easement to Northern Lights, Inc. for public utilities, recorded
November 22, 1991, Instrument No. 398285;
29. Defendant's Exhibit 0 - Warranty Deed, Angrosio to Fergel, Instrument No. 394764;
30. Defendant's Exhibit P - Affidavit of Survivorship, surviving spouse Verna 1. Fergel,
Instrument No. 519878;
31. Defendant's Exhibit Q - Articles of Agreement, Kingston to Moore and Neumann, May
14,1958, Instrument No. 90431;
32. Defendant's Exhibit R - Assignment of Contract Moore to Neumann, May 17, 1963,
Instrument No. 90432;
33. Defendant's Exhibit S - Warranty Deed, Kingston to Moore and Neumann, May 14,
1958, recorded April 20, 1978, Instrument No. 199_, Bk 173 of Deeds, Pg 479;
34. Defendant's Exhibit T - Trust Agreement, The Neumann Family Trust, July 19, 1990,
Instrument No. 378067;
35. Defendant's Exhibit U - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karleen Neumann,
ORDER GRANTING

Instrument No. 565709;
36. Defendant's Exhibit V - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et ux.,
Instrument No. 582371;
37. Defendant's Exhibit W - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Karl Neumann et ux.,
Instrument No. 582373
38. Defendant's Exhibit X - Deed of Distribution by Trustee to Kathy Neumann et ux.,
Instrument No. 582372; and
39. Defendant's Exhibit Y - Map

Itt- of May, 2011.
DATED this ~
For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon,Ctlerk
cc: Counsel of Record
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
VERNA FER GEL,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
SUPREME COURT NO 37984-2010

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)
)

I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was
compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the
pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this
day of December, 2010.

Marie Scott
Clerk of the District Court

Clerk's Certificate

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

PAUL TRUNNELL, an individual,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
vs.
VERNA FERGEL,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SUPREME COURT NO 37984-2010

I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served or
mailed, by United Parcel Service, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys
of Record in this cause as follows:
BRENT FEATHERSTON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE
SANDPOINT ID 83864

JONATHAN COTTRELL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 874
SANDPOINT ID 83864

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this :1'/~ day of
201i.
Marie Scott
Clerk of the District Court

Clerk's Certificate of Service

